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Abstract 
This thesis takes as its starting point the question whether European Works Councils 
(EWCs) can overcome the divisive pressures of cross-border competition for jobs and 
investment between sites. A review of the body of literature on EWCs yields that with 
respect to this question, opinion is divided and examples are contradictory.  The 
central works council (CWC) established according to the German 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz is identified as a close analogue to an EWC.  In the absence of a 
body of literature on the internal functioning of CWCs, this research undertook to 
examine in depth the experience of a single CWC as a lead case.  As an analytical 
framework, the contributions of theories of federalism as a means of reconciling unity 
and diversity were applied to the multi-level system of employee interest 
representation. A conceptualisation of solidarity as it might be generated among the 
members of a central and/or European works council is developed. It is concluded that 
a discursive/participative structure is most likely to enable the generation of solidarity 
across and within a multi-level, essentially federalist system. Key analytical factors are 
identified which are applied to the experience of the Central Works Council at 
DaimlerChrysler, and to EWCs more generally. Applying the methods of participant 
observation, semi-structured interviews with the CWC members, documentary 
analysis, and a postal survey of the local works council members, the operation of the 
central works council at DaimlerChrysler is explored in detail, covering its day-to-day 
functioning, its articulation with local works councils, and the values and expectations 
underlying its work. With reference to the conceptual framework, the findings from 
the case study are compared with EWC law and practice more generally. It is 
concluded that the EWC can be considered a nascent federalist system at most. Despite 
the existence of important gaps, however, this research concludes that solidarity within 
EWCs is possible if it can be built upon a participative and transparent set of 
institutions and processes which are seen by EWC members, national and local 
employee representatives, and trade unions to be fair and legitimate. The final chapter 
explores the implications of this research for policy, practice and further research.  
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Seldom, very seldom does complete truth belong to any human disclosure; seldom 
can it happen that something is not a little disguised, or a little mistaken.  
 
Jane Austen, Emma 
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Chapter One: Introduction and Overview 
1.1. Introduction  
Are European Works Councils only fair weather institutions? Fuelled by an increasing 
integration of management strategies and production, it has become a common 
strategy for management to try to extract concessions from trade unions and workplace 
employee representatives by threatening to withhold or withdraw investment and 
production capacities. With the deepening integration of the European economy in 
particular, this amounts to attempts to play sites in different countries against one 
another.  
By providing a forum in which to exchange information and to coordinate local and/or 
national strategies, European Works Councils (EWC) could be an instrument to 
counter cross-site competition.  Yet many commentators have implicitly or explicitly 
argued that even if EWCs can play a useful role in times of low conflict, the in-built – if 
at times latent – competition between sites for jobs and investments means that EWCs 
will not be able to overcome the divisive effects of such coercive comparisons.   
The problem of cross-site competition is not new, however. Nor is the idea that a 
central institution which brings together employee representatives from different sites 
allows them to develop at least a partial solution to this dilemma: aside from the 
disciplining effect of obliging the employer to say the same thing to all representatives 
at the same time, such an institution can provide an invaluable framework for the 
exchange of information and, where appropriate, the coordination of local strategies in 
the face of a common threat. Many German Gesamtbetriebsräte (central works councils), 
for example, or French comités de groupe perform precisely this role.  
This was the starting point to this research. If  a German Gesamtbetriebsrat, for example, 
can be considered analogous to an EWC, in the sense that both are cross-site forums for 
the representation and defence of the employees’ interests, then surely there must be a 
wealth of experience about the ways in which potential conflicts of interest can be 
handled in that forum if and when they arise.  By drawing on the lessons learned 
within central works councils (CWC), perhaps the discussion about the prospects for 
solidarity could be moved beyond the exchange of positive and negative examples of 
EWCs’ ability to respond to whipsawing strategies.  
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So how do central works councils function? Is there a conscious strategy to identify 
collective interests? How do CWCs decide how much differentiation is possible and 
how much uniformity is necessary? What promotes or hinders solidarity? What are its 
limits and opportunities? If solidarity can be generated in central works councils, can it 
be also be generated across borders within EWCs?  These are the overarching questions 
which guide this research.  
1.2. Overview 
In the absence of existing research about how central works councils actually function, 
this thesis therefore sets out to investigate the practical workings of a particularly 
integrative central works council in order to identify the lessons to be learned for the 
perspective of solidarity within EWCs.  
Against the backdrop of the increasing europeanisation of company strategies, Chapter 
Two takes stock of what is known about the ability of EWCs to deal with potential 
conflicts of interest, particularly as they may arise in the course of cross-border 
restructuring processes. The existing if meagre body of knowledge about the ways in 
which German central works councils function is also examined.  
In the absence of existing conceptualisations of the role and potential of CWCs, 
Chapter Three explores the ways in which the German multi-level system of interest 
representation, consisting of local, central, and group works councils, can be 
understood to be a federalist system which provides the means to accommodate both 
unity and diversity. The implications of democratic theory, in particular the 
contributions of notions of consociational democracy, are linked to the primarily 
organisational and policy-oriented characteristics of federalism. The meaning of and 
prerequisites for solidarity are discussed, and its relationship to federalism and 
democracy is explored. On this basis, the chapter identifies the key analytical issues 
which are needed to explain the way the CWC — and by analogy an EWC — can 
generate solidarity.  
This research is necessarily explorative. Chapter Four explains the methodological 
implications of the central questions of this research and describes the research design 
and methods which were employed to gather and analyse appropriate data.  
The case study of the Central Works Council at DaimlerChrysler which follows in 
Chapter Five provides a detailed analysis of the ways in which such an essentially 
federalist and pluralist system of multi-level employee interest representation 
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functions in practice to generate and affirm a fundamental willingness to exercise 
solidarity.  
Chapter Six discusses the implications of these findings for the perspective of solidarity 
in European Works Councils. While EWCs may also be considered essentially 
federalist, compared to CWCs there are important limitations to their ability to 
generate solidarity.  The concluding Chapter Seven discusses the implications of this 
research for policy, practice, and further research.   
 15
Chapter Two: A Review of the Literature 
12.1. The state of play of EWC research
Over time, the dynamic development of EWCs as a new European institution of 
employee interest representation has given rise to a wide variety of parallel streams of 
inquiry; this variety can be seen in both the range of issues addressed and the ways in 
which they were addressed.  
Changing agendas of EWC research over time  
The chronological development of EWC research clearly mirrors EWC practice; 
research approaches and focal questions shifted and changed over a relatively short 
span of time, taking into account an emerging and rapidly developing field of practice.  
Early EWC research, when the prospect of statutory transnational employee 
representation seemed a far off prospect for some policymakers and trade unionists, 
was inspired by the political objective of supporting the struggle for the adoption of 
European legislation on information and consultation within European-scale 
companies2. The investigation of the handful of truly voluntary EWCs sought to 
underpin political pressure on European policymakers and to prove to reluctant 
employers that the establishment of EWCs would not necessarily lead companies into 
economic ruin (see for example Gold and Hall 1992, Lecher 1994, Rehfeldt 1994, Stoop 
1994). Another stream of inquiry at that time was the analysis of the factors that 
contributed to the emergence of the first voluntary European-level information and 
consultation arrangements. Based on the analysis of the first French and German 
initiatives, the contributions by Northrup et al (1988), Schulten (1992), Marginson (1992 
and 1994), and Streeck and Vitols (1995) demonstrated that the establishment of the 
first pioneer EWCs could be explained by the interplay between country-specific, 
sector-specific, and company-specific factors.  
The period immediately following the adoption of the EWC Directive in 1994 saw the 
emergence of a considerable body of “implementation research” (Lecher 1996), which 
                                           
1 This section draws heavily on an extensive review of EWC literature by Müller and Hoffmann (2001). 
2 European legislative initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s included the draft ‘Fifth’ company law Directive 
(1972 and 1973), the draft so-called ‘Vredeling Directive’ (1980 and 1983) and the draft Directive for a 
European Company Statute (1970 and 1975). 
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involved a predominantly legal discussion about the transposition of the EWC 
Directive into national law (Blanpain and Windey 1994, Blanpain and Hanami 1995, 
Bercusson 1996).  
Quantitative and qualitative research on EWCs  
As the number of voluntarily concluded EWC agreements increased almost 
exponentially between September 1994 and September 1996, the analysis of the 
structural and operational features of these agreements became increasingly prominent 
in EWC research (Krieger and Bonneton 1995, Carley and Hall 1996, Rivest 1996, 
Knudsen and Bruun 1998, and Marginson et al. 1998). Reflecting the intimate 
relationship between EWC practice and EWC research, this stream of analysis had 
another peak in 1999/2000, as more and more agreements under the provisions of 
Article 6 were concluded (EWCB 1999a, 1999b, Carley and Marginson 2000; Lecher et 
al. 2001b).  
Meanwhile, as more empirical material and experiences became available after 
1996/1997, there was a steep increase in case study research on the actual practice of 
existing EWCs. Over the course of time, case study analyses of EWC practice became 
more differentiated, as specific factors which were assumed to influence the internal 
dynamics and the effectiveness of EWCs were isolated and investigated.  
A number of studies investigated the influence of (external) structural factors, such as 
national employee representation structures. For example, the in-depth case studies by 
Helbig (1999) and Whittall (2000) of the EWCs at Volkswagen and BMW respectively 
demonstrate that the existence of strong national workforce representation structures 
in Germany, the home country of both companies, had a positive influence on the 
effectiveness of their EWCs. Both authors emphasise that it was in particular the strong 
position of the German EWC Chairmen in the national context which strengthened the 
EWC;  by virtue of their functions as Chair of the Central Works Council and member 
of the Supervisory Board, both EWC Chairmen were able  to mobilise substantial 
resources, such as  infrastructure, information, and power for the benefit of the EWCs. 
Investigating the experience of EWCs in Dutch-based MNCs, Lamers (1998) and 
Veersma (1999) came to similar conclusions about the potentially positive impact of 
strong national employee representation structures on the availability of resources and 
the effectiveness of EWCs.  
The comparative analysis of four EWCs by Lecher (1999) shows, however, that this 
depends strongly on the willingness of the home country’s delegates to use their 
legally underpinned power position in the national context for the benefit of the EWC 
as a whole. If they are not wiling, then the dominant position of one group can have 
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the opposite effect, as Wills’ (2000) longitudinal analysis of the EWC in a company that 
was formed by an Anglo-French-American merger demonstrates. According to Wills 
(2000), the weakness of the EWC and the low degree of internal cooperation can be 
attributed to the dominance of the French delegates and their unwillingness to use 
their greater experience and political acumen, which was greater than that of the UK 
representatives, for the benefit of the EWC.  Lecher’s and Wills’ examples show that 
strong national rights can also be detrimental to the development of a European 
identity and a common approach of the EWC, if the home country’s delegation uses its 
national privileges to dominate the EWC and to stall attempts to develop a genuinely 
European orientation.  
A further structural factor which was the focus of a number of studies about the 
effectiveness of EWCs was the organisational structure of companies and 
management’s restructuring initiatives. The observed effects of this structural factor 
were similarly inconsistent.  On the one hand, contributions by Gohde (1995) und 
Weston and Martinez Lucio (1997) suggest that re-structuring initiatives trigger 
transnational employee networking and cooperation. Weston and Martinez Lucio for 
example found that an integrated production structure coupled with a management 
strategies of benchmarking and/or cross-referencing contributes to the development of 
transnational cooperation among employee representatives. On the other hand, 
Hancké’s (2000) analysis of restructuring measures in the automobile industry argues 
that management strategies of benchmarking and concession bargaining undermined 
transnational employee and trade union cooperation despite the existence of 
favourable structural conditions in the automobile industry in terms of a highly 
integrated and internationalised production structure. With respect to the influence of 
company structure on the effectiveness of EWCs, a more recent study by Marginson et 
al. (2004) shows that the likelihood that EWCs will have an impact on management 
decisions is greater in companies with a single business structure with substantial 
operations in several countries and whose management structures are highly 
integrated across borders.  At the same time, there is no automatic effect; even though 
some company structures are found to be more conducive to the development of a 
European orientation of the EWC delegates and to transnational employee cooperation 
than others, the EWCs capacity to act still depends on the EWC delegates’ willingness 
to utilise these potentially more favourable framework conditions. 
These studies about the impact of structural factors, such as national employee 
representation structures or company structures, on the development of employee-side 
cooperation within and through the EWC and thus the effectiveness of EWCs 
demonstrates that the potential impact of these factors is mediated by the attitudes of 
the individual employee representatives. Or put differently: whether external factors 
have a positive or negative influence on the development and role of EWCs depends 
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on the delegates' context-bound strategic choices within their interaction processes. A 
further stream of empirical EWC research focused on the investigation of the impact of 
these inner-EWC processes which serve to generate social cohesion and an 
independent European identity on the effectiveness of EWCs. Since the conclusions 
drawn from this stream of empirical research are particularly relevant to the question 
of solidarity in EWCs, they will be discussed in more detail further below.  
In sum, the analysis of most of the empirical research conducted following 1996 aimed 
to offer prescriptions designed to improve the ‘effectiveness’ of EWCs — whatever the 
various authors meant by ‘effectiveness’. This stream of empirical EWC research relied 
heavily on the analysis of individual cases or standardised questionnaire surveys. Both 
are important methods to broaden the empirical knowledge base about the operation 
of EWCs. However, the case study findings heavily reflect the embeddedness of each 
EWC into a particular pattern of company-, sector- and country-specific framework 
conditions. While the development of a European identity and internal cohesion 
among the EWC delegates emerges from the case study findings as a crucial 
prerequisite for the ‘effectiveness’ of EWCs, the widely varying combination of factors 
which are identified as having an impact on the development of EWCs makes it 
difficult to generalise the case study findings.  
Generalisation of the accumulated case study findings is further complicated by their 
reliance on different methodological approaches. It is possible to distinguish between 
structural approaches which focus on the influence of structural framework conditions, 
such as company or production structures and national IR structures, and actor-
centred approaches, which concentrate on the impact of the individual characteristics 
of the actors involved. The case-specificity of the findings coupled with a diversity of 
methodological approaches highlighted the need for a systematic categorisation of 
specific roles or even developmental stages of EWCs and an examination of how these 
are in turn shaped by external and internal factors.  
Next to broad-scale quantitative surveys to acquire an overview of broader 
developments such as the cross-national comparative analysis of the views of EWC 
representatives by Waddington (2001, 2003a), the most appropriate approach was to 
conduct large-scale, interview-based, in-depth comparative research projects using a 
multiple case study design. The obvious advantage of the comparative case study 
method over single case studies is that it allows the researcher(s) to control for a 
specific set of variables; furthermore, a systematic comparison of individual cases can 
provide the basis for the inductive development of what Hyman calls “classificatory 
instruments for the analysis of EWCs” (Hyman 2000: 6).  
A first step in this direction was made by the large-scale comparative studies 
conducted by Lecher et al. (1998, 1999a). Based on a cross-country and cross-sectoral 
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comparison of 23 cases, the authors develop a typology of EWCs which is based on 
their ‘capacity to act’. This typology comprises four ideal types of EWCs: the symbolic 
EWC, the service-oriented EWC, the project-oriented EWC, and the participation-
oriented EWC. These ideal types can be seen as a developmental trajectory, in which 
the four types of EWCs represent different developmental stages on the way from a 
symbolic EWC, which merely exists on paper, to a participation-oriented EWC, which 
shows the strongest signs of internal cohesion and is recognised by management as an 
autonomous actor. According to Lecher et al., the defining characteristics of the 
progression from a symbolic EWC to a participation-oriented EWC are the EWCs’ 
ability to overcome the domination of the home country delegation and the 
development of stable communication and working structures, through which the 
EWCs achieve autonomy from management and which enable them to create ‘added 
value’ for their members and the different national workforces they represent.  
The underlying logic of the typology is twofold. On the one hand, the ideal types 
represent a developmental trajectory which traces the actual process of the EWCs’ 
‘constitutional’ development towards autonomy and a European identity. At the same 
time, the types are defined by the interests and behaviour of the actors involved in the 
EWC’s interaction processes. This does not necessarily have an impact on the EWCs 
‘progress’ from one stage to the next; in other words, the types may be steady rather 
than fluid. As the authors themselves admit, this leads to difficulties in assigning real 
cases to the different categories, since the ideal types are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive: to a certain extent, this defies the logic of a ‘typology’. However, 
notwithstanding this methodological quibble, the ‘typology’ or developmental 
trajectory developed by Lecher et al. represents the first systematic framework for the 
analysis of the practice of EWCs which is able to take into account the complex and 
interdependent relationship between the development of EWCs and the variety of 
‘external’ and ‘internal’ factors impinging on this process. Their studies in particular 
demonstrate that the character or internal ‘constitution’ of EWCs is the result of the 
interplay between interaction processes within the EWC and the related actions of 
other actors (management, national representation structures and trade unions) within 
a specific set of (enabling or constraining) structural framework conditions. 
In the late 1990s, again mirroring the demands of practice, both the analysis of the 
structural and operational features of EWC agreements and the case study analysis of 
the actual operation of EWCs were taken up and recast in the debate about the revision 
of EWC Directive. Since the EWC Directive stipulated the need to revise the EWC 
Directive by autumn 1999, this period saw a resurgence of the legal debate about 
potential amendments to the Directive which could draw on the findings of existing 
empirical research (Blanke 1999, Buschak 1999, Rigaux and Dorssemont 1999). At the 
time of writing in early 2005, however, the European Commission had only just 
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launched the consultation procedure with the European social partners regarding a 
possible revision of the EWC Directive.  
Research into the impact of EWCs on management strategies as well as the research 
into the articulation between EWCs and national IR systems has remained a late 
developer.  Most of the literature produced on the relationship between EWCs and 
management (Wills 1999, Nakano 1999, Weber et al. 2000) tended to perceive EWCs as 
a tool for improved transnational employee and trade union cooperation vis-à-vis 
management, but neglected the potential utilisation of EWCs by managements for their 
own purposes. The studies by Lamers (1998) Vitols (2003), which investigated the 
potential ‘added value’ of EWCs as perceived by management representatives, are 
tentative exceptions to this rule. However, it was only recently that the impact of EWCs 
on management decision-making was systematically investigated by Marginson et al. 
(2004) on a qualitative comparative basis.  
Another more recent development in EWC research, and one which is still in its 
infancy, addresses the recent increase in the geographical scope of EWC activities. The 
enlargement of the EU to include ten new Member States is found to carry important 
implications for the structure and operation of EWCs (Kohl and Platzer 2003, Meardi 
2004, Varga 2004). A further body of literature explores the role played by EWCs in the 
development of world-wide employee representation structures and other forms of 
employee-side cooperation on a global scale. (Müller and Rüb 2002, Miller 2004, Müller 
et al. 2004, Wills 2004).  
This summary overview of over two decades of EWC research shows that one of the 
central challenges faced by EWCs –namely how they cope with the divisive effects of 
cross-border competition between sites for jobs and investment—have not been closely 
examined empirically. Furthermore, as will be seen below, the question of how EWCs 
cope with cross-site competition played a role in the context of the debate between 
Euro-optimists and Euro-pessimists about the impact of EWCs on the development of 
a European system of IR. In addition, the underlying assertion of many authors from 
both ‘camps’ was that EWCs might only be a fair-weather institution: as soon as 
competition between sites took hold, it would quell all cooperation.  
2.2. The transnationalisation of companies and its implications for 
labour 
The last twenty years have witnessed an unprecedented intensification of economic 
activities on a European or even global scale. The new quality of the 
transnationalisation of economic activities is above all attributed to the following 
factors: the globalisation of financial markets, qualitative and quantitative shifts in 
global trade, the strong increase in foreign direct investment and the increasing 
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importance of transnational companies (Altvater and Mahnkopf 1996, Hoffmann 2001, 
Hübner 1998). A closer look at these indicators shows, however, that the 
transnationalisation process was mainly restricted to the triad of North America, 
(western) Europe and Asia (mainly Japan). Ruigrok and van Tulder (1995) thus refer to 
‚triadisation’ rather than ‘globalisation’. According to Dølvik, “the OECD countries 
thus account for approximately 70-80 percent of world trade and investment flows. The 
West European share of world trade is 43 percent, of which two-thirds are within the 
EU/EEA area; and in 1999 as much as 90 percent of all mergers and acquisitions took 
place within Europe“ (Dølvik 2002: 87).  
Various studies also show that with respect to companies’ transnationalisation 
strategies it might be more appropriate to speak of europeanisation rather than 
globalisation. Dörre (1997) finds that most continental European companies follow an 
euro-centric developmental path, which is concentrated on the European single 
market.  This finding is confirmed by Hassel et al. (2000) in their investigation of the 
transnationalisation strategies of the 100 largest German companies: the increasing 
regional spread of large German multinationals is concentrated in Europe. In the light 
of the specific transnationalisation patterns of European companies which, compared 
to the other two regions in the triad, were favoured by the high degree of economic 
and political integration of Europe, Marginson and Sisson (1994) already predicted the 
“emerging Euro-company“ over ten years ago.   
Following Marginson and Sisson (1994, 2004), the Euro-company contrasts with the 
global corporation along the following lines: the establishment of market servicing and 
production operations on a pan-European basis through cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions and the creation of joint ventures and strategic alliances across the 
continent; and  internally through the creation or strengthening of European-level 
management structures which enabled MNCs to set up European-wide systems of 
control and coordination, thereby downgrading the role of national subsidiaries. The 
more widespread pursuit of common cross-border policies in internally integrated 
MNCs is reflected in the application of benchmarking practices, which are used to 
diffuse what the employers perceive as ‘best practice’ and to conduct cross-national 
coercive comparisons of performance and labour-related indicators in the context of 
investment decisions.  
The emergence of the Euro-company had far-reaching implications for national 
workforces and the actors representing their interests, since the power asymmetries 
between capital and labour thus shifted even further in favour of the former. The Euro-
companies’ growing flexibility and capacity to shift production from one country to 
another has considerably improved their exit options, which in turn has enabled them 
to pursue a strategy of regime shopping, thereby putting pressure not only on trade 
unions and workplace employee representation structures to engage in concession 
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bargaining, but also on national governments, which have seen their regulatory power 
decrease considerably (Streeck 1998).  
Even though there is as yet no clear evidence of social dumping, (Marginson and 
Sisson 2004: 222), the intensified competition both between and within individual 
companies leads to a situation in which the mere threat to relocate or to withhold 
investment often suffices for MNCs to extract concessions both from national unions 
and national governments. The MNCs “transnational power of withdrawal“ (Beck 
1998: 25) enables them to pit both national workforces and national governments 
against each other and to punish those nation states which fail to provide what the 
representatives of capital perceive as favourable framework conditions for investment. 
The same is true of the micro-level, where “under a process of ‘corporate investment 
bargaining’, individual sites of MNCs are under continuous threat to improve 
performance with the risk otherwise of being starved of investment and ultimately run 
down and closed“ (Marginson and Sisson 2004: 223).  
Against this backdrop, the establishment of EWCs, and in particular the adoption of 
the EWC Directive in September 1994, represented an important step towards 
correcting the asymmetry between the economic and social dimensions of European 
integration, as well as to the resulting imbalance between the strategic options of 
MNCs, which transcend national borders, and labour’s limited capacity to act, which 
was largely circumscribed by national boundaries. In providing the statutory basis for 
the first genuinely European institution of employee interest representation which by 
definition transcends the spatial confines of national IR systems, the EWC Directive’s 
main intention was to “bridge the gap between increasingly transnational corporate 
decision-making and employees’ nationally-defined information and consultation 
rights“ (Hall 1992: 547). EWCs thus enable — at least in theory — employee 
representatives to deepen their cross-border cooperation in order better to address the 
problem of intensified competition between sites across borders within the Euro-
company.  
2.3. EWCs and the problem of company-internal competition 
While there is a broad consensus that the transnationalisation of companies results in 
new challenges for labour, there are very variable assessments of whether EWCs might 
in practice be able to contribute to an employee-side solution to the dilemma of 
company-internal competition. The debate about the role of EWCs and inter-site 
competition has mainly been held in the context of the wider debate between euro-
optimists and euro-pessimists about the impact of EWCs on the development of a 
European system of industrial relations (Müller and Hoffmann 2001).  
 23
The Euro-pessimistic line of argument tends to be based on a structuralist approach 
coupled with a narrow (and arguably German-biased) conceptualisation of European 
industrial relations. The analytical focus of the proponents of this line of argument, 
such as Keller (1995 and 1996), Schulten (1996), and Streeck (1997a and 1997b), thus lies 
primarily on the structural framework created by the EWC Directive. Against this 
background, as Müller and Platzer highlight, the voluntarist nature of the EWC 
Directive, and in particular its “failure to harmonise employee participation rights 
across Europe, leads Euro-pessimists to conclude that EWCs are likely to reinforce 
regime competition and the emergence of micro-corporatist arrangements at European 
company level which eventually might set in motion a downward spiral of eroding 
national regulations in countries with high standards of employee representation 
rights“ (Müller and Platzer 2003: 73).  
Streeck (1996) even sees the danger that in an increasingly competitive environment, 
EWCs could contribute to the formation of new coalitions between central 
management and domestic workforces which are no longer based on common class 
interests of labour to seek protection against the competitive forces of free markets, but 
on national interests of labour to outcompete labour in other countries. Following such 
a euro-pessimistic logic, EWCs are likely to strengthen the existing tendencies towards 
competitive enterprise particularism, rather than providing a means of fostering cross-
border cooperation among employees and trade unions. Hancké (2000) argues in a 
similar vein in his study of the role of the EWCs in industrial restructuring at General 
Motors and Renault. Based on the observation that local unionists used the information 
obtained at European level through the EWC to pursue their national or even plant-
centred interests, he concludes that instead of becoming a pan-European vehicle for 
employee and trade union cooperation in order to combat competition, EWCs 
themselves become one of the major carriers of a new competition regime.  According 
to this line of argument, the fact that EWCs merely function as extensions of their 
national system allows management to utilise EWCs “as a pan-European human 
resource institution to facilitate industrial restructuring“ (Hancké 2000: 55). The study 
by Royle (1999) on the EWC at McDonalds provides further empirical evidence for 
management’s capacity to co-opt the EWC in order to prevent the development of 
effective employee-side cooperation. 
In contrast to the euro-pessimist assessment that EWCs even undermine cross-country 
cooperation and solidarity, and that “EWCs are unable to override the competitive 
relations that are established between different sites and workplaces by many TNCs“ 
(Martinez Lucio and Weston 2004: 36), both authors have shown that management 
strategies of cross-national benchmarking and cross-referencing contribute to the 
development of transnational employee networking structures (Martinez Lucio and 
Weston 1995; Weston and Martinez Lucio 1997). According to the authors, this is 
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because such coercive management strategies raise employee representatives’ interest 
in engaging in cross-national exchange of information and experiences in order to fend 
off local management pressures.  
As Martinez Lucio and Weston (2004) point out, the contradictory findings about the 
role of EWCs in transnational restructuring processes are unsurprising, since “EWCs 
are caught between distinct pressures in terms of push and pull factors between labour 
and capital both inside and outside the firm: there are dual pressures within these 
environments that both push unions towards managerial agendas and pull them 
towards autonomous labour ones“ (Martinez Lucio and Weston 2004: 37). This means 
that the role of EWCs as a management tool to facilitate cross-national restructuring 
processes on the one hand, or as a tool to foster solidarity and cooperation among 
employees on the other hand, depends on the complex interplay of “internal 
transnational corporate dynamics and external social and political relations within 
labour“ (Martinez Lucio and Weston 2004: 43). Both orientations exist alongside one 
another and can take centre stage at different points in time depending on the 
environmental framework conditions.  
The insight that EWCs are subject to different actors’ interests and expectations, whose 
interaction shapes EWCs’  role and capacity to act, is not new.  The typology developed 
by Lecher et al. (1998 and 1999a) depends on the dynamic interplay of four fields of 
interaction: interaction between EWC and management; interaction among EWC 
members; interaction between the EWC and national institutions of employee 
representation structures and the workforce; and interaction between EWC and trade 
unions. The key difference between the approaches of Lecher et al. and of Martinez 
Lucio and Weston lies in the fact that the latter see EWCs as largely externally 
controlled, or as they put it, as “conduits and vehicles for the action of others“ 
(Martinez Lucio and Weston 2004: 44).  In contrast, Lecher et al. grasp EWCs as 
independent actors who are largely masters of their own destinies in their social 
interaction with other actors (management, national representation structures and 
trade unions).  
This strong actor-centred approach, which attaches great importance to the social 
interaction processes within the EWC and the perceptions of the EWC members, is 
typical of the line of argument put forward by the euro-optimists. While the euro-
pessimists’ negative assessment of the role of EWCs in dealing with restructuring 
primarily refers to structural deficiencies of the EWC Directive and the syndicalist 
tendencies associated with it, the euro-optimistic assessment of EWCs’ impact on the 
europeanisation of IR more generally and the EWCs’ capacity to deal with the 
competitive pressures of TNCs more specifically focuses on the mutually reinforcing 
effects of the internal development of EWCs on the one hand, and the europeanisation 
of trade union structures and policies on the other (Müller and Platzer 2003: 74). This is 
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not to suggest that euro-optimistic observers do not acknowledge the structural 
obstacles to the europeanisation of IR emphasised by euro-pessimists. However, the 
euro-optimists’ analysis is based on a different frame of reference. Rather than 
presupposing the existence of appropriate structural framework conditions, which, 
from a euro-pessimistic point of view, the EWC Directive failed to create, the 
proponents of the euro-optimistic line of argument “tend to assess the EWCs with 
reference to the previously existing situation - one in which [...] no transnational rights 
of employee representation existed whatsoever“ (Dølvik 1997: 382). Thus, Euro-
optimistic analyses, such as those by Bobke and Müller (1995), Lecher and Platzer 
(1996), Dølvik (1997) and Lecher et al. (1998), emphasise that the structural deficiencies 
of the EWC Directive in failing to harmonise employee participation rights at European 
level are more than offset by the practical implications of the widespread establishment 
of EWCs, since these have considerably extended the employee-side’s scope for 
transnational political action and cooperation.  
Turner (1996), for example, argues that the adoption of the EWC Directive together 
with further institutional developments at European level, such as the building of the 
ETUC, the 1989 Social Charter, and the 1991 Social Protocol of the Maastricht Treaty, 
created an institutional ‘superstructure’ for European cross-national labour movement 
collaboration. Although Turner admits that the emerging European labour movement 
is currently characterised by the absence of collective action and is primarily based on 
networks of contacts and new structures of interest representation, he concludes that 
by encouraging a thickening web of cross-national union contacts at company, sectoral, 
and macro levels, institutions such as EWCs, sectoral European Industry Federations, 
and the ETUC create a ‘political opportunity structure’ which potentially paves the 
way for cross-national labour collaboration and collective action. This argument is 
supported by Dølvik (1997) and Lecher et al. (1999a), who found that the adoption of 
the EWC Directive prompted both European and national trade unions to adapt their 
organisational structures to this newly established European-level arena. At the 
European level, an increasing number of European Industry Federations set up ‘EWC 
Committees’ bringing together representatives of their affiliated national unions in 
order to facilitate the exchange of information and the coordination of strategies. 
Taking this approach a step further, the European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF), for 
example, has recently begun to set up company-specific ad hoc task forces to facilitate 
the coordination of trade union and EWC strategic responses to restructuring. Lecher 
et al. (1999a) report that national trade unions simultaneously began to integrate 
European agendas into their day-to-day work. Besides strengthening their 
international/European departments, more and more trade unions have set up cross-
departmental task forces to deal with European issues. In some cases these innovations 
took a clearly institutionalised character, as the EWC Project (later made permanent as 
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the EWC Team) at the German IG Metall union demonstrates (Götz and Buchholz, 
1996; Lecher et al., 1999a).  
However, the EWCs’ potential to strengthen cross-national trade union cooperation is 
not limited to structural processes. Perhaps even more important is their potential to 
‘Europeanise’ the underlying mindset of trade union activists. Dølvik for example 
makes the point that the sheer number of national employee representatives who will 
be involved in EWCs and transnational union activities “contains a potential for 
learning and change which should not be underestimated“ (1997: 388). He even sees 
the possibility that EWCs may contribute to the emergence of a new “pioneer core of 
workforce representatives at the level of TNC headquarters“ who are more outward-
looking and more familiar with the problem of coping with cross-national diversity, 
which in turn “can represent a valuable potential for the development of trade union 
networks and structures within the context of company EWCs“ (Dølvik, 1997: 389). 
This line of argument is exemplary for the Euro-optimistic way of reasoning, because, 
although the respective authors acknowledge the structural obstacles to a 
europeanisation of labour, they emphasise the scope for political action and social 
choice of labour organisations which was created by the institutional reforms in the 
wake of attempts to strengthen the European social dimension. This line of argument is 
furthermore typical for a Euro-optimistic perspective in terms of the underlying 
developmental logic of a europeanisation of IR, because it implies that this process 
follows the logic of spill-over effects from market integration to social integration as 
national actors re-define their political strategies and increasingly turn their attention 
to the newly established institutions at the European level.  
The debate between euro-optimists and euro-pessimists about the impact of EWCs on 
the europeanisation of IR more generally, and the role of EWCs faced with intensified 
internal competition specifically, remains highly speculative and shaped by different 
normative frames of reference, which lead the proponents of both lines of argument to 
diametrically opposed conclusions. The existing empirical evidence does not help 
much further either, since both camps can find examples in support of their particular 
position.  
Is it thus in the eye of the beholder whether the glass is half full or half empty? Not 
quite, because despite the inconsistent picture which case study research paints of 
EWC practice, there is one central factor which decisively shapes the development of 
EWCs: the development of social cohesion and a ‘European identity’ within the EWC.  
It has been seen that in those cases in which EWCs were primarily (mis)used to pursue 
national or local interests as well as in those cases in which the EWC was (mis)used as 
an HR tool, the EWCs only exhibited a very small degree of social cohesion.  At the 
same time, those EWCs which successfully developed and maintained a solidary 
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approach to restructuring measures were shaped by a high degree of internal cohesion, 
which enabled them to aggregate differing interests and to formulate a common 
position and approach vis-à-vis management. If ‘internal cohesion’ and the 
development of a European identity is a central prerequisite for the EWC’s ability to 
cooperatively resolve conflicts, then the question arises under which conditions can 
internal cohesion and a European identity be developed?  
2.4. Internal cohesion and European identity: fostering EWCs’ 
effectiveness 
Although a range of contributions to the body of EWC literature have focused on the 
meaning of internal cohesion for the development of effective employee-side 
cooperation within and through EWCs3, most of them remain fairly vague about the 
real meaning and foundation for internal cohesion. Most contributions stop at the 
identification of factors which inhibit the generation of internal cohesion and a  
European identity. Exceptions to this tendency are the studies by Lecher et al. (1998), 
Miller (1999) and Stirling and Tully (2004), who, in contrast to many other empirical 
studies about the effectiveness of EWCs, develop a clear conception of an ‘effective’ 
EWC.  According to these three studies, an effective EWC is able to internally 
aggregate different interests and develop an independent, participative capacity to act 
outwards,  which enables it, for example, to exert influence on management decisions 
and their implementation. The basis for an effective EWC in this sense is the 
development of internal cohesion, which in turn depends upon the development of a 
collective European identity. According to Miller (1999), such a European identity is 
marked by the development of a  new overarching set of mutually shared transnational 
values and practices that transcends national interests.  Following Hyman’s conception 
of trade union identity, an EWC’s European identity represents the  collectively shared 
perceptions and views of the EWC’s underlying purpose, its priority objectives, and 
the appropriate forms of action (Hyman 1994 and 2001). A prerequisite for the 
development of such a mutually shared European identity is that existing differences 
are not suppressed, but instead accepted and taken up. Martinez Lucio and Weston 
(2004: 44) and Miller (1999) have called for a reconceptualisation of solidarity with 
respect to EWCs.  This new understanding should no longer orient itself towards 
Durkheim’s concept of mechanical solidarity, which relies on the imposition of a 
certain approach via hierarchical structures, but should orient itself towards the model 
of organic solidarity, which leaves room for divergent interests within social 
interaction processes and is open-ended.  
                                           
3 See for example Fulton (1995), Lamers (1998), Veersma (1999), Wills (2000). 
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How can a European identity as a foundation for social cohesion be developed? 
According to Lecher et al., “in building internal strength and cohesion [...] three 
dimensions will play a crucial role: the communicative, the socio-cultural and the 
institutional“ (1999b: 81).  With respect to the communicative dimension, several 
authors (Fulton 1995, Lamers 1998, Lecher et al. 1998, Miller et al. 2000) emphasise 
language barriers as one major obstacle to the development of internal cohesion. 
Lecher et al. (1998) and Miller et al. (2000) point out that language barriers not only 
hinder informal contact and the development of mutual trust, but that they can also 
lead to the formation of sub-groupings within EWCs.  Such fragmentation can foster 
the development or the maintenance of national parochialisms and egoisms. Jaeger 
(1996) notes that the pursuit of site-specific interests is not a new phenomenon. Within 
national multi-site institutions such as German Konzernbetriebsräte or French comités de 
groupe these same tendencies can often be observed.  He emphasises, however, that the 
problem of pursuing particularistic interests within the EWC is exacerbated by 
communication barriers between EWC members. Miller et al. (2000) and Stirling and 
Tully (2004) point out that communication is a means of exercising power and control 
within social interaction processes, which must be taken into account in the 
development of internal communication structures. In order to overcome 
communication barriers within EWCs by ensuring the greatest possible transparency, 
Lecher et al. (1998: 232) suggest that the task of disseminating information be given to a 
group of actors within the EWC, such as the select committee. Beyond this, procedural 
rules for the information of EWC members should be agreed upon.   
Closely linked to the problem of communication is the second dimension identified by 
Lecher et al. as important to the development of internal cohesion: socio-cultural 
differences. A central problem here are the differing national political and cultural 
backgrounds of the EWC delegates, who in most cases have not been exposed to a 
situation in which they had to perform as employee representative in a multi-cultural 
setting (Jaeger 1996, Lamers 1998, Miller and Stirling 1998, Lecher et al. 1999, Miller 
1999, Stirling and Tully 2004). Their understanding of their role as EWC delegate is 
heavily influenced by their national IR context and the interests they pursue therein as 
employee representatives and/or trade unionists. However, the development of 
internal cohesion is not only hampered by the different nationally pre-defined role 
perceptions and interests of the EWC representatives, but also by the different ways in 
which they try to pursue these interests, because, as Lecher et al. point out, “different 
national IR systems are marked by differing styles of politics“ (1999: 222). The 
insufficient knowledge of different national IR backgrounds and national frames of 
reference can lead to misunderstandings, conflicts, and factionalism within the EWC 
(Lamers, 1998; Miller and Stirling, 1998; Lecher et al., 1999). 
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Several authors (Gohde, 1995; Jaeger, 1996; Harazim, 1998; Miller and Stirling, 1998; 
Miller, 1999; Fitzgerald et al., 2000, Stirling and Tully 2004) have brought attention to 
the central role which training can play in overcoming communication and socio-
cultural barriers. Based on the assumption that the development of EWC-internal 
cohesion is the product of communication-based interaction processes among EWC 
members who are aware of each other’s different socio-cultural backgrounds (Lecher et 
al., 1998; Miller and Stirling, 1998; Miller, 1999), the various authors set out to develop 
a training agenda for EWC delegates. The main function of training in the EWCs’ 
development of a distinct role is to prepare the EWC members for the challenges posed 
by the multicultural and multi-lingual environment of an EWC. In order to achieve this 
aim, Miller even calls for a new “pedagogy of transnationality“ (1999: 356) to shape the 
content, method and the organisation of delivery of training. Against this backdrop, 
different training components have been identified, which can be broadly grouped into 
two categories: issue-related qualifications and individual qualifications (Harazim, 
1998). Whereas the former set of qualifications covers basic knowledge about the 
different national IR systems and collective bargaining arrangements, the legal 
background of the EWCD, and the broader economic context in which EWCs operate, 
the individual qualifications comprise communication and conflict resolution skills, 
which facilitate the aggregation of potentially differing interests within EWCs (Gohde, 
1995; Harazim, 1998; Miller and Stirling, 1998). 
Significantly less attention has been paid to the internal institutional prerequisites for 
the development of internal cohesion. Lecher et al. (1998) emphasise the positive 
contribution which trust-building measures by the representatives from the dominant 
country and institutional arrangements to ensure transparency and active participation 
can have on the development of social cohesion. Specifically, they mention the positive 
effect observed if the dominant group conspicuously takes a step back and forgoes 
dominant positions, or actively supports other EWC members vis-à-vis central 
management in conflict situations. Further institutional measures to reduce or 
downplay power asymmetries include a flat representation structure, the 
establishment of a steering committee to put leadership, operational and decision-
making structures on a broader international footing, or setting up issue-specific 
working groups, in order to allow more members to become actively involved in the 
work of the EWC. 
This overview of the EWC literature which is relevant to the central question of this 
thesis about the role of EWCs and cross-site competition yields something of a  
paradox. While euro-pessimists explicitly address the question of cross-border 
competition but exclude a priori a positive role for EWCs because of external 
framework conditions and disregard the EWC-internal social processes, the euro-
optimistic contributions, which put EWCs as social actors at the centre of their analysis, 
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stop short of explicitly addressing the question of cross-site competition. The latter 
contributions examine the possibilities and conditions for the generation of internal 
cohesion, but the question is left open whether this also suffices as a means to 
overcome cross-site competition. It is the aim of this study to close this gap.  
2.5. What is known about central and group works councils?  
Across Europe, centralised instances of employee representation which bring together 
representatives from various plants or workplaces within a firm, have presumably long 
had to deal with these issues of plant egoism and competing particularistic interests, 
albeit within very different industrial relations systems.  
A review of literature on the phenomenon of collective interest representation in 
general and on central works councils in particular reveals that very little is known 
about the process of interest aggregation within central works councils. With two 
exceptions, it is not addressed in specialised texts, is skirted in more generalist texts 
and only appears in any detail in some narrative texts.  
A great deal of the existing literature about central and group works councils focuses 
on legal advice or analysis of the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, the German law regulating 
company-level codetermination. There are elaborate investigations of the legal 
intricacies of central works councils, such as that contributed by Grotkamp (1998) and 
overviews of court rulings on the complicated question of the CWC’s ability to act on 
behalf of the local works councils (Kunz 2003a). In 1993, the Hans-Böckler-Foundation 
published an explication of the various company law forms regulating groups of 
companies and their implications for cross-site employee representation (HBS 2003). 
With respect to the function of central or group works councils, the authors merely 
conclude that the German Betriebsverfassungsgesetz does not adequately capture the 
variety of actual company structures and that a wide range of alternatives have been 
developed in practice. But despite its title, which explicitly refers to “employee 
interests”, there is no mention of the politics or mediation involved in central works 
council activity (HBS 1993).  
Regular publications aimed at practitioners (chiefly works council members and labour 
lawyers) clarify questions such as how to set up a central works council and what its 
competences are (Grimberg and Peter  1999, Kunz 2000), how to implement the 
provisions on reducing the size of the central works council (Mengel 2002), whether 
and how the central works council is  competent to negotiate a social plan in the event 
of collective redundancies (Betriebsberater 2002), delegation to the CWC (Löwisch 
2002), setting up a group works council based on the revised Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 
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(Fischer 2001) and even whether or not it is possible to set up a central works council if 
there is only one local works council currently in place (Helm and Müller 2001). Nearly 
every German trade union offers handbooks or guidelines which outline the legal 
prerequisites of central and group works councils, but these refrain from offering any 
guidance on what role they play in the larger scheme of works councils’ or trade 
unions’ policy or strategy at the company level (for the IG Metall, see Kunz 1998 and 
Kunz 2003b). 
While the famously juridified nature of German IR might explain this preponderance 
of legal analysis, it is striking that without exception, none of these contributions go 
beyond mentioning in passing the need to coordinate works council policy and 
strategy across sites.  
There is, of course, a wealth of literature on local works councils, but this body of 
literature chiefly focuses on works councils’ interaction with management , their 
approach to issues such health and safety, training, or group work, or their uneasy 
relationship with trade unions; scant attention is paid to the specific challenges of 
cross-site interest representation. In her Critical Assessment of the Theoretical and 
Empirical Research on German Works Councils, which aims to take stock of what we know 
about works councils, their roles, activities and values, Frege (2002) does not mention 
central and group works councils at all. An extensive review of the social science 
literature about the German Betriebsverfassungsgesetz published by the Hans-Böckler-
Foundation in 1994 (Höland and Eidmann 1994) does briefly summarise the results of 
Rancke’s extensive study on cross-site employee participation (Rancke 1982, see 
below). The authors only take up one of his conclusions, however: that the German 
works council legislation fails to accommodate the actual needs of practice in the light 
of simultaneous centralisation and decentralisation of companies. Apparently, the 
particular challenges confronted by works councils in navigating between different 
levels of central and local competence, which Rancke explicitly highlights, was not 
judged to be relevant enough to be included in the otherwise wide-ranging  theses 
about the sociological and political implications of company-level workers’ 
participation with which the authors conclude their study. This finding is, however, 
cross-referenced to possible responses to the erosion of the local level and the 
perceived need to develop adequate cooperation between works councils, such as 
within company networks – a theme which can also be found in the contributions of 
Wassermann (2003) and Müller-Jentsch (2003).   
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Works councils and changing management structures 
There is a nearly universal consensus in more recent literature on German IR that the 
centripetal and centrifugal effects of fragmentation and centralisation of company 
structures pose new challenges for works councils and trade unions (Rancke 1982, 
Nagel et al. 1994, Müller-Jentsch 2003, Wassermann 2003).  
It would seem that central and group works councils would occupy pride of place in 
such a debate. And yet, in his contribution on trade union policy and works council 
practice at the company level to a recent stocktaking exercise on trade unions and IR in 
Germany (Schroeder and Wessels 2003), Wassermann (2003) barely mentions the 
existence of central and group works councils and instead argues that works councils 
and trade unions need to develop possibilities to develop adequate responses to newly 
emerging cross-company networks, such as those which exist between original 
manufacturers and their suppliers. The rationale is that since personnel and technology 
issues are often closely coordinated on the management side, particularly if the 
supplier is an outsourced part of the original manufacturer, then works councils need 
to develop ways to coordinate their activities with the works councils at partner 
companies.  
In his contribution, Müller-Jentsch (2003) similarly omits the centralised level of 
codetermination at the company level entirely, leaping instead from the local level to 
cross-company networks.  In an extended analysis of codetermination, which includes 
an otherwise thorough discussion of theory and practice of work councils, he fails to 
even mention central and group works councils. Under the heading of “new problem 
areas”, however, along with the so-called ‘new economy’ and the emergent European 
level, he echoes Wassermann in briefly highlighting the need to develop adequate 
responses to cross-company networks.   
In his comparative case-study research on works councils in fragmented companies, 
Wassermann (2002) analyses the experience of  several companies drawn from sectors 
such as construction or retail, in which small sites face greater legal and practical 
obstacles in making use of the options for local and cross-site works councils. As a 
consequence of this research focus, Wassermann (2002) only mentions central works 
councils and group works councils in passing.  His assessment of the opportunities and 
challenges of adapting works councils to eroding and shifting company structures 
relies on highly case-specific examples of the ways in which alternative structures and 
processes can be set up. Unfortunately for present purposes, however, Wassermann 
assumes a pressing need for cooperation among employee representatives from 
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different sites without exploring why this is the case or what obstacles such efforts to 
cooperate might face.  
Central Works Councils 
The last large-scale investigation of central and group works councils in Germany was 
conducted nearly thirty years ago. Rancke (1982) presents the results of a study of the 
roughly 800 German companies which employed over 2000 employees at the time4. 
Prompted by the 1972 amendment of the German Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, the 
research, conducted from 1975-77, sought to take stock of the ways in which this 
legislation was actually applied in practice.  The research was based on interviews, 
non-participant observation conducted in four companies in four different sectors, and 
a postal survey,. The response rate to the 62-page survey containing over 240 questions 
was understandably low (just over 15%) but the questionnaires returned by 99 central 
works council chairpersons provides a useful empirical base.  
Rancke concludes that overall, the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz does not adequately capture 
the fragmented and dynamic character of company structures; if the intention of the 
works council legislation was to enable employee representatives to exert influence on 
company decision-making across all levels of the company or group of companies, 
then its static definition of company structures, which does not take into account ‘new’ 
developments such as divisionalisation, line management, or profit centres, etc. fails to 
achieve this. Noting the widespread and significant departures from the legally 
foreseen structures and processes, however, and despite his concern for the resulting 
legal uncertainties in practice, Rancke concludes that the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz does 
leave significant room for individual actors to adapt it to their needs (1982: 336). In 
other words, despite the strong legal emphasis of his analysis, Rancke’s findings 
suggest that this room for manoeuvre and adaptation provides primarily political, not 
legal opportunities.  
Rancke’s findings shed valuable light on the important role played by central works 
councils in practice. Indeed, in Rancke’s assessment, central works councils, and in 
particular their executive committees, are clearly the “single most important employee 
committee” in the whole works council system; they are “in fact the control centre of  
                                           
4 Companies in the coal and steel industries were excluded, since these applied the specific parity co-
determination regulations of the Montanmitbestimmungsgestz.  
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codetermination” (1982: 157-8)5. He attributes this eminent role of the central works 
council’s executive committees to three factors: first, the concentration of power and 
authority, which can for example be seen in the frequency with which central works 
council chairpersons are at the same time chairpersons of the largest local works 
council (68%), as well as, where they exist, of the group works council (52%), and are 
members of the company’s supervisory board (61%); second, the fact that nearly all 
formal and informal information channels between central management and the local 
works councils and workforces originate or terminate in the central works committee; 
and third, the high frequency with which central works committees are granted the 
authority to take decisions independently, which, taken together with the sum of the 
first two factors, means that they are a counterpart to central management to be 
reckoned with at the key level at which issues of true importance are taken. Rancke 
points out that though this may result in the marginalisation of the works council 
members at individual sites, this marginalisation seems to be on the whole accepted –
despite the inevitable conflicts – as long as, on the whole, successes can be secured on 
behalf of the employee representatives. (1982: 162).  
With respect to the regulatory activities of central works councils, Rancke reveals a 
large gap between what the law intended and the reality of practice. Indeed, Rancke 
concludes that despite the strict subsidiarity laid down by the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, 
local works councils’ participation in regulatory processes lags significantly behind 
that of the  central works council (1982: 355).  
Group Works Councils  
Rancke finds moreover, that group works councils, i.e., works councils that bring 
together peak-level employee representatives within groups of companies, are largely 
without function.  According to Rancke, they serve primarily as forum for the 
exchange of information among employee representatives and as a source of 
information  from group-level management.  As the key explanation for group works 
councils’ “widespread de facto lack of a function” (1982: 184) Rancke suggests that since 
the central works council already wields strong influence at the key locus decision-
making at the company level,  whether or not these issues originate within the 
company or the group, there is little practical or political necessity to call upon the 
group works council as a “higher level”.   
                                           
5 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations into English from German-language sources are mine.  
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Nagel et al. (1994), the only other researchers to have focussed on centralised instances 
of employee representation, come to similar conclusions about the limited regulatory 
capacity of group works councils (GWC). Taking a similar starting point to Rancke’s a 
decade earlier, Nagel et al. set out to examine the  ways in which the German works 
council legislation functions in practice. Drawing on six company case studies, Nagel et 
al. echo Rancke’s findings that the need to adapt a rigid and short-sighted conception 
of company structures to the realities of ‘modern’ companies has given rise to a great 
variety of formal and informal works council structures within groups of companies. 
Where Rancke sees a proliferation of alternative forms, Nagel et al. identify two basic 
forms of adaptation: the first is to develop an encompassing system of multi-level 
works councils which is congruent with management structures at all levels, albeit at 
the risk that their agendas will be watered down; the second is to “strategically reduce” 
the group works council structure to that management level at which issues of 
overarching relevance are decided within any given company (1994: 215).  
Nagel et al. identify a wide variation in the depth and nature of GWC activity. Most 
GWCs serve primarily as an information ‘clearing house’: they obtain, analyse and 
transfer information from the top level to lower levels of the company. A few GWCs, 
however, also aim to provide a service to local works councils, for example by drafting 
template agreements on common issues for further negotiation and implementation at 
the local level. The GWC’s ability to take on a more operative role, however, depends 
on the willingness of lower levels to accord them such a role. According to Nagel et al., 
the extent and nature of GWCs’ activities depends largely on the company’s 
codetermination traditions and culture, as well as on its own perception of its role, 
particularly as it is shaped by its chairperson and its executive committee. The authors 
describe the alternatives as follows: either the GWC is seen as a lamp which can be 
switched on and off at will by the local works councils when they need it – in this 
sense, the GWCs is only the sum of its parts. Alternatively, the GWC can develop into 
an institution with its own weight and capacity to act – in other words, it can be more 
than the sum of its parts.  
In the light of Rancke’s finding of the pre-eminent role played by central works 
councils, it is striking that Nagel et al. hardly mention central works councils at all, 
even though several of their case study companies do have central works councils in 
place.  Instead, they focus on the relationship between local works councils and group 
works councils, without considering what might be happening at the intermediate – 
and as Rancke found – more operatively and strategically important level.  
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Central and Group Works Councils as arenas for the mediation among 
local interests  
With the limitation that there are simply fewer issues of substance that are dealt with 
by group works councils, Nagel et al. do set out to investigate the ways in which the 
diverse needs and constraints of individual sites can be aggregated and balanced. 
These speculations suggest some important leads for the more detailed investigation of 
how central works councils function in practice which is the subject of the present 
research.  
Among the research hypotheses which originally informed their research were three 
which explicitly take up the question of balancing the different interests of the 
individual sites. First, the authors hypothesised that the GWC has the legal potential 
and resources to represent fragmented workforce interests across the group. On this 
basis the GWC can take on an important integrating function by ensuring a uniform 
representation vis-à-vis central group management. Second, the GWC runs the risk of 
being caught between the interests of the local works councils and central 
management. Peak-level employee interest representation thus amounts to a tightrope 
walk: how far can the GWC enter into compromises with central management without 
being accused of betraying the interests of local workforces? Third, Nagel et al. 
postulated a strategic function for the GWC: as the counterpart to central group 
management, the GWC must balance the wide range of individual employees’ interests 
and develop a negotiating position towards central group management which is not 
simply grounded in dominant interests but which can also incorporate particularistic 
interests (1982: 58-9).  
Unfortunately, the authors do not revisit these hypotheses, except to conclude that the 
strength of the GWC depends on the existing power relationships within the GWC 
which often mirror those within the company: larger sites will tend to dominate the 
group, although the existence of the GWC provides smaller sites with an important 
forum in which to air their particular concerns and to address group management 
directly. The authors also point out that the GWC tends to rate its own importance and 
influence higher than do its constituent works councils.   
The elusive importance of coordination  
Rancke (1982) finds that a range of issue-specific subcommittees which focus on, for 
example, remuneration principles, health and safety, or vocational training exist at 
both the central and local levels.  Pointing to the parallel existence of formal and 
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informal processes and substructures in central works councils, Rancke concludes that 
in principle, central works councils deal with “all issues of any importance” (1982: 163).   
Having established that central and local works councils deal with many of the same 
subject matters, Rancke’s quantitative data unfortunately only yields few indications of 
how the approach to such common or overarching issues is shuttled between the 
central and local levels. On the basis of an elaborate discussion of the principle of 
subsidiarity in the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, Rancke concludes that while there may be 
an intention or even a desire within the central works council to decide certain issues 
jointly – and indeed while there may even be a compelling practical necessity to do so – 
the distribution of authority which underpins the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz essentially 
forbids this. It is here that Rancke’s primarily legal analysis of the distribution of 
authority in practice reaches its limits, but it opens the door for the present analysis: if, 
despite the limitations of the legal framework, central works councils are demonstrably 
active in the whole range of issues subject to codetermination, then the focal questions 
must be: on what issues, how and why?  
Rancke identified this seemingly ubiquitous activity of central works councils nearly 
three decades ago;  it is all the more surprising, therefore, that the regular large-scale 
surveys of works councils which are conducted by the Hans-Böckler-Foundation/WSI 
do not address the range of issues that are dealt with by central works councils. In fact, 
they do not contain any questions about central or group works councils at all. In these 
regular surveys, works council members are asked which codetermination issues are 
most prominent in their works councils. (For the most recent results, see Schäfer 2003.) 
The top three issues which local works council members identify – early retirement, 
collective redundancies, and health and safety – are also known to figure large on the 
agendas of central works councils. Anecdotal evidence from practice also suggests that 
other issues noted by the respondents, such as the introduction of new technologies or 
forms of work, outsourcing or closures of establishments or parts of establishments, 
and reductions in bonus payments are also regularly dealt with in central works 
councils. On basis of the currently available empirical data, therefore, there is no way 
to assess the spread or nature of central works council approaches to these issues.  
From Nagel et al.’s findings, it can be concluded that group works councils’ position as 
peak-level employee representation is volatile. Pointing out that GWCs are essentially 
horizontal, rather than vertical structures, which are, moreover, far removed from the 
local works councils, Nagel et al. argue that in establishing their own specific chain of 
legitimation, GWCs are confronted with a dilemma: if the GWC is seen to be ‘too 
active’, then the local works councils fear that it will dictate policy and hinder their 
work. If the GWC is seen to be ‘too quiet’, however, local works councils will suspect it 
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of  having conceded too much to central management (1994: 14). Nagel et al. conclude 
that the GWC’s legal competences are not the decisive factor in determining its power 
resources; rather, the GWC is embedded into a complex regulatory system, in which 
informal behavioural norms are as effective as are legal norms. Thus,  Nagel et al.’s 
findings point to an intriguing conclusion: arguably, its actual legal competences are so 
limited that the GWC needs to adapt its structures and processes in order to be able to 
demonstrate the legitimacy of its actions towards its constituent central and local 
works councils.  
Clues from practice  
While the impression that central and group works councils have disappeared off the 
academic radar screen seems inescapable, indications from practice suggest that the 
challenge of mediating between the constraints and opportunities of different sites is 
an issue of some concern.  
As early as 1986, the Chairman of the Volkswagen Central Works Council suggested 
that in order to better respond to sweeping changes in work organisation and working 
time, the works councils would have to intensify their efforts to address these not 
simply at the local level, but across sites (IG Metall 1986). Publications in mainstream 
practitioners’ journals highlight the fact that due to the close integration of production 
processes across sites, central works councils increasingly address issues such as 
employment security (Kempe 1998) and outsourcing (Lieb 1996).  
In 1998, the German metalworkers’ union IG Metall launched a series of seminars 
designed to support their national-level CWC and GWC advisors. These seminars 
addressed the ways in which central works councils were increasingly confronted by 
intra-company coercive comparisons, structural changes in management processes 
which resulted in increased centralisation in some areas and fragmentation in others, 
and the need to accommodate these processes within a rigid legal structure and 
regionalised collective bargaining structures. Shortcomings in the national-level 
advising of central works councils in the IG Metall craft section, particularly in 
automotive repair companies, were identified in 1999; the IG Metall was urged to take 
active steps towards coordinating its activities at the company-level across the country, 
in order to actively prevent branches of the same company from being played against 
one another, to strive towards uniform regulations, and to ensure that all local sites 
have access to relevant information.  
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To sum up, and as the Chairman of the Central Works Council at Ford unambiguously 
described the central challenge – and the possible solution:  
“With its comparative analyses of unit costs  across the company’s own sites, 
Ford management have given competition within the company new impulses 
and meaning. And so it requires an ongoing and cautious coordination among 
the works councils of the German sites, in order to ensure that the legitimate 
efforts of individual local works councils to protect jobs does not result in a 
battle of everyone against everyone.  
This already difficult task becomes even more complicated when foreign sites 
are included in these competitive comparisons. Up to now, international 
cooperation among employee representatives at the European Ford sites, which 
has mainly taken place under the auspices of the International Metalworkers’ 
Federation in Geneva as well as the EMF in Brussels, has been satisfactory.  
It is evident, however, that the variety of shared problems requires an ongoing 
coordination similar to [that practiced in] the central works council.  Here the 
questions of uniform safety standards, the development of common approaches 
to the definition of working time or production schedules, and the prevention 
of transfers of orders in the case of industrial conflict should be highlighted.” 
(quoted in IG Metall 1990: 62). 
It is precisely this proposition which this research seeks to explore.  
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Chapter Three: Key analytical issues – Federalism, 
Democracy and Solidarity 
3.1. Introduction 
It has been suggested that EWCs will never be able to overcome the competitive 
relations between sites and workplaces (Streeck 1996, Hancké 2000, Martinez Lucio 
and Weston (2004). Yet this is precisely what Central Works Councils in Germany are 
designed to do.  In the absence of existing research about how central works councils 
actually function, this thesis therefore sets out to investigate the practical workings of a 
particularly integrative central works council in order to identify the lessons to be 
learned for the perspective of solidarity within EWCs.  
Based on a discussion of the meaning of solidarity as well as different types of 
solidarity, the need for a pluralist conception of solidarity which can be achieved by 
means of discursive and participative structures is identified. Rather than attempting 
to impose a hierarchical and monolithic concept of solidarity, this approach takes 
(potentially) diverging interests as the very basis for solidarity.  
Implicitly, this approach applies to single groups of individuals. The process of 
generating solidarity is arguably more complicated if it is to take place across different 
levels involving different constellations of actors who have access to different amounts 
and kinds of information, and who are  furthermore charged with representing the 
interests of further groups of individuals.   
It is here that federalism provides the means to grasp the ways in which collective 
opinion-forming and decision-making can be achieved across a multi-level system. In 
other words, federalist political orders, which are conceived as a means of reconciling 
unity with diversity, can provide the framework for discursive-participative processes 
cast against a backdrop of shared values and objectives.  Casting the multi-level system 
of interest representation as laid out in the German Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (BetrVG: 
Works Constitution Act) as a federalist political order, and focussing on the central 
works council as  the closest available analogue to a European Works Council, this 
chapter seeks to identify the key analytical issues which are needed to explain the way 
the CWC — and by analogy an EWC — can generate solidarity.  
The case study of the Central Works Council at DaimlerChrysler which follows in 
Chapter Five will explore how such an essentially federalist and pluralist system of 
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multi-level employee interest representation functions in practice to generate and 
affirm a fundamental willingness to exercise solidarity. The final chapters will explore 
the implications of these findings for the perspective of solidarity in European Works 
Councils. 
The role of this chapter, then, is to explain how the federalist organisational character 
of the CWC makes a reliance on negotiated consensus rather than imposed conformity 
its only option. The broad principles of solidarity as a collective interest are developed 
and applied to the context of cross-site and cross-country multi-level interest 
representation. The constraints and opportunities provided by a federalist political 
order represent the key prerequisites and conditions which shape the ability and 
willingness to exercise solidarity across sites — and, indeed, across countries.  
Federalist theory allows us to illuminate the ways in which different levels combine to 
accommodate both unity and diversity. Key tenets of federalism allow us to 
conceptualise both divided and shared sovereignty within a central works council.   
This chapter therefore seeks to cast the multi-level system of interest representation at 
company level as it is prescribed by the German Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (BetrVG: 
Works Constitution Act)  as a federalist political order. Cast in federalist terms, the 
multi-level system of interest representation at company level consists of three orders 
of “government”: the local works council, the central works council, and the group 
works council.  
This chapter will explore the ways in which the multi-level system of interest 
representation as it is laid out in the BetrVG can be understood to be a federalist system 
which provides means to accommodate both unity and diversity. The implications of 
democratic theory, in particular the contributions of notions of consociational 
democracy, will be linked to the primarily organisational and policy-oriented 
characteristics of federalism. Finally, the relationship between federalism, democracy 
and solidarity will be explored.  
3.2. Multi-level systems of employee representation 
In complex companies which operate across several sites, multi-level systems of 
company-level workplace participation can be the most appropriate counterpart to the 
corresponding managerial structures. From the local level to the European or even 
global level, each level can build upon the one below it and thus enable interaction 
between management and employee representatives at and across different levels of 
the same company or group of companies.   
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Most European countries have provided for multi-level institutional arrangements for 
employee interest representation at the company level to match the multi-level 
structures of companies. The German BetrVG provides for a particularly elaborate and 
comprehensive such multi-level system.  
With respect to European Works Councils in particular, the system can be conceived as 
potentially representing a peak-level institution of employee representation which 
build upon lower-level institutions of employee representation,  be they Betriebsräte, 
comités d’entreprises, or shop stewards committees. However, the existence of such 
substructures at the national level, and particularly their institutional and political 
connection to the EWC as its constituents, is the crucial prerequisite for the EWC’s 
ability to function as a peak-level institution which integrates national systems of 
industrial relations.    
Chapter Six will explore in more detail whether and how European Works Councils 
can be integrated into such a federal conception of employee interest representation. In 
order to provide a foundation for this concluding analysis, this chapter will set the 
stage for the case study of the Central Works Council at DaimlerChrysler, in which the 
relationship between the two orders of local and central works councils is isolated in 
order to investigate how the multi-level system of interest representation functions in 
practice.   
3.3. The contribution of theories of federalism 
Federalist theories have been developed to examine the prerequisites for and workings 
of governance systems that span more than one level of government. Federalism 
provides a constitutional language which is well suited to grasp both the structures 
and dynamics of such multi-tiered institutional arrangements for company-level 
employee participation.  
The resemblance between multi-tiered systems of interest representation and federal 
governance structures is more than structural. The same questions that are raised by 
federal theory also arise in the context of industrial relations: how do levels interact? 
How do actors act within those systems? How are unity and diversity reconciled?  
Building upon a brief introduction to federalist theory, the following section will 
explore the ways in which the key tenets of federalist theory can be applied to multi-
level systems of workplace employee participation. Using the institutional framework 
laid out in the German BetrVG, it will be demonstrated that the German system of 
workplace interest representation clearly amounts to a federal political order.  
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It is important to bear in mind that this section focuses mainly on the ground rules 
defining the federal political order, rather than its actual practice. What little empirical 
evidence is available indicates that the ways in which these frameworks are filled out 
in practice varies widely across German  companies according to the preferences and 
priorities of the actors involved.  
What is Federalism?  
According to Watts (1991)  a federal system is  
a form of territorial political organisation in which unity and regional diversity 
are accommodated within a single political system by distributing power among 
general and regional governments in a manner constitutionally safeguarding the 
existence and authority of each. Distinctive features are the distribution of 
authority between at least two levels of government and the coexistence of unity 
and regional diversity (Watts 1991: 228). 
The need for a useful definition of federalism has given rise to a wide-ranging 
scholarly debate. On the one hand, it is possible to define federalism as any form of 
shared government which lies between the two extremes of unitary government and a 
loose linkage between states. Rather than developing a broad, encompassing definition 
of federalism, Wheare (1946) advocates a restricted definition of the term “Federalism”. 
According to Watts (1991),  
This approach identifies the concept that neither the central nor the regional 
order of government should be legally or politically subordinate to the other as 
the basic federal principle (…) Federalism is viewed as a compromise between 
extreme concentrations of power and loose confederacies. It makes possible the 
combination of effective central powers for handling common problems with the 
preservation of regional autonomy and distinctiveness. Federal political systems 
so conceived are not hierarchical systems of decentralisation but non-centralised 
systems in which authority is diffused among independent but interacting 
centres. Both independence and interdependence, and both rivalry and 
cooperation, characterise relations between general and regional governments 
within federations (Watts 1991: 228). 
Arguing that such a restricted definition of federalism results in the exclusion of many 
variants that would shed light onto the sliding scale between extreme centralisation 
and extreme decentralisation which are apparent in the actual workings of federalist 
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systems, Riker (1993) has advocated a more inclusive definition. According to Riker, 
“federalism is a political organisation in which the activities of government are decided 
between regional governments and central government in such a way that each kind of 
government has some activities on which it makes final decisions” (1993).   
In other words, if the objective is to achieve the widest possible range of empirical 
comparisons in order to generate a robust theoretical grounding for an understanding 
of federalism, a more inclusive definition of federalism may be more appropriate. The 
aim of this section, however, is not to compare, but rather to cast the existing multi-
level system of employee interest representation as it is specifically laid out in the 
Works Constitution Act as a federalist political order. Because a restrictive definition is 
more specific and definitive, it is therefore analytically more useful to rely on the 
restrictive definition put forward by Watts.  
3.4. A multi-tiered system of works councils as laid out in the 
BetrVG 
German law provides for participation and codetermination rights for employees at 
both the workplace level (betriebliche Mitbestimmung) and in the supervisory boards of 
companies (Unternehmensmitbestimmung).  
The Works Constitution Act (BetrVG) provides for the establishment of  a tiered system 
of works councils at all levels of the company. The first Works Constitution Act was 
enacted in 1952, it was revised in 1972, and it was most recently revised in 2001. The 
German BetrVG lays out the rules governing cooperation between the employer, the 
workforce, the works council, the trade unions and the employers’ associations. The 
following section will focus exclusively on the rules governing workplace employee 
representation.  
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The local works council (Betriebsrat) 
The BetrVG provides for the election of works councils in any establishment of private 
industry with at least five employees with voting rights6.  The size of the works council 
increases with the total number of employees.  
The Central Works Council (Gesamtbetriebsrat) 
A central works council  (CWC) must be established within any company with two or 
more establishments which have set up works councils.   
The Group Works Council (Konzernbetriebsrat) 
In groups of companies, a Group Works Council (GWC) can be established to cover all 
companies belonging to the group if the works councils representing at least 50% of the 
group’s total workforce so request. Until the reform of the BetrVG in 2001, this 
threshold was set at 75% of the total workforce.  
Works councils set up on the basis of the BetrVG meet as necessary. As a rule, local 
works councils meet weekly or bi-weekly.  The BetrVG only specifies that management 
must meet with the local works council at least once per month. The frequency of 
Central and Group Works Councils meetings has never been systematically 
investigated. However, anecdotal evidence suggests a wide variation. Some Central 
Works Councils, such as that at DaimlerChrysler, meet 10 times per year; others, such 
as that at Bosch, meet in plenary only three times per year, although its central Works 
Committee meets 10 times per year. Some Group Works Councils meet only twice per 
year.  
Annual works council assembly 
Section 53 of the BetrVG requires that at least once per calendar year, an annual 
assembly of all the executive committees of all the local works councils be convened. 
Local works councils are free to delegate other members, provided that the number of 
delegates does not exceed the number of executive committee members who could be 
delegated.  
                                           
6 Eligibility to vote is closely defined in the BetrVG, and includes such requirements as a minimum age of 
18, and at least three months’ employment with the company (e.g., this also includes temporary workers).  
 46
At this meeting, the Central Works Council is to report on its activities. The employer 
is also required to report on  
staff questions and social affairs in the company, including the status of 
equality between women and men and the integration of the foreign employees 
working in the establishment, the financial position of and trends in the 
establishment, and on environmental protection in the establishment, in as far 
as there is no risk of a disclosure of trade or business secrets. (Section 53 (2)2 
BetrVG 2001)7
For an illustration of these different levels of works councils, see Figure 1: A multi-level 
system of works councils according to the BetrVG.  
                                           
7 All citations of the Works Constitution Act (2001) are taken from the official English-language translation 
published online by the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour BMWA. 
http://www.bmwa.bund.de/Navigation/Service/Englisch/labour,did=7514.html 
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Figure 1: A multi-level system of works councils according to the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (BetrVG)
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3.5. The CWC as a federal political order 
Watts (1991) identifies the characteristic features of federations which are consistent 
with the above restricted definition of federalism.  I will demonstrate how, in line with 
these characteristic features, the relationships between local, central, and group works 
councils can be considered federal systems.  
Orders of government under the BetrVG: the election and delegation of 
works council members  
According to Watts, a federation consists of at least “two orders of government” 
(Watts 1991:229).  In federalist terms, these two orders of government are a general or 
central government and regional government. As outlined above, if we replace 
“government” by works council, then this description clearly applies to the multi-
tiered system of works councils under study here.   
The members of local works councils under the BetrVG are elected by and from the 
workforce for a four-year term.  Works council members can be re-elected to serve 
further terms. Candidates must have worked for the company for at least six months. 
Members of the executive staff8 are not entitled to vote or stand as candidates. If a 
works council has three or more members, then whichever gender is in the minority in 
the establishment must make up at least the same percentage of the works council as it 
does in the establishment as a whole9. By default, the election is conducted according 
to the principle of proportional representation; i.e., the elector casts a single vote for 
one of several lists of candidates put forward by employees or trade unions10. The seats 
on the works councils are then distributed among the lists according to the proportion 
of votes cast for each list. In practice, however, works council elections are normally 
carried out by majority vote; i.e.,  a single list of candidates is put forward, and each 
elector can choose as many candidates are there are seats to be filled on the works 
councils. Those candidates who receive the highest number of votes will have been 
elected.  
                                           
8 Executive staff (leitende Angestellte) are defined in Section 5 (3) BetrVG as employees who under their 
contract of employment or status in the establishment are for example “entitled on their own 
responsibility to engage and dismiss employees”, “ are endowed with general authority (power of 
procuration) or full power of representation or power to sign”, or “regularly carry out other duties which 
are important for the existence and development of the company”, etc. (BMWA 2001).  
9 This gender quota was introduced in the BetrVG reform in 2001. It did not apply at the time that the 
works councils at DaimlerChrysler were surveyed as part of this research.  
10 A list which is put forward for election must have the documented support of at least 1/20th of the total 
workforce or at least three electors (two electors in workplaces with less than 20 employees).  
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 If a company has several establishments with works councils in place, then each local 
works council has the right to delegate members to the Central Works Council (CWC). 
Within groups of companies, each local Works Council or Central Works Council has 
the right to delegate members to a Group Works Council (GWC).  (See Figure 1: A 
multi-level system of works councils according to the BetrVG.)  Depending on the legal 
structure of ownership and control within the group of companies, there can be several 
Group or Central Works Councils in place; each of these can then delegate members 
directly to an overarching Group Works Council.  The delegates are elected from 
among the delegating works council’s members by majority vote; as will be outlined in 
more detail below, in CWCs and GWCs, this majority is qualified by votes weighted 
according to the relative strength of each local workforce represented in the delegating 
works council.  
The BetrVG also allows for alternate arrangements for cross-site employee 
representation structures under certain conditions. Such alternative arrangements must 
as a rule be the subject of a collective agreement with the trade union represented in 
the company. It is only if there is currently no collective agreement with a trade union 
in force that alternative arrangements can be formalised in a works agreement signed 
by the works councils themselves.  
Under the provisions of the 1972 BetrVG, the local works council of any establishment 
employing both blue collar and white collar employees had the right to send one 
representative of each group to the CWC. Similar requirements ensured the 
representation of both blue- and white-collar representatives on the GWC.  One of the 
key amendments to the BetrVG in 2001 was to repeal this distinction between white 
and blue-collar workers. Instead, any local works council with three members or fewer 
elects one member to the CWC, and local works councils with more than three 
members have the right to delegate two members to the CWC. Furthermore, where for 
reasons of internal company ownership and control structure a local works council is 
not covered by an overarching central works council, it may delegate representatives 
directly to the GWC.  
Each level exists in its own right  
Watts goes on to specify that these different orders of government within a federation 
exist  “in their own right under the constitution, each directly elected and acting 
directly upon citizens by legislation, administration and taxation” (Watts 1991:229). 
The local works councils, the central works council, and the group works council each 
exist in their own right, as provided for by the BetrVG.  
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It must be said, though, that while the local works council is directly elected from 
among the workforce, the members of the CWC and the GWC are elected by the local 
works council or the CWC from among its members, rather than directly by the work 
force; in this sense they are only indirectly elected to the CWC/GWC by the workforce.  
Nonetheless, the CWC and the GWC act “directly upon citizens by legislation and 
administration”; in CWC and GWC terms, this “legislation and administration” 
comprise CWC and GWC agreements and policies which, for a strictly defined set of 
issues at least, are directly binding upon the local establishments. Furthermore, as a 
result of the reform of the BetrVG in 2001, the CWC is also responsible for sites at 
which there is no local works council in place, either because they do not meet the 
threshold requirements or because the workforce has failed to elect a local works 
council. It is clear, then, that for a limited range of issues at least, the local works 
councils cannot ‘secede’ from the authority of the CWC.  
Formal distribution of power and authority: the competence of the works 
councils at different levels 
According to Watts,  a federation is marked by a formal distribution of legislative and 
executive authority between the two orders of government. This distribution of 
authority is laid down in a written constitution which is furthermore “not unilaterally 
amendable in its fundamental provisions by one order of government alone” (Watts 
1991: 229).   
The competence of local works councils 
One of the main duties of the works council is to ensure that effect is given to Acts, 
ordinances, safety regulations, collective agreements and works agreements.  
The range of rights granted to works councils represents an extremely complicated 
attempt to strike a balance between employee interests and managerial prerogative. 
Put simply, the rights of the works council can be distinguished according their effect.  
On some issues, the works council has only participative rights (i.e., rights to 
information, to make suggestions, to be heard, to be consulted).  On other issues, works 
councils enjoy the right to codetermination (i.e., the right to take initiative and to refuse 
approval). In general, works council rights are strongest with regard to overall social 
policy, somewhat weaker regarding to personnel issues, and still weaker with respect 
to financial and strategic matters (Jacobi et al. 1998; Knudsen 1995).  
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The right to information, although it is the weakest form of participation rights, ensures 
that the works council is informed in good time and comprehensively about the 
company’s financial, operative and strategic plans; this information serves as useful 
background and leverage in exercising its other, stronger rights.  
The right to make recommendations, to be heard and to be consulted are more far-reaching; 
however, they are graduated. The works council’s right to make suggestions, for 
example, is limited to certain situations, such as staff planning, or the promotion of  
participation in vocational training, but the employer is obliged to take note of the 
works council’s suggestions. The right to be heard, however, requires the employer to 
have obtained the works council’s opinion before taking action; if the employer fails to 
do so, then the measure may be blocked. Measures about which the works council has 
the right to be heard include dismissals and new hires. The works council has the right 
to be consulted concerning issues such as workplace design, job content, staff planning, 
vocational training, and the introduction of new technologies, for example.  
The works council has the right to codetermination or co-decision on a wide range of social 
matters, but even these provisional veto-rights are graduated according to the issue at 
hand.  The intricacy of the limits to codetermination is far too complex to sketch here; a 
rough overview of the general issue areas subject to codetermination rights must 
suffice. Co-determination rights apply to such matters as order in the establishment, 
the distribution of working hours across the day and week (including overtime), 
holidays, the introduction and use of technical control equipment (insofar as they also 
monitor performance), and principles and methods of remuneration (including bonus 
schemes and performance-related pay).  Specific aspects of staff issues, such as 
standard employment contracts, design of staff questionnaires, staff guidelines, or 
assessment principles are also subject to co-determination. Some core aspects of 
recruitment, grading and dismissals are also covered by codetermination. Finally, 
should restructuring in the establishment result in collective redundancies, for 
example, then the employer must secure the works council’s approval of a social 
compensation plan.  To the extent that specific aspects of any issues are subject to full 
codetermination, the employer must secure the approval of the works council.  
While the various rights are specifically granted for closely-defined aspects of 
overarching social, personnel and financial issues, it is essential to note that in practice, 
these works council rights to information, consultation and codetermination are 
exercised tactically in conjunction with one another. To name a classic example, works 
councils regularly use their right to refuse to approve overtime in order to exert 
pressure on the employer regarding other issues in which their codetermination rights 
are less strong.   
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The competence of CWCs and GWCs 
It is important to bear in mind that the CWC is not hierarchically superior to the local 
works councils. It exists alongside them in order to exercise the same rights to 
participation and codetermination sketched above, but only with respect to those 
issues which have cross-site implications and which cannot be dealt with at the local 
level. Similarly, the GWC is not hierarchically superior to the CWC or the local works 
councils; it too exists alongside the other works councils in order to address issues 
which have implications for more than one company within a group of companies.  
This principle of subsidiarity is paramount in the overall logic of the BetrVG. The local 
works council is closest to the workforce, and is thus best placed to deal with the range 
of issues on which works councils have the right to information, participation and 
codetermination.  It is only in exceptional cases that the CWC or GWC is competent; as 
a rule, the local works council is competent rather than the CWC or GWC. 
The formal allocation of authority between the local works councils and the central 
works council is laid out in the BetrVG:  
Works Constitution Act, Section 50: Competency 
(1) The central works council shall be competent to deal with matters affecting 
the company as a whole or two or more of its establishments, which the 
individual works councils are unable to settle within their establishments; 
therefore its competency also covers establishments that have no works council. 
It shall not be deemed to be a higher organ than the individual works councils.  
(2) A works council may refer a matter to the central works council by a majority 
vote of its members. In doing so, the works council may reserve the right of 
decision.  
A nearly identical wording in Section 58 of the BetrVG describes the competency of the 
Group Works Council with respect to Central Works Councils or local works councils.  
In other words, the competence of the CWC and the GWC is strictly limited to those 
issues which cannot be settled at the level of the local works council. At the same time, 
the law allows for a delegation of competence to the CWC and/or the GWC, leaving it 
up to the local works councils to decide whether or not they are willing to be bound by 
its decisions.  
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Whether a matter affects more than one establishment is usually easy to determine, but 
whether it cannot be dealt with at the local level is often more difficult to determine.  
Two examples should suffice to illustrate how the allocation of competence in each 
case must be assessed individually. The installation of a new telephone system, for 
example, is subject to codetermination since it can be used to monitor behaviour or 
performance of employees. If the same system is to be installed across the company, 
the CWC might be considered competent to exercise the rights to codetermination. 
However, the actual use of the telephone system will most likely vary across sites: in a 
site in which there are many desk-jobs, the use of the telephone can be linked to 
specific employees, while on the shop floor, there may be telephones that are for 
‘public’ use. Since these different  and possibly site-specific uses have implications for 
the employer’s ability to monitor employees’ performance and behaviour, the actual 
use of the telephone system must be regulated individually and specifically by each 
works council for each site,  even if for technical or economic reasons the same system 
is to installed across the company’s different sites.  The local works council would 
therefore have the last word regarding the implementation and use of the new 
technology.   
To name another example, if the employer wants to introduce a company-wide bonus 
payment on top of existing collective agreements, then the question of whether or not 
such a payment is made and how high it is would not be subject to codetermination, 
but the works councils would have the right to codetermination about the principles 
according to which it is distributed across the workforce. If the employer makes the 
bonus scheme conditional upon the existence of a uniform agreement about the 
principles of distribution of the payment which are valid for all sites, then it is only the 
CWC or the GWC which is competent to conclude such an agreement (Kunz 1998).   
Because of the strength of this subsidiarity principle, negotiations towards Central 
Works Agreements are quite rare in practice, and Group Works Agreements are even 
more rare. Indeed, it is only agreements which lie in the original competence of the 
CWC or GWC which take the legal form of Group or Central Works Agreements. In 
cases in which according to Paragraphs 50(2) and 58(2) the local works councils have 
referred a matter to the CWC or GWC, by contrast, the final agreement still takes the 
legal form of a set of local works agreements with identical wording. It is the local 
works councils who are officially the signatories of the agreement(s), and they reserve 
the right to terminate them.  
Most commonly, then, as a means to accommodate this principle of subsidiarity, 
Works Agreements at the centralised level take the form of framework agreements, in 
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which certain minimum standards or outcomes are defined, but the actual specification 
of the measures and their implementation are subject to codetermination or 
participation at the local level. For example, some aspects of the introduction of 
company-wide systems of identification cards, such as the information it contains, 
might be regulated in a framework agreement at Group level, while other aspects such 
as the ways in which access to sites is regulated via company identity cards would be 
dealt with by local works council (Däubler et al. 2002: 867-888).   
As a result of this strictly protected autonomy of the local level, the role of Central and 
Group works councils is far more to coordinate than to negotiate (Behne 1990; Däubler 
et al. 2002). And the need for coordination is rising. Even if as a rule final authority 
rests securely in the hands of the local works councils, the growing concentration of 
economic and strategic decision-making at the central level means that increasingly, 
holistic company-wide strategies such as lean production, restructuring of production 
chains and outsourcing are no longer decided at the local level, but at a more 
centralised level instead. The local managerial level is merely responsible for 
implementing these policies; this imbalance leads to an erosion of the local works 
councils’ regulatory influence, since their access is limited to the implementing level, 
not the decision-making level.  In response, the central and group works councils must 
increasingly step into this breach, not by regulating in the place of local works councils, 
but in securing information for all and in endeavouring to closely coordinate their day-
to-day activities in order to foster a uniform approach to common problems (Kunz 
1998). 
In summary, then, since the BetrVG clearly defines the competence of works councils at 
each level, as well as defining the rules whereby the local works councils and central 
works councils can mandate the CWC and/or the GWC to act on their behalf, this 
federalist prerequisite of a formal distribution of authority which is laid out in a 
written constitution clearly applies to the multi-tiered works council system operating 
in accordance with the Works Constitution Act.  
Specific processes and institutions: The comitology of the BetrVG 
Watts points out that federations as a rule have defined “specific processes and 
institutions to facilitate intergovernmental administrative and political interaction” 
(Watts 1991:229).  According to Watts, chief among such institutions are central 
institutions, “designed to ensure that the interests of regional minorities and groups 
are accommodated in the process of central policy-making”.  
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Under the BetrVG, local works councils which have nine or more members elect a works 
committee, consisting of the chairperson, deputy chairperson, and further members up 
to a maximum of nine, allocated according to the size of the works council. Where 
there are fewer than nine works council members, the works council may delegate the 
day-to-day running of the works council’s business to its chair and deputy chair. 
Similar rules apply to central and group works councils.  In addition to dealing with 
the day-to-day business of the works councils, these committees may be given 
responsibility for independent action by majority vote of the local works council, CWC, 
or GWC, respectively. (See Figure 1 : A multi-level system of works councils according to 
the BetrVG.) 
At the cross-site level, the BetrVG requires the establishment of an executive committee 
in those CWCs or GWCs which have more than nine members. This executive 
committee, called the Central Works Committee or the Group Works Committee11, consists 
of  the chair and deputy chair of the CWC or GWC, with the number of additional 
members to be elected varying according to the size of the CWC or GWC.   
The works councils in companies with at least 100 employees can set up additional 
committees, task forces, or project groups and assign them specific tasks.  Central works 
councils and group works councils can also set up further subcommittees to deal with 
specific issues and tasks. At all levels, joint committees can be set up with the 
participation of the employer or his representatives. At no level is a committee entitled 
to sign works agreements, however.  Final policy decisions are the prerogative of the 
full works council only; in the comitology of the BetrVG, this substructure is designed 
to facilitate the administrative and political interaction which provide the basis for final 
policy decisions.  
According to Section 106 of the BetrVG, works councils in companies normally 
employing more than 100 employees must appoint a finance committee consisting of 
between three and seven members. At least one member of the works council must be 
a member of this finance committee; further members can be drawn from the 
workforce at large. By majority vote, the local works council can assign the duties of 
the finance committee to one of its own subcommittees. The finance committee is 
always installed at the level of the whole company, not its individual establishments; 
where there is a central works council, it appoints a finance committee to cover the 
whole company. While there is no requirement for a finance committee at the Group 
                                           
11 Gesamtbetriebsausschuss and Konzernbetriebsausschuss respectively 
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level, however, group-level finance committees have been set up by collective 
agreement in many companies.  
The finance committee has the duty to consult with the employer on financial matters 
and to report back to the works council. The employer must inform the finance 
committee in good time and with the relevant documentation about issues ranging 
from the economic and financial situation of the company, the production and 
marketing situation, investment programmes, production techniques and work 
methods,  to the reduction, closure or transfer of establishments or parts of 
establishments.  
In summary, the BetrVG thus provides for specific processes and institutions across all 
levels, from the executive committee charged with running the day-to-day work of the 
CWC and the GWC, and other issue-specific committees as necessary, to the annual 
works council assembly as a means of ensuring both the democratic accountability of 
the work of the CWC and local works council’s access to top-level management.  
As will be seen, the CWC at DaimlerChrysler has devised an elaborate substructure 
designed to not only facilitate the process of joint policy development by local works 
council representatives under the aegis of the CWC, but also to ensure that the views of 
minorities, whether they be individual plants or groups of employees, are taken into 
account in the policy-making processes of the CWC.  
An umpire: constitutional powers 
Watts points out that there is generally “an umpire, usually a supreme court, to rule 
upon disputes over the respective constitutional powers of the two orders of 
government” (Watts 1991:229). The labour court system in Germany plays this umpire 
role with respect to the BetrVG, and indeed the vast majority of cases involving CWCs 
and GWCs revolve around  disputes about the distribution of competence between 
local and central works councils (Kunz 2003). Chiefly, such judgements involve cases 
in which a local works council disputes whether an issue can only be dealt with 
uniformly across all sites, and thus whether the CWC or GWC, rather than each local 
works councils individually, is competent to treat it.   
3.6. The CWC as an interlocking form of federalism 
Føllesdal (2003) distinguishes between different forms of interaction between what he 
calls the sub-units and the central unit. The involvement of sub-units in central 
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decision making is institutionalised in one of two basic forms. In the first of these 
forms, which Føllesdal calls “separate (split or compact) federalism”, decisions made 
centrally do not involve the sub-units directly at all.  
By contrast, in the second basic federalist model which Føllesdal calls “interlocking or 
cooperative federalism”, a variety of sub-forms have emerged in which the sub-units 
are directly integrated into the structures of the central level. He distinguishes between 
at least two forms of such interlocking federalism, while pointing out that the two 
often co-exist. Through forms of “collective agency”, compositional arrangements are 
struck whereby the subunits participate directly in central bodies, such as cabinets or 
legislatures. As Føllesdal points out, subunits often furthermore form a central body 
which interacts with other bodies. As an example of such “divided agency” which is 
characterised by its relationship with other bodies rather than its composition, 
Føllesdal cites an Upper House which has the power to veto or postpone decisions 
taken by another body or bodies by  majority or qualified majority vote.  
Decision-making within the works councils 
As stipulated by the BetrVG, decision-making within works councils functions by a 
majority vote among the members present; in some cases, a quota of a majority of all 
works council members (whether present or absent) is specified.  
In the CWC and GWC, however, a system of weighted majority voting is introduced in 
order to take into account that sites of different sizes are represented by the same 
number of representatives from each site:  each member of the CWC and GWC casts as 
many votes as he or she represents at his or her local site. Until the reform of the 
BetrVG in 2001, these proxy votes were allocated according to white- and blue-collar 
groups of employees: the blue-collar representative cast as many votes as there were 
blue-collar workers in the local site, and the white-collar representative cast as many 
votes as there were white-collar employees at the local site. At the time that this 
research was conducted, this system of vote allocation according to groups of 
employees was in force.  Since 2001, however, when the distinction according to 
groups of employees was revoked, each CWC member is allocated half the votes of his 
or her site.  
The decision-making processes and allocation of authority within a CWC and a GWC 
thus exhibit both variants of interlocking or cooperative federalism. On the one hand, 
the CWC is clearly a form of collective agency, since it is entirely made up of members 
of the sub-units, i.e., the local works councils. The wide-scale involvement of local 
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works council members in the work of some CWCs via committees and project groups 
can be understood to be a further form of such collective agency. At the same time, 
since the local works councils in many cases must formally mandate the CWC and the 
GWC to take decisions on their behalf, this also results in a form of divided rather than 
collective agency.  
In summary, the BetrVG’s system of multi-level and above all cross-site interest 
representation at company level amounts to a federal political order in line with both 
inclusive and restrictive definitions of the term.  The composition and decision-making 
procedures of each level are clearly defined, and power and authority are formally 
distributed among the levels. Specific processes and institutions exist to facilitate but 
not oblige background administrative and policy-oriented cooperation between levels.  
In case of dispute, the labour courts are mandated rule upon the constitutional division 
of authority between levels.  
One final question which arises is whether the CWC might not better be termed a 
confederation. Hughes (1991:128), points out that “States sometimes share certain 
institutions of government […] But when a point of no return is passed, when 
unanimity is no longer required for vital ultimate decisions, the related concept of 
federalism is appropriate.” Assuming a case in which the CWC is indisputably 
competent according to Section 50 of the BetrVG, the law provides for majority 
decision-making according to votes weighed by the number of employees represented 
by each member.  Since in such cases minority opinions can be easily overruled, this 
suggests that the CWC system as laid out in the BetrVG cannot be considered a 
confederation.  
3.7. Democratic theory 
The following section explores the democratic underpinnings of federalist political 
orders.  The discussion from this point onwards will refer only to central works 
councils. There are two reasons for this: the first is for clarity; as demonstrated above, 
the organisational features of central works councils and the group works councils are 
so similar to one another that they are virtually interchangeable in this discussion of 
central compared with local levels. Second, the case study below isolates the central 
works council at DaimlerChrysler; this discussion therefore provides a direct 
introduction to the case study which follows.  
Føllesdal points out that “Federalism raises several challenges to democratic theory, 
especially as developed for unitary states. Federal arrangements are often more 
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complex, thereby challenging standards of transparency and accountability” (Føllesdal 
2003).   
Insofar as it was developed for unitary states of the Westphalian model, key tenets of 
democratic theory are challenged by federalism. 
The power that sub-units wield in federations often restricts or violates majority rule in 
ways that merit careful scrutiny. Federal political orders typically influence 
individuals’ political influence by skewing their voting weight in favour of citizens of 
small sub-units, or by granting sub-unit representatives veto rights on central 
decisions. Minorities thus exercise control in apparent violation of principles of 
political equality and one-person-one-vote – more so when sub-units are of different 
sizes. These features raise fundamental normative questions concerning why sub-units 
should matter for the allocation of political power among individuals who live in 
different sub-units (Føllesdal 2003).  
This criticism may ring true if one only thinks of majoritarian systems of the 
Westminster model. There is, however, no one unambiguous and uncontested  
‘democratic theory’.  
The model of consociational democracy, which can be considered the principal 
alternative to majoritarian systems (Lijphart 1991), provides the means to better grasp 
the role of minorities as they are captured within an essentially federalist and pluralist 
structure such as the central works council. Indeed, as Lijphart (1991) points out, 
federalism provides an especially suitable means of securing the segmental autonomy 
which is a key principle underlying consociational democracy.  By applying the 
concept of consociational democracy, we may thus better understand the theoretical 
underpinnings of the exercise of democracy within the federal political model of a 
central works council.  
Arguably, the system of weighted majority voting in force at the CWC does not 
contradict democratic theory, as suggested by Føllesdal (2001); indeed, because CWC 
members cast as many votes as individuals working within the plant which they 
represent, the system in place at the CWC is conceivably more in line with the principle 
of one-person-one-vote than are ostensibly similar systems of weighted majority 
voting. One of the most prominently discussed models of weighted majority voting is, 
of course, the qualified majority voting (QMV) system which is the decision-making 
modus applied for certain issues within the European Council. This QMV system in 
place at the EU only roughly approximates the size of the countries represented; most 
famously with respect to Luxembourg , it clearly skews voting weights in favour of 
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smaller countries, and irons out quite significant differences in population size among 
the four largest Member States.  
The four basic principles of consociational democracy: executive power 
sharing, autonomy, proportionality and the minority veto 
Arend Lijphart (1991) provides a useful explication of consociational democracy: 
“consociational democracy is particularly suited for the governance of plural societies, 
that is, societies which are deeply divided by religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, 
cultural, racial or ethnic differences, which form clearly separate and easily identifiable 
segments.”    
The individual works councils within the multi-tiered system of works councils can be 
considered regional segments in Lijphart’s terms.12
Lijphart (1991) defines consociational democracy in terms of four basic principles. The 
two most important principles are executive power sharing and a high degree of 
autonomy for the segments, or sub-units, of the plural society. The two secondary 
principles in Lijphart’s conception are proportionality and the minority veto.  
Lijphart’s principles of consociational democracy can be applied to the federalist 
system of cross-site interest representation via the CWC.  
Lijphart defines the first principle, executive power sharing, as government by a 
coalition of representatives of all significant segments (Lijphart 1991:137).  In the sphere 
of public government, which is the basis for his explication, this may take a variety of 
forms, such as coalition government, presidential power-sharing and the distribution 
of high offices among the different segments.  As Lijphart points out, this principle 
stands in stark contrast to the concentration of power in one-party, non-coalition 
governments which are typical of the Westminster model of majoritarian democracy. 
Applied to the CWC, this principle of executive power sharing is embodied in both the 
comitology of the CWC as well as in reservation of final decisions to the collective. It 
will be seen that in practice, the principle of executive power sharing is an ever-present 
concern within the CWC at DaimlerChrysler.  
                                           
12 These “segments” are what Føllesdal (2003) calls “sub-units”.  
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The second principle of autonomy “prescribes the delegation of as much decision-
making as possible to the separate segments”. Lijphart points out that this principle 
complements the first principle of executive power sharing: all issues of common 
concern should be taken jointly by the representatives of the segments.  
The distribution of decision-making authority between the local and central levels is 
clearly prescribed by the Works Constitution Act which governs practice within the 
CWC: the primacy of the local works council is protected, yet mechanisms are in place 
to enable collective decision-making on issues of common concern and – with very few 
exceptions – by joint agreement only. This principle of segmental autonomy stands in 
clear contrast to centralised, unitary systems of majoritarian democracy systems.  
The principle of proportionality is a further tenet of consociational democracy as 
defined by Lijphart. He refers to it as the basic consociational standard governing 
political representation; indeed “as a principle of representation it is particularly 
important as a guarantee for the fair representation of minority segments” (Lijphart 
1991:138). Lijphart highlights two extensions of the effects of proportionality rule as a 
protection for minority rights: overrepresentation of smaller segments, and parity.  
Both of these phenomena can be seen in the CWC. Despite widely varying site sizes, 
each establishment has the right to delegate two members to the CWC. In effect then, 
there is parity representation within the CWC, in which, furthermore, smaller 
segments (sites) can be considered to be over-represented.  In terms of participation, 
then, the CWC grants parity representation, in which all segments are represented 
equally regardless of their size, and in which smaller segments are effectively over-
represented. At the same time, while policy-making processes are open to equal 
participation, actual decision-making has been seen to be proportional, in that larger 
sites wield more votes than do smaller sites.  
Lijphart’s final principle is that of the minority veto as “the ultimate weapon that 
minority segments need to protect their vital interest.” As laid out above, the local 
works councils enjoy a right of veto regarding all but very few issues. It is only for the 
relatively few issues for which the central works council is indisputably competent that 
they can be outvoted.   
Lijphart specifies that this minority veto applies to “vital interests”; the question may 
arise, what is a local works council’s vital interest?   In their rulings applying the 
admittedly rather fuzzy principle of subsidiarity, the German labour courts have 
consistently protected the autonomy of the local works council in regulating or at least 
having the last word regarding actual working conditions at the local site.  
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This principle of autonomy is thus also clearly linked to the principle of subsidiarity, 
which provides a plausible and compelling basis for the allocation of authority within 
federal political orders. Put very simply, autonomy is an absolute concept, while 
subsidiarity is about the relationship between the autonomy of different levels within a 
federalist system. Bermann defines the “elusive and sometimes deeply confusing “ 
(1994: 5) concept of subsidiarity thus:  
Subsidiarity expresses a preference for governance at the most local level 
consistent with achieving government’s stated purpose. Although the virtues of 
local governance are sometimes treated as self-evident, they actually depend on 
our willingness to draw connections between local governance and certain more 
fundamental values (Bermann 1994: 8).  
To take up the fundamental values underlying subsidiarity identified by Bermann 
(1994), the local works council has the right to self-determination, political liberty, and 
the protection of diversity;  is accountable to the local workforce  and must preserve 
their local identity; and, finally, is in a position to devise flexible, pragmatic, 
functionally equivalent responses at the local level, which can take internal and cross-
site divisions into account without necessarily endangering the pursuit of collective 
objectives.  
3.8. What is solidarity? 
As was seen above, the system of cross-site interest representation at Daimler Chrysler 
as laid out in the Works Constitution Act (BetrVG), can be understood to be a federalist 
political order. As prescribed by the BetrVG, the central works council (CWC) is 
responsible for dealing with those issues which affect more than one site, and which 
the local works councils cannot regulate at the local level. Besides these procedural 
provisions about the division of powers and tasks within a multi-level system of 
workplace interest representation, the BetrVG contains no content-based rules about 
which issues the CWC is meant to deal with. What the CWC is to deal with, and how, 
is left up to the discretion of the group itself.  
In this respect, it is the expectations voiced by individual members of the CWC which 
prove the most revealing. Asked to identify the role of the CWC at Daimler Chrysler, 
one respondent put it as follows: 
“The main role of the CWC is for one, to agree regulations that are generally binding for 
the whole company, and then of course an important issue is to prevent being played out 
against each other, so to make sure that those rules which do apply [to all],  apply in the 
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same way for everyone, otherwise it leads to a situation like we had with the breaks policy, 
that one site is played out against the others and that’s a really great technique that 
management is working with there. They throw us a chunk so that we all jump all over 
each other, and attack it like dogs that bite each other and tear each other apart, just to get 
this chunk of meat“ (11/3) . 13
This vivid statement makes clear the two main functions of the CWC in practice: first, 
the CWC serves an external function as  ‘mouthpiece’ , vehicle of interest 
representation, and negotiation partner vis-à-vis central management; and second, the 
CWC serves an internal function in coordinating joint employee positions and 
strategies in order to prevent sites being played off against one another.  
In serving these two functions, an efficient and effective aggregation of the interests of 
the individual sites and the generation of social cohesion within the CWC are of central 
importance. Both are important prerequisites for the development of a basis of 
legitimacy and power which is not only sufficient to defend the interests of the 
workforce, but which also ensures that local works councils adhere to jointly 
developed policies and strategies.  
The key to explaining the practical functioning and political capacity of the CWC 
within a federal system of interest representation lies in the answers to the following 
central questions:  
1. How does cross-site interest aggregation take place? To what extent are local 
interests brought to bear on central strategy formulation? How is a common 
overarching interest identified or developed in the light of possibly diverging local 
interests? 
2. Which political or organisational mechanisms and processes exist in order to 
generate social cohesion and solidarity within the CWC and in order to prevent a 
fragmentation of the group? Under which institutional and political conditions 
does the generation of social cohesion and solidarity take place? What are their 
opportunities and limits?  
The challenge most commonly cited by the DaimlerChrysler CWC members lies in 
attempts by management to employ coercive cross-site comparisons in an attempt to 
extract concessions from individual sites.  
                                           
13 Because most respondents preferred to remain anonymous, the figures in parenthesis following quoted 
statements indicate the interview and page number from which it is quoted.  
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According to CWC members, management “is always trying to play sites off against one 
another, and that’s why it’s so important that we compare notes, that we see what the others are 
doing, where it is all going, what’s happening over there” (8/3).  “Individual sites’ vulnerability 
to blackmail has to be prevented” (4/3).  “The CWC cannot in any way permit attempts to play 
sites off against one another” (34/2).  “The blackmail policy goes across the whole company, 
across all the plants. It is sometimes so brutal that every plant gets blackmailed“(22/4). 
In the light of these challenges, the members of the CWC at DaimlerChrysler see the 
need to close ranks, to support one another in the face of  the threat of whipsawing. As 
will be seen in Chapter Five, there is a nearly universal consensus among CWC 
members that the company’s whipsawing strategies can only be withstood in the long 
run if the CWC develops and maintains a common line on how to deal with those 
issues which are most susceptible to coercive comparisons. But how can the CWC 
achieve this level of integration; how can such long-term strategic cooperation and a 
solidary balance of interests be established and maintained?  
The discussion of the organisational character of a central works council at the 
beginning of this chapter made clear that negotiated consensus is the only path 
towards viable collective decision-making within the constraints of the federalist order 
established by the BetrVG.  Despite the tightly constrained authority of the CWC, 
organisational mechanisms and processes exist to facilitate collective, pluralist 
decision-making.  
The first of the two central questions identified above was how and why is a common 
overarching interest identified in the light of possibly diverging interests? As a first step 
towards answering this question, the following section will more generally explore the 
broad principles of solidarity.  What is meant by solidarity, and how can it be 
achieved? The analysis of the case study of the CWC at DaimlerChrysler which follows 
will further investigate this question of what is to be achieved in conjunction with the 
second central question regarding whether and under what circumstances it can be achieved.  
What are the limits and opportunities provided by collectively shared visions of the 
role and purpose of the CWC at DaimlerChrysler and its various organisational 
mechanisms and processes?  The transferability of these findings to the European level 
will be explored in Chapter Six. Finally, the implications of these findings for EWC 
practice, policy and research shall be discussed in the concluding Chapter Seven.  
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Approaching the notion of solidarity – its use in everyday language  
In terms of its meaning and usage, the concept of solidarity has a long and multi-
faceted history.  This stretches from the historic roots of the concept as a technical term 
in Roman law, in which the notion of  ‘obligatio in solidum’ refers to a specific form of 
mutual and unlimited liability (Zoll 2000: 17, Bayertz 1999: 3) to today’s usage as a 
compelling moral underpinning for a wide range of highly diverse forms of support 
and cooperation.   
Today, a vast variety of societal groups call for solidarity in a seemingly endless range 
of contexts.  Solidarity with those in need is demanded as much in neighbourly and 
familial circles as it is demanded with the hungry in less developed countries, with the 
victims of political repression, or with workers threatened by lay-offs.  At the same 
time, the peace movement appeals to solidarity against imperialistic and militaristic 
governments, the trade union movement calls for solidarity against companies who 
ignore fundamental workers’ rights, and in the light of the upsurge in Neo-Nazi 
activities, the German government has for example called for the solidarity of 
democrats against right-wing extremists.   
In the light of the evidently manifold usage of the term ‘solidarity’, Bayertz notes a 
tendency in current every-day language to denote any form of help or support as 
solidarity (Bayertz 1998: 49). Von Alemann even argues that the inflationary use of the 
term solidarity has “worn it down beyond recognition” (von Alemann 1996: 756).  
In the search for conceptual clarity, however, and despite the wide variety of usages 
illustrated above, several basic characteristics of the notion of solidarity can be 
distilled. Common to all is both the idea of a mutual and inner connection between 
members of a group, as well as a normative component in that joint action aims to put 
a stop to perceived injustice or hardship.  The fact that solidarity can be practised with 
the members of a group as well as against the perpetrators of perceived injustice or 
hardship indicates the simultaneously inclusive and exclusive character of solidarity.  
These characteristics are already found in Vierkandt’s classic definition of the three 
constituent elements of solidarity: first, joint action in which “variety behaves as a 
unit“; second, defence against external “disturbances, interference and assaults”; and 
third, the existence of a “mentality of community”, i.e., the individual’s identification 
with the community which, in contrast to a simple interest group, is founded on a 
“state of inner attachment” (Vierkandt 1969: 944). 
The basic characteristics of solidarity are described in day-to-day language by a 
member of the CWC at DaimlerChrysler: “The workforce sticks together, and where it gets 
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problematic we help each other. Sometimes it’s necessary to jump into the breach for someone 
else, but that also means that if I jump into the breach for someone, then I expect them to jump 
for me too, and if that doesn’t happen, that’s the end of solidarity“. This statement clearly 
identifies the mutual and reciprocal character of solidarity. Reciprocity as a 
characteristic and prerequisite of solidarity can be understood as a voluntary 
commitment to unilateral support, which is, however, linked to an expectation of 
support from others should the tables be turned (Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger 1992: 
14). In practice, therefore, solidarity is as a rule expressed as a readiness to provide 
unilateral support, even if an expectation of reciprocity is an underlying motivating 
element. From this it follows, as Hondrich und Koch-Arzberger emphasise, that 
solidarity does not include every form of help and support, “but only those which are 
given out of a sense of aligned interests and goals, out of a special  bondedness, in 
which at least the – even if fictitious – possibility of reciprocity is considered“ 
(Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger 1992: 14, emphasis in the original).  
Different types of solidarity  
Bayertz (1998: 49/50) provides a helpful distinction between community solidarity 
[Gemeinschaftssolidarität] and  combative solidarity [Kampfsolidarität]; this distinction is 
relevant to this study’s central question about the opportunities and limits of solidarity 
and its influence on the behaviour of the CWC and EWC as collective actors. Following 
Bayertz,  community solidarity  arises out of empathy and the perception of mutual 
linkages and responsibilities among groups of people based on shared living 
conditions, beliefs and values. This perceived sameness of living circumstances gives 
rise to a sense of belonging together and a feeling of collective loyalty and identity 
among members of a group; this in turn represents a important source of both 
individual identity and morals of group members.   
In tracing the source of collective identity to a shared perception of common living 
conditions, Bayertz’ notion of community solidarity  thus corresponds in part with 
Durkheim’s definition of mechanical solidarity in pre-industrial society. There is one 
key difference, however: as Coser (1984) points out, Durkheim’s notion of mechanical 
solidarity relied almost exclusively on penal sanctions which punished behaviour 
which deviated from societal norms, values and beliefs. Bayertz’ conception of 
community solidarity, by contrast, makes no reference to coercive imposition of 
solidarity.  
It is not always possible to distinguish sharply between community solidarity  and 
combative solidarity. The latter rests on the fact that individuals are prepared to band 
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together into a group in order to fight collectively for their shared interests. Following 
Bayertz, however, the key characteristic of  combative solidarity is its dual polarity: i.e., 
combative solidarity  has both a positive reference to specific goals and interests which 
are to be achieved by collective action by the group, as well as a negative reference to a 
common opponent who resists the realisation of the groups’ shared goals and thus 
creates the need for joint action in the first place (Bayertz 1998: 41). Combative 
solidarity  is thus by its very nature conflictual and morally compelling.  
A distinction was drawn above between internal solidarity or solidarity with on the one 
hand, and between external solidarity or solidarity against on the other. For Bayertz, the 
dual polarity of combative solidarity integrates internal and external solidarity, or 
solidarity with and solidarity against,  into the positive and negative components of 
combative solidarity.  
Worker solidarity as a special form of solidarity  
Worker solidarity, which is often described as an ideal type of solidarity,  can be 
understood to be a fusion of the two types of solidarity identified by Bayertz.  Zoll 
considers worker solidarity to be a special form of Durkheim’s mechanical solidarity 
(2000: 120), since the collectivism of the labour movement – at least in its early stages – 
arose out the phenomenon that workers perceived their living and working conditions 
and their need to overcome exploitation and repression to be fundamentally identical. 
The essential emotional foundation for the emergence of traditional worker solidarity 
was grounded in a shared working-class milieu, which was marked by social and 
spatial nearness among those working in the same factory and living in the same 
neighbourhood, by mutual assistance in times of need, and (later) by membership in 
the same associations and societies (Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger 1992: 30).  
Community solidarity  as “organised risk compensation” [organisierter Risikoausgleich] 
(Zoll 2000: 121) took its first institutional form in the friendly societies which emerged 
in England in the second half of the 18th century as a means to ensure mutual support 
in cases of sickness, accident, old age or death. As Thompson (1980: 460-462) 
emphasises, the friendly societies were as much an expression of an “ethos of 
mutuality” as they represented a point of crystallisation in the emergence of an 
autonomous working class culture and collectivist values, which provided the 
foundation for the establishment of trade unions as a further institutional form of 
community solidarity.  A key function of trade unions thus lay in the provision of 
mutual insurance, which the Webbs define as  
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the provision of a fund by common subscription to insure against casualties; to 
provide maintenance, that is to say, in cases in which a member is deprived of his 
livelihood by causes over which neither he nor the union has any control. This 
obviously covers the ‘benevolent’ or friendly society side of Trade Unionism, 
such as the provision of sick pay, accident benefit, and superannuation 
allowance, together with ‘burial money’, and such allowances as that made to the 
members of the Amalgamated Society of Tailors who are prevented from 
working by the sanitary authorities, owing to the presence of infectious disease in 
their homes (Webb and Webb 1920: 152).  
Mutual insurance goes beyond mutual charity, however.  It should be borne in mind 
that traditional worker solidarity has often included an element of discipline.  As the 
Webbs write, “in a strong and well-organised union, the existence of important 
friendly benefits may become a powerful instrument for maintaining discipline among 
the members, and for enforcing upon all the decisions of the majority” (Webb and 
Webb 1920: 158).  What emerges from the Webbs is that mutual insurance may look 
like charity, but it is implicitly based on the strategy that the support of the weak by 
the strong can prevent the former from undercutting the latter (Webb and Webb 1920: 
158).  
To put it bluntly, mutual insurance also meant insurance against defection. External 
solidarity or solidarity against usually implies an adversary who will otherwise divide 
and rule: in the absence of solidarity, there is competition and fragmentation of 
interests which may yield gain for the external adversary. In the short term, gains may 
also be won by some of the members of the group at the expense of the others, but in 
the long run, the workers divided will always be defeated. In an attempt to ensure the 
long-term maintenance of effective (external) worker solidarity, trade unions have 
traditionally seen hierarchical discipline as the only means of achieving solidarity in 
the face of powerful divisive internal and external pressures.  
According to Bayertz, traditional worker solidarity went beyond the provision of 
mutual support on which community solidarity rests. It has always included an 
element of combative solidarity which is based on the perception of aligned interests 
and a realisation that these can only be defended in a collective struggle against 
opposing societal forces. In Bayertz’ more general conception of solidarity, community 
solidarity is a resource, but not a necessary prerequisite for combative solidarity.  
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The importance and origins of shared values and norms 
The perception and pursuit of shared interests is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for combative solidarity.  How collective interests are identified and shaped 
in the first place is the key to explaining the capacity for collective action.   
Let us consider trade unions as the most prominent form and expression of combative 
solidarity . If indeed it were the case, as proponents of rational choice theory based on 
Mancur Olson’s influential work The Logic of Collective Action assume, that the utility-
maximising pursuit of individual interests is the only motivation behind the decision to 
form or join trade unions, then there  would be no trade unions in the first place, as 
Kelly (1998:  chapter 5) demonstrates in his scathing critique of Olson’s work. Since a 
crucial outcome of trade union activity lies in the provision of collective goods, Olson’s 
utility-maximising individual, who rationally weighs costs against benefits, would 
choose not to join a trade union at all if he or she could instead take a free ride by 
benefiting from the collective good in any case.  However, as Kelly succinctly notes: “if 
everyone tries to free-ride there is no ride at all, so how does ‘the ride’ come into 
being?” (Kelly 1998: 78). Olson primarily explains the contradiction between his theory 
and the empirical phenomenon of trade union organisation by pointing to the 
provision of selective incentives and exercise of coercion. This explanation is, however, 
not very persuasive, since as Hyman emphasises, “neither [selective incentives nor 
coercion] could apply without pre-existing collective organization; hence, the problem 
of explaining collectivism is merely deferred“ (Hyman 2004a: 275).  
As Kelly convincingly lays out, the main problem in explaining collective action with 
the rational choice approach lies in its individualistic conception of the emergence of 
interests. Because of their individualist bias, rational choice approaches overlook the 
fact the interests and behaviour of individuals are also the result of social interaction 
processes. This means that an individual’s behaviour is influenced both by his or her 
personal interests as well as by the values and norms of the social group with which 
the individual identifies (Kelly 1998: 72). Furthermore, an individualist conception of 
the formation of interests does not take into account that collective action can also arise 
out of the bonds of  shared values and norms, which in turn result in a feeling of 
mutual responsibility and commitment within a group. How else can it be explained 
that individuals act ‘irrationally’ in Olson’s sense by putting their own interests behind 
collective interests, and indeed willingly forego a free ride with explicit reference to 
notions of ‘fairness’?  
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Against this background, I concur with Bayertz’ assessment that worker solidarity goes 
beyond the bare fact of aligned interests by including an inalienable moral dimension. 
Indeed, worker solidarity is the opposite of free-riding (Bayertz 1998: 44). 
From this it follows that worker solidarity is neither based on pure altruism (since an 
implicit expectation of reciprocity is inherent to solidarity) nor on pure utility 
maximisation, as posited by rational choice theorists. Worker solidarity thus rests on a 
fusion of combative and community solidarity, both of which influence one another. In 
other words,  the collective pursuit of shared interests against an external opponent 
rests on the values and norms shared by the group. Community solidarity thus 
represents an important internal resource for the exercise of external combative 
solidarity.  At the same time, the confrontation with an external opponent confirms 
and strengthens community solidarity.   It is of central importance in this context that 
community and combative solidarity as constitutive elements of worker solidarity are 
not conceived as static; rather, they are in several respects shaped by dynamic social 
processes.  
The importance of social interaction processes to the constitution of individual and 
collective worker interests and perceptions was demonstrated empirically in the 
numerous workplace studies conducted in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s (Lane and 
Roberts 1971, Beynon 1973, Nichols and Armstrong 1976, Batstone et al. 1977, 1978, 
Edwards and Scullion 1982), as well as in the works councils studies by Kotthoff (1981, 
1994) in Germany.  The key contribution of these studies to our understanding of 
collective action lies in their focus on the social generation of interests, i.e., in the 
mobilisation of bias. According to these analyses, individuals’ collectively shared 
interests and perceptions do not arise more or less automatically out of the uniformity 
of living and working conditions; rather, they are always also socially constructed and 
situational.  Thus, for example, Batstone et al.’s (1977, 1978) studies of shop steward 
organisation and activities demonstrate impressively how shop stewards influence and 
shape the attitudes and interests of individual members through social interactions in 
order to create and maintain a specific pattern of behaviour. As Kelly (1998) 
emphasises with respect to mobilisation theory, the collective interests, values, and 
norms of a group are the result of internal interaction processes  and struggles between 
opposing individual or sectional interests: “In terms of mobilisation theory, many of 
these struggles involve debates over the most appropriate ways of ‘framing’ issues that 
face the union or the union movement” (Kelly 1998: 54).  
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How solidarity is generated 
Returning to the notion of solidarity as one of many possible collective interests, it 
becomes clear that it must come from somewhere. Building upon the legacy of earlier 
workplace studies, Fantasia’s (1988) research on the emergence of different Cultures of 
Solidarity  explores the process-based and socially constructed character of worker 
solidarity in particular.  On the basis of three in-depth case studies, Fantasia describes 
solidarity as both expression and result of the struggle to defend workers’ rights in the 
face of a common opponent: 
“During the course of these struggles, ‘cultures of solidarity’ were constructed by 
workers. That is, tactical activities, organizational forms, and institutional 
arrangements were employed that represented the expression of solidarity and 
its creation simultaneously in the process of their development. These cultures of 
solidarity took myriad of forms in response to the specific features and demands 
of particular struggles“ (Fantasia 1988: 20).  
What is distinctive about Fantasia’s conception of solidarity is that he grasps the 
emergence of solidarity as situational and as the outcome of an open-ended process of 
social interaction. According to Fantasia, the emergence of solidarity is situational in 
that it is necessarily shaped by the institutions and practices of a given system of 
industrial relations; at the same time, it is an open-ended process because new social 
dynamics emerge when workers band together in order to pursue their common 
interests; it is these social dynamics which enable solidarity, and furthermore, they 
express themselves in those forms which are appropriate to the situation or 
circumstances at hand.  
Such a dynamic, process-based conception of solidarity enables us to explain the 
emergence of worker solidarity even within highly differentiated modern societies, 
since it no longer assumes the existence of a homogenous living and working world, 
but instead sees the emergence of shared interests and values as the result of social 
interaction processes. Durkheim’s notion of organic solidarity, which is based on a 
fusion of difference and sameness (Zoll 2000: 32), takes into account this need for a 
more flexible conception which is capable of explaining emergence of solidarity in 
modern societies.  The consistence of this idea has been developed further by Hondrich 
und Koch-Arzberger, who define solidarity thus:   
Solidarity is cohesion [Verbundenheit] despite differences, despite inequality (and 
thus assumes social differentiation). At the same, it is also cohesion because of 
difference, namely because of unequal encroachment on interests which are 
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perceived to be equivalent. Solidarity is demanded of or explained by those who 
are, given otherwise identical interests, at that moment better off  (1992: 13).  
In the light of growing processes of social differentiation and the obvious problems 
confronting collective organisations such as trade unions as traditional champions of 
solidarity, one must ask: how much difference can solidarity endure?  
Individualisation and pluralisation as challenges to worker solidarity  
There is a broad consensus in the academic observation of social change processes that 
today’s modern societies are marked by an individualisation and pluralisation of 
individuals’ station in life, their needs, and thus their values and norms; this poses new 
challenges, not only for traditional collective organisations such as trade unions, but 
also for works councils. Conclusions differ widely, however, when it comes to 
interpreting the implications of these processes on the generation and exercise of 
solidarity in general, and of worker solidarity in particular.  
More pessimistic analyses emphasise a tendency towards de-solidarisation. In his 
influential work Risikogesellschaft (1986), Beck, for example, notes three parallel 
processes which tend towards the erosion of the very foundations of solidary 
behaviour. First, increasingly heterogeneous social circumstances resulting from the 
emergence of new inequalities according to gender, age and ethnicity; second, the 
fragmentation of traditional milieux and the resulting loosening of social ties; and 
third, the emergence of a new post-material political model which causes the decline of 
large, traditional social democratic and catholic-social groups.  
In this context, Negt identifies a “cultural crisis of erosion”, in which old norms are no 
longer implicitly valid, although new norms are not yet in place but are instead still 
being sought (Negt 2001, 2004). He thus sees the reduction of the individual fears and 
insecurities which are associated with this search as a crucial element of the capacity 
for solidarity: “The fear-ridden members of  a competition society, who are fighting for 
survival, have as a rule few resources to devote to the development of solidaristic 
cooperation”  (Negt 2001: 7).  
Less pessimistic analyses emphasise that despite a tendency towards the disintegration 
of classical milieux, the class differences within modern societies have not disappeared; 
they are merely concealed behind group and individual interests. Thus, the conditions 
for traditional solidarity are still present, if latent (Grebing 1996: 765). One of the 
central findings of the empirical analysis of German social structures by Vester et al. 
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(2001) is that traditional social milieux have not so much disintegrated as undergone an 
internal process of modernisation and differentiation. The authors emphasise that it is 
precisely because of their capacity to adjust and differentiate that traditional “everyday 
class cultures”  demonstrate an extraordinary stability and continue to influence 
individuals’ perceptions and actions by way of  inherited lines of tradition and 
experience [lebensweltliche Traditionslinien] (Vester et al. 2001: 13). With respect to 
traditional worker milieux, Schumann’s (2003a, b) empirical analysis of worker 
consciousness confirms this finding of simultaneous continuity and internal 
differentiation.  In the light of the transformation of the capitalist production regime, 
Schumann identifies the emergence of six ideal-types of social groups, which differ 
above all according to their current employment status and their socio-occupational 
background, and thus in their labour market power.   14
The empirical findings of Schumann’s study demonstrate that those groups of workers 
whose perceptions are most relevant to collective interest representation (“shapers of 
modernisation”, “skipped over by modernisation” and “threatened by 
modernisation”) do not fundamentally question the necessity of trade unions and 
works councils as an opposing force to company management (Schumann 2003a: 120). 
Thus, despite the internal differentiation of the workforce as a whole, works councils 
and trade unions can still draw upon normative perceptions oriented towards the 
values of fairness and justice in their mobilisation of solidarity.  
The study furthermore demonstrates, however, that the variations in labour market 
position and diverse socio-occupational backgrounds give rise to different expectations 
and prerequisites for solidary behaviour; solidarity is thus confronted by differentiated 
interests and highly specific perceptions of problems.  
                                           
14 The first type is the “global class” and includes top-level actors in industry, politics, and culture, whose 
ample power resources enable the highly effective defence of their own interests. The second type, the 
“modernisation-makers” includes employees in the service and knowledge sectors as well as research and 
development experts who have benefited from exclusive professional training and skills and who have a 
great deal of confidence in their own ability to shape their destinies. The third type, the “modernisation 
losers”, is the polar opposite to the first two types; it includes those who have been excluded from gainful 
employment against their will, i.e., the (long-term) unemployed. The fourth type are those who are 
“threatened by modernisation”, and includes those employed in precarious or atypical employment, such 
as temporary workers and seconded employees who have little job security and scant  “market power” in 
the labour market. The fifth type has been “skipped over by modernisation”, and is made up of those who 
are (still) in more or less secure employment in companies and industries which rely heavily on labour-
intensive production; these workers, however, have little individual labour market power. The sixth type 
are the “shapers of modernisation”, comprising skilled blue-collar and white-collar workers, who have 
benefited from the introduction of innovative production processes and concepts and who enjoy a fairly 
secure position in the labour market. (Schumann 2003a: 111). 
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The differentiation of the workforce and the resulting pluralisation of living and 
working worlds has thus led to a pluralisation of the very understanding of solidarity. 
With respect to the group he calls “shapers of modernisation” in particular,  Schumann 
concludes that “the heterogeneous points of contact with the modernisation-shapers in 
particular will be difficult to tie together without organisational efforts to mediate and 
aggregate […] The modernisation-shapers’ approach towards solidarity can no longer 
be taken for granted; it can only be achieved by means of insight won through 
discourse” (Schumann 2003a: 119).  
More problematically, the manufacturing sector is undergoing a profound 
transformation towards a global division of labour: large, internationally active 
companies have decreased their emphasis on manufacturing within heretofore highly 
industrialised countries in favour of a concentration of research and development and 
after-sales service, while shifting actual manufacturing activities elsewhere. This 
division of labour means that the group of workers which Schumann calls 
“modernisation-makers” (i.e., so-called knowledge workers, particularly research and 
development experts) are becoming the dominant group of employees in the industrial 
sector in what can be called post-industrial countries. As Schumann points out, these 
“modernisation-makers” have a pronounced confidence in their own ability to shape 
their destiny; since they prove largely impervious to the traditional appeal of trade 
unions, Schumann is pessimistic about the ability of trade unions to find effective and 
compelling ways to address and mobilise these workers in particular, even if trade 
unions successfully develop the means to recapture the appeal of traditional solidarity 
by actively mediating and aggregating diverse interests among other groups of 
workers.   
Overall, however, Schumann’s analysis makes it clear that the aggregation of interests 
which is so crucial to the mobilisation of combative solidarity as a central element of 
worker solidarity does not arise ‘naturally’ out of a uniformity of living and working 
conditions, but instead must be deliberately induced and nurtured. This is particularly 
the case in modern society, since worker solidarity must compete with a range of other, 
more heterogeneous community relationships and commitments.  
In view of the ongoing differentiation and pluralisation of conceptions of solidarity, 
modern and necessarily overarching forms of solidarity can only be the result of active 
negotiation and mediation, which are geared towards attaining a socially reasonable 
balance of interests on the basis of democratic-discursive problem-solving processes 
(Schumann 2003b: 95).  
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This presents new challenges to solidarity-creating institutions such as trade unions 
and works councils, since they must consider modern conceptions of solidarity in their 
interest representation strategies. It is thus necessary that they reconceptualise their 
notion of solidarity in a way which achieves the transformation from a monopolistic 
concept of solidarity to a pluralistic conception of solidarity while retaining the 
normative goal of overcoming injustice and adversity.  
The necessity of an alternative conception of solidarity  
In the academic discussion about the fragmenting effects which observed processes of 
individualisation and pluralisation of interests have on the generation of solidarity, it is 
frequently pointed out that these pose significant organisational challenges for trade 
unions in particular. 
These societal transformation processes also pose new challenges to central works 
councils as collective interest representation organs in their attempts to generate 
internal social cohesion and to retain their capacity to act externally towards 
employers.  The challenge of organising solidarity within central works councils and 
EWCs is twofold: first, following Schumann, internal differentiation processes across 
the workforce mean that the individual members of the CWC and the EWC must take 
into account the differentiated interests and expectations of an increasingly 
heterogeneous workforce at the local level in exercising their representative role at the 
local, national, and European levels.  Second, the problem of organising sustainable 
solidarity is further exacerbated by the increased pressure of cross-site competition 
within the company, which is caused by the increasingly integrated and 
transnationalised production and business strategies.  
Against this backdrop, the central question of this study is as follows: Under which 
conditions can workers’ solidarity in the CWC and EWC as collective organisations 
provide an organisational resource to secure integration inwards and a capacity to act 
in concert outwards?  
Or, in other words: which policy-oriented and organisational measures are necessary 
to generate solidarity within a federal system of interest representation in the face of 
individualisation and pluralisation of interest conceptions?  
In answer to these questions, the above discussion of workers’ solidarity provides the 
basis for identifying the key conditions under which solidarity can provide the 
foundation for the CWC’s and the EWC's capacity to act in the light of the societal and 
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economic transformation processes of our time: the promotion and maintenance of 
credible participative-discursive processes of exchange and decision-making which are 
underpinned by a credible appeal to the lasting values captured by traditional 
conceptions of solidarity.  
The establishment of discursive and participative structures is perhaps the most 
frequent recommendation to be found in the relevant literature regarding how 
collective organisations (direct reference is often  made here to trade unions) can 
organise solidarity even under changed societal and economic framework conditions.  
Following Negt’s call for “participative trade unions” [Beteiligungsgewerkschaften] (Negt 
1996: 770), ‘participative works councils’ can be considered a crucial prerequisite for 
the generation of solidarity across sites and countries.  The provision of more room for 
structures which enable discussion and participation would in particular take into 
account that the inner differentiation of the workforce as a whole and the resulting 
competing  loyalties means that worker solidarity neither arises naturally nor can it be 
imposed from above.  
In a discourse-oriented national or European ‘participative works council’, solidarity 
and any collective action resulting from it would rather be the result of internal 
discussions and debates marked by the active participation of the representatives of 
different sites and countries. Within such a framework, every member of the central or 
European Works Council has the possibility to bring specific local and/or national 
interests to bear on the process of decision-making and interest aggregation at the 
central level.   
This conception of a ‘participative works council’ does not suppress existing conflicts 
of interest; on the contrary, it takes them into account and makes them the very basis of 
its decision-making.  In this sense, a ‘participative works council’ comes close to the 
ideal formulated by Hyman with reference to Piore of collective employee interest 
representation structures as “‘communities of action’ (organisations that provide a 
context for individual self-realisation) and as ‘borderland institutions’ (which bridge 
the ideals and perspectives of distinct social or cultural groups)” (Hyman 2004b: 7). 
Such an organisational conception would also take into account the empirical findings 
of  the so-called workplace studies, which found that the generation of collective and 
individual interests within communicative social interaction processes are dependent 
on one another.    
Furthermore, situation-specific or issue-specific interest compromises which are 
developed out of discursive and participative processes can also be expected to be 
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more stable than those which are imposed hierarchically, since the inclusion of 
individual site representatives means that such compromises rest not on the exercise of 
power, but on advocacy and insight.  This in turn increases the chances that each site 
representative takes ownership of whatever joint solution was found, thereby 
integrating collective perceptions and interests into his or her own individual and site-
based perceptions and actions.  The ‘participative works council’ thus takes up a 
pluralistic conception of solidarity and does not undermine the autonomy of local or 
national works councils or the subsidiarity inherent to federalist conceptions of cross-
site and cross-country interest representation.  
The emphasis has lain above on the creation of organisational conditions for the 
generation of solidarity. As empirical research by Vester et al. (2001) and Schumann 
(2003 a, b) has shown, however, the conditions giving rise to what Durkheim called 
mechanical solidarity have not disappeared completely.  The relevance and appeal of  a 
legacy of solidarity, i.e., the visions which are anchored in the collective memory and 
which are often invoked as the solidarity of the glory days and the historic successes 
which have been attributed to it (Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger 1992: 33) should not 
be underestimated as a condition for the generation of social cohesion.   
Moreover, as Fantasia (1988) points out, social interaction processes which generate 
solidarity do not take place in a power vacuum. On the contrary, they are marked by 
significant power differences between sites; indeed, both employee representatives and 
management are well aware of these power (im)balances.  In the generation and 
maintenance of social cohesion as a foundation for solidarity, it is all the more 
important that representatives of stronger and more influential sites openly signal that 
they are prepared to take a step back and allow themselves to be bound into more 
egalitarian, participative structures, or that they are also willing to use their power 
resources vis-à-vis the employer for the benefit of smaller and less assertive sites. 
Because the inherent reciprocity of solidarity initially — if implicitly — assumes the 
provision of unilateral support based on trust, such measures increase the confidence 
in and identification with the CWC or the EWC. 
Furthermore, a participative/discursive works council presumes that each participant 
has the same possibilities to participate actively. While specific rules and procedures 
may at first glance ensure ‘equal time’ for all, this does not mean that the contributions 
of all participants are weighted equally, as will be seen in Chapter Five below. And 
with respect to EWCs, as Stirling and Tully (2004) point out, the fact that 
communication is inextricably linked to questions of power and control means that an 
inability to overcome the language and cultural barriers within EWCs may amount to 
an insurmountable  barrier to the development of trust and solidarity. The need to 
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ensure equal participation despite linguistic and cultural differences within the EWC 
will be discussed further in Chapters Six and Seven.     
Returning briefly to conceptions of worker solidarity, a distinction can be made 
between solidarity from above (hierarchical) or from below ('spontaneous'). An 
analogous distinction can be made between imposed/negotiated or 
disciplinary/discursive solidarity. This distinction is central to Durkheim's 
mechanical/organic distinction: in the former, rigid social norms are applied coercively; 
in the latter, interdependence creates a  willingness to cooperate among autonomous 
moral agents.  
If employee representatives face the risk of employer divide-and-rule, then internal 
solidarity has to be primarily a means to guarantee the maintenance of external 
solidarity. It was pointed out above that in order to ensure the maintenance of effective 
(external) worker solidarity, trade unions have traditionally seen hierarchical discipline 
as the necessary concomitant. However (and whether or not 'mechanical solidarity' 
was effective or desirable for traditional trade unionism) a CWC or EWC lacks the 
hierarchical legitimacy and sanctions to impose a 'common rule': its only means lies in 
the negotiated/discursive model.   
The organisational prerequisites for solidarity: key points of analysis  
If we look more closely at what such a participative and discursive decision-making 
process must ideally deliver in practice, we can define a set of analytical points of 
orientation for the empirical investigation of the functioning and action of the CWC at 
DaimlerChrysler, and, building upon that, for the perspective of solidarity in European 
Works Councils.  
If it is to generate and support solidarity, a discursive-participative structure must be 
able to ensure the following:  
– First, it must provide wide-ranging opportunities for participation, since these 
increase the identification of individuals with the whole group by providing a basis 
for the stabilisation or regeneration of a normative foundation for collective 
activities. In this way, discursive and participative elements strengthen the internal 
social cohesion (i.e., community solidarity) as an essential condition for effective 
action outwards vis-à-vis the employer (i.e. combative solidarity).  
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– Second, participative elements must be able to strengthen the capacity of a 
compromise, once reached, to command commitment, thus increasing the 
probability that those who participated in the process will also adhere to 
commitments made as a result of a negotiated solution or compromise.   
– Third, discursive processes must ensure both the transparency of decision-making 
processes and sufficient density of interaction among group members. 
Transparency and the opportunities for (independent) control provided by dense 
and interlocking communication enhances trust in the collective actor.  
– Fourth, power asymmetries must be dealt with responsibly. Representatives of 
stronger and more influential sites must demonstrate a willingness to take a step 
back in the interests of the whole or to use their influence for the benefit of weaker 
sites; they must allow themselves to be bound into egalitarian structures if the 
inherent reciprocity of solidarity is to prove a solid foundation for collective 
identity and action.  
– Fifth, a ‘participative works council’ must be able to offer a preventive solution to 
the fundamental dilemma of solidarity pointed out by Vobruba (1989: 66):  the 
greater the divisive pressure from outside to increase competition among those 
who strive to generate solidarity with one another, the more difficult it is to achieve 
solidarity.  In response to external pressure, such as situations in which an 
employer tries to play sites against one another, there is a marked danger that 
individual sites do not act in solidarity but instead break ranks in an effort to 
achieve what they can on the basis of their own strengths. In order to prevent such 
dilemmas, it is of great importance that opportunities which occur in times of low 
external pressure are used to reach agreement preventatively, so to speak, about 
how to deal with conflictual situations if and when they arise.  
– Sixth and finally, such processes must actively support the generation of shared 
values and morals. The moral dimension of ‘traditional’ solidarity, the vision and 
idealism behind it, must be given room to unfold and be tested.  
Processes which support such a modernised understanding of solidarity which links 
new conceptions with traditional potentials of solidarity, can contribute to a central 
works council’s or a European Works Council’s internal stability and external capacity 
to act vis-à-vis central management.  
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3.9. Tying it all together: federalism, democratic theory and 
solidarity  
This chapter set out to provide the foundation for the analysis of the practical 
functioning and political capacity of the CWC within a federal system of interest 
representation and for an exploration of the lessons learned from this analysis for the 
perspective of solidarity in European Works Councils. An analysis of these issues must 
address the following central questions posed at the beginning of this  chapter:  
1. How does cross-site interest aggregation take place? To what extent are local 
interests brought to bear on central strategy formulation? How is a common 
overarching interest identified or developed in the light of possibly diverging local 
interests? 
2. Which political or organisational mechanisms and processes exist in order to 
generate social cohesion and solidarity within the CWC or EWC and in order to 
prevent a fragmentation of the group? Under which institutional and political 
conditions does the generation of social cohesion and solidarity take place? What 
are their opportunities and limits?  
The constitutional language of federalism is well-suited to grasp the dynamics of 
multi-level processes of interest representation and interest identification. Federalism 
does not determine outcomes, but provides a favourable framework for flexible, 
pragmatic, politicised outcomes. Organisational structures  merely provide a 
framework which is filled out by actors according to their own functions, perceptions, 
and interests, both collective and individual or site-based.  
As Wheare (1946) points out, practice, not constitution is definitive. This chapter aimed 
to establish a foundation upon which to examine actual practice at one particular 
CWC: how does a federalist order enable pluralist governance?  How is the balance 
struck between central and local decision-making? What implications does this balance 
have for the generation of solidarity?  
The federalist structure laid out in the BetrVG leaves the actual subjects and degree of 
centralisation largely up to the actors themselves. What the federalist structure 
provides is the opportunity, not the obligation to coordinate and collaborate. Any 
perceived obligation must come from the members themselves.  
The federalist system of cross-site interest representation clearly defines the 
composition by election or delegation of the various levels within a multi-level system 
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of company-based interest representation. Power and authority are formally 
distributed among the levels: while the local works council enjoys primacy in all but 
very few areas, the increasing centralisation of companies has prompted a search for 
pragmatic solutions to seemingly overlapping competences and areas of responsibility. 
Lacking an uncontested authority to negotiate on behalf of local works councils, the 
CWC must actively devise means to coordinate rather than command. Specific 
processes and institutions exist to facilitate the necessary background administrative 
and policy-oriented cooperation, and the labour courts are called upon to rule upon 
disputes regarding the constitutional division of authority.  
In enabling and indeed requiring a pluralist, consensus-oriented approach, and in 
providing the means to accommodate both unity and diversity, the federalist 
representation and decision-making structure provided by the BetrVG rests upon the 
key principles of consociational democracy: executive power sharing, autonomy, 
proportionality and the minority veto.  Executive power is shared: first, the CWC as a 
group exercises only very tightly circumscribed unilateral authority, and second, 
neither the chairperson nor the executive committee can take final decisions on behalf 
of the whole CWC. The autonomy of the local level in particular is protected by 
reserving all but a few issues to its sole prerogative, yet at the same time, centralised 
cross-site decision-making is enabled by giving local works councils the right to 
mandate the CWC on a case-by-case basis, while still reserving their right to make a 
final decision.  
In those instances in which the CWC actually acts on behalf of the local works councils 
vis-à-vis central management,  the result is almost always a complicated framework 
agreement fixing obligations by central management and containing carefully crafted 
clauses for local implementation. Most often however, the CWC must convince all its 
constituent members to follow a centrally agreed line in their autonomous local 
activities.   
Thus, the power and influence of the CWC rests on its power to convince, not to 
command. This is the key to understanding the way in which the federalist structure 
provides the organisational means to generate solidarity: the primacy of the local level 
means that decisions reached in the CWC must be based on insight and advocacy; they 
cannot be imposed from above.  
The final section of this chapter concluded that discursive-participative structures and 
credible appeals to traditional workers’ solidarity are the key to generating solidarity. 
To recapitulate,  the key features which mark such a discursive-participatory process 
are: the provision of wide-ranging opportunities for participation in order to provide a 
 82
basis for the generation, stabilisation, and regeneration of a normative and strategic 
foundation for collective activities; this normative foundation also calls upon inherited 
traditions and ideals of solidarity. Differences are not papered over; they are instead 
taken up as the very foundation for collective decision-making. Individuals must be 
able to identify with the whole group, in order to strengthen the degree of commitment 
which individuals feel towards decisions taken. Transparency of decision-making must 
be ensured, and dense rather than sparse interaction not only increases transparency, 
but also provides opportunity for (independent) control. Existing power asymmetries 
must be dealt with openly and responsibly, and stronger actors may be called upon to 
demonstrate their willingness to forego individual gain for the benefit of the whole. 
Opportunities to develop preventive solutions to potential conflicts of interest must be 
seized before such conflicts flare up.  
It will be demonstrated in this study that the federalist order exemplified by the CWC 
is about more than the allocation of power and authority. It also serves to foster the 
shared values which underpin the system. Because federal political orders are 
designed to accommodate both unity and diversity within a single political system, 
they are appropriate to organic conceptions of a political or social order. As Durkheim 
famously argued, ‘organic solidarity’ grows out of interdependency caused by 
difference, rather than similarity. The argument draws on the analogy of a living 
animal, all of whose organs must function together in order for the animal to survive.  
This posits a fundamental understanding and appreciation of this interdependency: if 
people fail to comprehend the ties that bind them to others, then the system breaks 
down (anomie). As will be demonstrated, the CWC at DaimlerChrysler and its 
substructures serve to establish and continually reinforce this sense of mutual 
dependence as the underlying motivation for the actions and policies of the CWC. 
There is a nearly universal consensus among the CWC members, as well as among the 
local works councils members, that this is the primary rationale for the existence and 
work of the CWC at DaimlerChrysler.  It is this widely shared insight into the need to 
cooperate despite at times diverging local interests which provides the basis for 
solidarity among the works councils at DaimlerChrysler.   
In his analysis of the historic emergence of federalist systems, Stepan (1999) has 
identified two processes of federalism. He distinguishes between “holding together” 
federalism, which develops out of unitary states as central governments try to alleviate 
the centrifugal forces of minority’s demands for autonomy, and “coming together” 
federalism, in which sovereign powers are ceded or pooled in certain areas in order to 
achieve goods otherwise unattainable, such as security or prosperity.  
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In the context of the present analysis, it is important to bear in mind that the process of 
federalism is not static; as Stepan (1999) points out, it is dynamic and indeed fluidly 
shaped by the circumstances and issues at hand. Multi-tiered systems of works 
councils can be understood to be ‘coming together’ federalism: access to management 
at more central levels, as well as the capacity to coordinate common goods, such as 
better working conditions or a level playing field,  are attained by pooling sovereignty 
within CWCs, GWCs, and EWCs. And solidarity, which, as has been argued above, has 
far less to do with sovereignty than with loyalty, can also be the outcome of ‘coming-
together’ federalism.  
The following case study of the CWC at DaimlerChrysler will explore in detail the 
emergence of “coming-together federalism” : in response to a widely perceived need to 
contain the centrifugal effects of differentiation, the CWC at DaimlerChrysler has over 
time increased the degree of both formal and informal central coordination.  
An analysis of the ways in which this process enhances the capacity for solidarity 
yields important insights into the perspective of cross-national solidarity within EWCs.  
It will be seen in Chapter Six that while EWCs can also be considered to be basically 
federalist, compared to CWCs there are important limitations to their ability to 
generate solidarity. Most obviously, differences in language and culture, but also fewer 
and/or less developed opportunities as well as patchy and unclear rules and 
procedures for exchange and participation impede the processes of participative and 
discursive collective decision-making which have been seen to be essential to the 
generation of solidarity. Unclear rules and procedures raise the necessity of developing 
legitimate yet flexible means to ensure a responsible approach to power asymmetries 
and to generate social cohesion in the face of divisive coercive comparisons.  
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Chapter Four: Methodology and Method 
4.1. Metatheoretical assumptions and research design  
Within the social sciences, a distinction can made between objectivist and subjectivist 
approaches, which, as Burrell and Morgan (1994) show, each rest on a specific set of 
epistemological and methodological assumptions. These specific metatheoretical 
assumptions in turn influence the choice of methods to be employed.  
From an objectivist perspective, which rests on a positivist epistemology and a 
nomothetic methodology, the goal of social science is to “seek to explain and predict 
what happens in the social world by searching for regularities and causal relationships 
between its constituent elements“ (Burrell and Morgan 1994: 5). As Blaikie (1993: 15) 
emphasises, the main objective of an objectivist research approach is to establish 
generalisations and law-like statements which apply across time and space.  
In contrast, the subjectivist approach is anti-positivist, (or in Blaikie’s terms 
interpretivist) and idiographic in nature. This means that the main goal of subjectivist 
research approaches lies in understanding ‘from the inside’, or as Burrell and Morgan 
put it, “from the point of view of the individuals who are directly involved in the 
activities which are to be studied“ (Burrell and Morgan 1994: 5). In short, in subjectivist 
research the goal is a holistic understanding of the phenomenon under investigation.  
These different metatheoretical assumptions are also expressed in the different value 
assigned to structure and agency in explaining social phenomena, i.e., the analytical 
focus. Following Scott (1997), one can distinguish between objectivist and subjectivist 
approaches as follows:  while the former concentrates primarily  on the macro-level of 
the analysis of social systems and structures, which in this perspective exist 
independent of individual actors and furthermore influence or even determine their 
actions, the subjectivist approach puts the individual at the centre of the analysis. 
According to Scott (1997: 202), “the common thread in [...] subjectivist approaches is to 
see social organization — social institutions and ‘society’ itself — as the direct creations 
of individual acting subjects“.  The focal point of subjectivist analyses are thus 
individual actions and the individual goals, motives, and perceptions which underlie 
them.  
This research belongs to the second category.  The central objective of this research is to 
explore the potential for solidarity in cross-site multi-level structures and processes of 
employee interest representation on the basis of an analysis of social processes within 
the CWC from the point of view of its members and constituents.  This approach is 
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based on the assumption that the behaviour of the CWC as a collective actor is the 
result of social interaction processes shaped by individual interests and perceptions. 
These interaction processes do not take place in a vacuum, however. The interests and 
perceptions of the individual actors are themselves influenced by the social context in 
which they are embedded.  Against this background, Hyman (1989) stresses the 
necessity of a dialectical approach: “There is [...] a complex two-way process in which 
our goals, ideas and beliefs influence and are influenced by social structure. To do 
justice to its complexity, industrial sociologists must be attuned to this dynamic 
interaction between structure and consciousness“ (Hyman 1989: 76).  
The pursuit of a dialectic and actor-centred approach requires the use of qualitative, 
explorative methods. This is particularly true for this research, since the actual 
operation of CWCs has hardly been investigated empirically. As Ragin (1987: 35) 
emphasises, qualitative methods are sensitive to complexity and thus enable a holistic 
understanding of the phenomenon under investigation.  In order to be able to grasp the 
motivation of the CWC members and the meaning which they ascribe to the 
phenomenon under investigation, this research thus relies heavily on qualitative 
techniques such as participant observation, interviews, and the analysis of archival 
data (Bryman 1995).  
A further consequence of the pursuit of a qualitative approach is the limited number of 
cases which can be analysed.  In contrast to quantitative approaches, which tend to rely 
on the availability of large data sets which are usually obtained through survey census 
or sampling methods (Smelser 1976: 205) and are then subjected to multivariate 
statistical analysis, qualitative approaches tend to be limited to the investigation of 
only a few cases at most since it is difficult to sustain attention to complexity across a 
large number of cases.  In technical terms, the subjectivist idiographic orientation of 
this study leads to a ‘small-N qualitative case-oriented’ research design. In this case, N 
is very small indeed.  It consists of a single case: the multi-level system of employee 
interest representation at  DaimlerChrysler. At the same time, the case study includes 
further cases within it; because the research covers two levels – i.e., the central works 
council and its articulation with the local works councils – N is larger with respect to 
the level of sites and their interactions. The choice of the single case study approach has 
been chosen because of the necessarily explorative character of the research15.  As there 
is no in-depth empirical investigation of the internal processes of interest aggregation 
                                           
15 Indeed, although the original intention was to compare the approaches to potentially 
divergent interests within a German Gesamtbetriebsrat and a French comité de groupe, the lack of 
any prior research on the subject in either country quickly led to the decision to focus on a 
single case.   
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and decision-making within CWCs, this research has ventured into largely uncharted 
territory.  
According to Yin, “a potential vulnerability of the single-case design is that a case may 
later turn out not to be the case it was thought to be at the outset“ (1994: 41). In order to 
minimise the chances of misrepresentation and to maximise the access needed to 
collect the case study evidence, the beginning of fieldwork at DaimlerChrysler was 
preceded by a phase of participant observation at the EWC Team of the German 
metalworkers’ union IG Metall. Although I was researching the EWC work of the IG 
Metall, discussions held during my time at IG Metall with the FTOs responsible for 
advising a range of CWCs allowed me to gain an understanding of the wide variety of 
ways in which CWCs actually operate in practice. It also gave me an excellent 
opportunity to ensure that the company I would selected for the case study  would 
indeed be a ‘critical’ or ‘revelatory’ case (Yin 1994). 
The CWC at DaimlerChrysler was selected for three reasons. First, the CWC at 
DaimlerChrysler was clearly a very professional and well-organised committee: its 
‘best practice’ could thus serve as a particularly instructive case for the investigation of 
the ways in which CWCs could operate. Since the main objective of this research was 
to understand how solidarity can be generated within the CWC and to identify the 
possible lessons for EWCs, this was an important criterion. Second, in order to at least 
in part be able to assess the gap between rhetoric and reality, I wanted to be able to 
focus my research on a critical experience. During the course of parallel employment  
security negotiations, the ability of the CWC at DaimlerChrysler to develop – and 
maintain—a common line was severely tested. Since this experience had taken place 
several years prior to my fieldwork there, I hoped that the dust would have settled 
enough for me to gain access to the detailed progress of that critical experience in the 
collective consciousness of the CWC. The third reason for selecting DaimlerChrysler 
was that the head of the department at IG Metall where I was working, who had been 
the national-level trade union coordinator for DaimlerChrysler for the past 25 years, 
offered to arrange full access at DaimlerChrysler for me.  
4.2. Methods 
From the subjectivist idiographic orientation of this study, the application of 
‘ethnographic’ data gathering techniques is almost automatic. Since the core aim of the 
research was to unearth the interests and motivations underlying the social interaction 
processes in the CWC,  it was imperative to get as close as possible to the individual 
actors in order to penetrate the frames of meaning within which they operate.  
Furthermore, this study relies on the use of multiple sources of evidence comprising 
participant observation, semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis as well as 
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the use of survey evidence. The strength of this triangulation approach is that it 
enhances the scope and breadth of the investigation by covering a broader range of 
historical, attitudinal and behavioural aspects, which increases the plausibility of the 
case study findings and conclusions (Yin 1994: 92). According to Bryman, the 
combination of different data gathering techniques furthermore “allows inferences or 
‘leads’ drawn from one data source to be corroborated or followed up by another” 
(1995: 47).  
Participant observation 
The application of the method of participant observation took place in two phases. The 
first phase, which took place from January until April 1999 at the EWC Team at the IG 
Metall served primarily two purposes. First, I sought to gain an understanding of the 
current state of play in EWC practice. My second objective was to prepare for the 
second phase of participant observation at my case company from July until April of 
the same year. Following Gans’ distinction between different activities involved in 
doing participant observation both my stays saw me performing three different roles: 
total researcher, researcher participant, and total participant (Gans in Bryman 1995: 48).  
Participant observation at IG Metall’s EWC Team 
The EWC Team is centred in the department of the IG Metall headquarters which, 
among other tasks, advises employee representatives in the largest German firms in the 
metal sector. Thus, the members of this department advise and facilitate meetings of 
the CWCs, and usually sit on the supervisory boards as external employee 
representatives. As a total researcher, I had the opportunity to observe CWC and EWC 
meetings and negotiations in the company of any one of the four FTOs with whom I 
worked most closely. Although my main focus lay on understanding EWC practice, I 
also had the opportunity to observe meetings of  the CWCs of  several different 
companies. This not only contributed to a better understanding of the overall duties 
and different modes of operation of CWCs in the German IR context, but it also 
allowed me to select the most appropriate ‘lead’ case for my case study, and to be able 
to place the goings-on of the CWC at DaimlerChrysler within a wider comparative 
context.   Through my discussions with FTOs at the IG Metall, I also learned much 
about the internal political processes which take place behind the scenes.  The 
relevance of my central question about interest aggregation and the generation of 
solidarity was also confirmed as one of the key challenges facing CWCs and EWCs. My 
attendance at CWC meetings at DaimlerChrysler during this research phase also 
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served a practical purpose, since it enabled me to meet the CWC members and arrange 
access personally with the support of the FTOs.  
As a research participant, I participated in CWC, GWC, and EWC meetings. As an 
intern, I participated not as a representative of the IG Metall but as an ‘outsider’. This 
proved especially helpful in informal settings, since works councillors and union 
activists were more open with their views and I was thus able to obtain a more 
differentiated understanding of the activities of the IG Metall.  This would most likely 
not have been possible if I had had the status of an ‘insider’.  
Finally, as a total participant I was actively involved in the work of the EWC Team. I 
developed an information folder for IG Metall’s EWC coordinators, who as a rule are 
the FTOs responsible for advising the CWCs or group works councils of German 
companies. Actively participating in the day-to-day work of the EWC Team helped me 
to understand the changing context of EWCs, their past, present and possible future 
priorities, and the difficulties of advising them on a European level.  
Participant observation at the CWC office at DaimlerChrysler 
I conducted my participant observation at DaimlerChrysler about six months into the 
term of office of a new CWC Chairman. This meant that the slight turbulence 
surrounding his election had subsided, and the first effects of his new style of 
leadership could already be felt. This proved to be a recurring point in the interviews. 
Furthermore, I was fortunate enough to be able to begin my observation in July 1999 by 
participating in a week-long seminar whose focus lay in discussing and possibly 
adapting the CWC’s working structures. This amounted to a week-long focus group 
addressing a key subset of questions about the expectations and limits of the CWC’s 
work. It also gave me the opportunity to meet all the CWC members at once and 
present my project to them. Like the CWC office staff, I acted as facilitator for one of 
the working group sessions at the seminar.  
In the course of my fieldwork at DaimlerChrysler, I participated in all regular meetings 
of the CWC and in meetings of the various commissions and working groups. For 
example, I attended the entire circuit of regional meetings held for the Sales and 
Service establishments. In this series of meetings the agenda was roughly the same, but 
the discussions were quite different from meeting to meeting. This experience helped 
to sharpen my sense of how differently the same subject can be assessed and discussed 
by different groups of people.  Overall, the opportunities to observe meetings and 
discuss them with the Secretariat staff afterwards provided me with unique insights in 
and first-hand information about the internal workings of and political processes 
within the CWC.  
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All in all, the entire research process benefited considerably from the application of the 
technique of participant observation. First, it enabled me to collect factual information 
about the actual work and function of the CWC at DaimlerChrysler and to understand 
events and behaviour in their specific organisational context. Second, it allowed me to 
explore the underlying motivations of the CWC members. Third, from a practical point 
of view, my stay at DaimlerChrysler as a participant observer also helped to develop 
and implement the next steps in my research design.  First, I was given access to 
relevant documentation, such as the minutes of the series of meetings held during the 
1996-7 phase of parallel local-level negotiations.   Second, the insights gained during 
my stay informed both the questionnaire and my semi-structured interview schedule; 
for the survey questionnaire in particular, this meant that both in terms of content and 
terminology it fit into the day-to-day context of the respondents. Finally, in many 
cases, the fact that I knew the CWC members personally by the time I approached 
them for an interview increased their willingness to take time for the interviews.  
Despite these benefits, participant observation creates its own bias. This particular 
technique may not be able to capture all relevant situations and processes. In critical 
and particularly sensitive decision-making situations, for instance, the presence of a 
participant observer may be inappropriate or simply not allowed. Therefore, in order 
to fill in the missing pieces and to enhance the scope and breadth of the investigation, it 
is essential to employ complementary data gathering techniques. Next to the postal 
survey, which explicitly aimed to control for widely divergent views of the role of the 
CWC among its constituents, other methods such as semi-structured interviews and 
the analysis of relevant documents helped to fill in gaps and compensate for the 
inevitable personal bias.  
Interviews 
The strength of semi-structured interviews as a method is that it leaves considerable 
room for the interviewees to express their perception of the CWC’s activities and 
functions in their own terms (Jones 1993: 56). It also allows the investigator to probe 
more deeply and to uncover new dimensions (Burgess 1984; Walker 1993). In 
conducting the semi-structured interviews, I had a set of issues and key questions I 
wanted to cover. At the same time, I was able to concede some control of the interview 
to the interviewee by allowing him/her to ‘ramble’. As Measor points out, ‘rambling’ is 
revealing because the interviewee “is moving to areas which most interest him or her” 
(Measor in Bryman 1995: 46). In the case of this investigation, the interviewees’ 
‘rambling’ enabled me to get information not only about those aspects of the CWC’s 
activities that are of central concern to them, but also about how the CWC features 
within the context of their day-to-day activities. This was an important exercise to 
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obtain a rounded notion of the different perceptions of the role of the CWC in the 
broader context of the multi-level system of employee representation at 
DaimlerChrysler. 
The semi-structured interview 
The interviews with the CWC members and guests were conducted on the basis of an 
interview schedule which had been developed based on the research questions and 
informed by the observations gathered during the 3-month participant observation, as 
well as my analysis of the minutes of the CWC meetings held between February 1996 
and April 1997.  
The interview schedule was divided into three main sections. The interview schedule, 
whose basic structure remained the same for all interviews, contained both specific 
questions as well as more open-ended questions.  
The first section contained specific and standardised questions about the respondents’ 
personal background. They were asked how long they had been a member of the local 
works council and the central works council, and what offices they currently held or 
had held in both committees. The respondents were also asked to indicate any other 
committees, such as CWC-subcommittees, of which they are members, as well as 
whether they were members of CWC committees before becoming a member of the 
CWC itself.  The respondents were also asked how long they have worked for the 
company, whether and for how long they were members in the IG Metall, and whether 
they received training from the IG Metall. The respondents were also asked whether 
they were active in a political party.  
The second section of the interview schedule consisted of open-ended questions about 
the respondents’ perceptions of and expectations about the role of the CWC and its 
commissions. Respondents were also asked about interdependencies between sites and 
effects of these on their role as intermediaries between the local and central levels of 
employee representation within the company. They were asked about the criteria 
according to which an issue was dealt with at the central level or the central level.  
The third section of the interview schedule focussed on the series of negotiations about 
employment security agreements which were conducted at each site in parallel 
between February 1996 and April 1997. The actual negotiations were conducted at the 
local level, but central coordination in the CWC had aimed to ensure that the 
provisions agreed at local level were in some ways functionally equivalent to 
provisions agreed at other sites. In the end, a central framework agreement was also 
signed complementary to the local agreements. The questions in this section focussed 
on a retrospective assessment of this process of parallel negotiations. Based on the 
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documentary analysis of the minutes of the CWC meetings during that time, as well as 
the comparative issue-by-issue analysis of the final agreements concluded at each site, 
the questions sought to re-trace the course of these negotiations with specific reference 
to the actual provisions which were agreed in stages at the local level in light of the 
ongoing attempts to centrally coordinate those negotiations  The questions relating to 
the actual agreements signed at the local level were different for each site, however. 
The empirical data about the parallel employment security negotiations, however, is 
not included in the present analysis.  It emerged during the course of the research that 
the rather controversial ‘denouement’ of the story lay in the hands of the former 
Chairman of the CWC, Karl Feuerstein. Feuerstein had suddenly passed away just 
prior to the beginning of my field research; this made it very difficult for the CWC 
members to speak openly about the ways in which the conflict was resolved.  While I 
might have been able to ‘get to the bottom’ of the story on the basis of the documentary 
evidence, without the benefit of candid interpretation by the main actors, it would 
have been necessary to go into great detail to explore the ways in which ‘equivalence’ 
was achieved across sites. This necessarily highly technical discussion would have 
been beyond the scope of the present research.  
The final section of the interview revisited the issue of central vs. local competence in 
light of the interviewers’ account of the parallel negotiations on employment security. 
Respondents were also asked to reflect on the presence or absence of implicit dividing 
lines or faults in the CWC, whether they be between the automotive or utility vehicle 
divisions, between white- and blue-collar workers, between the north and the south, or 
between east and west, for example. Finally, respondents were asked to explain what 
the notion of solidarity meant to them.  
To sum up, the interviews had a built-in choreography: respondents were first asked 
basic and unobtrusive questions about their personal background; this proved a useful 
warm-up phase to establish a constructive and open atmosphere for the interview. The 
second section about the actual work of the CWC gave them an opportunity to expand 
on their expectations about and experience in the CWC, and allowed me to follow up 
with questions aimed at uncovering the more sensitive aspects of the power issues 
involved. By this stage, rapport in the interview was in most cases well established. 
The third section about the parallel site negotiations was the most sensitive and 
therefore most difficult section of the interviews. The questions were at first more 
technical due to the focus on the course of the negotiations and the specificity of the 
agreements; it therefore seemed quite straightforward and perhaps less politically 
sensitive—especially since the CWC has since implicitly developed a common joint 
account. This shared retrospective account, however, is not borne out by my analysis of 
contemporary documentation (the minutes and a detailed comparison of the actual 
agreements). While these discrepancies allowed me to probe a bit more deeply in the 
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interview, my ability to fully clarify what happened was limited by the respondents’ 
necessarily retrospective view. During the final phase of the interview, the respondents 
were able to take a bird’s eye view of the CWC and their understanding of solidarity in 
light of the preceding discussion.  
The bulk of the interviews were conducted between September 2000 and June 2001. 
The fact that the interviews were conducted over a period of 18 months gave me the 
opportunity to refine my questions and ability to probe, and also to chart the ongoing 
shifts in the CWCs internal culture.  
All in all, I conducted 33 interviews. Of the full members of the CWC, I interviewed 28 
out of 30 members. I interviewed all 12 chairs of the plant works councils, and 11 out of 
12 vice-chairs. I interviewed four out of the five representatives of the sales and service 
establishments, and the single representative of the R&D sites. Several people had 
retired in the course of my research and were no longer available for an interview: the 
former vice-chair of the works council at Mannheim, and one of the five 
representatives of the Sales and Service establishments.  
Of the guests in the CWC, I interviewed four out of the five guests from subsidiary 
automotive companies. I interviewed the Chair of the Works Council at 
DaimlerChrysler Ludwigsfelde, a subsidiary company in former East Germany which 
produces the same models as are produced by the plants owned by DaimlerChrysler.  I 
also interviewed the Chair of the CWC at EvoBus GmbH, a company which makes  
buses in parallel to the plants owned by DaimlerChrysler.  
I interviewed the full time IG Metall official responsible for DaimlerChrysler at 
national level; Although he has since retired, he had been advising DaimlerChrysler for 
about 25 years and was also a member of the supervisory board.  During my 
participant observation, I worked closely with all six assistants to the CWC. I 
conducted an in-depth background interview with the member of CWC staff who was 
most familiar with the employment security agreements negotiated between 1995 and 
1997.  
I got to know all members and guests of the CWC during my participant observation 
which took place before the interview phase. For reasons of time constraints, there 
were several people whom I did not formally interview, however, although their views 
have certainly also informed this research. I did not interview the following guests in 
the CWC: the Vice-Chair of the works council of DaimlerChrysler Ludwigsfelde, 
because he retired in the course of my research; the Chair of the works council at 
Mercedes Benz Lenkungen GmbH, an outsourced company which makes steering 
systems in Düsseldorf and which has since been sold; the Chair of the CWC at 
Mercedes Benz Vertriebsgesellschaft (MBVG), a separate dealership and service 
company with establishments in the new German Länder; the only employee 
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representative on the Supervisory Board at DaimlerChrysler  who is not formally a 
member of the CWC; the Chair of central disabled persons’ representation council 
(GSBV); or the Chair of central youth and apprentice representation council (GJAV).  A 
list of interviews can be found in the Appendix.  
Documentary analysis at IG Metall and DaimlerChrysler 
The analysis of CWC Documents was an integral part of the research. These included 
internal memoranda, minutes of meetings, official policy papers and other written 
reports. Although, as Yin emphasises, it is important to keep in mind that any 
document analysed “was written for some specific purpose and some specific audience 
other than those of the case study being done” (1994: 82), documentary analysis is a 
useful tool to capture the historical dimension of  current events: the link between past 
and present events may not be directly observable, and memory tends to be selective. 
Some important events of the past may have been forgotten, purposefully not reported 
in interviews, or the account of past events may be heavily coloured by individual ex 
post rationalisations of behaviour. As mentioned above, this proved quite true with 
respect to the ‘critical experience of the CWC in 1996-7, there was a  marked 
discrepancy between CWC members’ later accounts of the series of parallel site 
negotiations and  the actual sequence of events as documented by the minutes. At the 
same time, since the minutes can also not be taken as statements of fact, but rather are 
at the same objectified yet politicised versions  of events, I was unable to gain a 
complete picture through the minutes either.  This example makes clear how useful  
documentary and archival analysis can be to  corroborate, refute, or augment evidence 
obtained through participant observation and/or interviews. 
Postal Survey 
In order to gain insights into the ways in which local works council members perceived 
the role and purpose of the CWC as its constituents  and –  at the very least – to control 
for any widely divergent perceptions, a postal survey was administered among the 
local works council members of the production sites at DaimlerChrysler.  
In March 2001 I conducted a pilot phase: five works council members from different 
plants were asked to fill out the questionnaire. They were asked to assess the survey, in 
particular with respect to the clarity and appropriateness of the individual questions. 
In response to their feedback, several questions were rephrased and the final 
questionnaire was printed.  
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The first section of the questionnaire focussed on personal information. The second 
part contained questions about their opinion-forming processes at the local level, their 
sources of information, their assessment of the work of the CWC and their perception 
of the development of overall employee representation strategy across the company. In 
the third section works council members were asked to agree or disagree with a range 
of statements culled from individual discussions with works council members. They 
were also asked to indicate the degree of their satisfaction with various aspects of the 
work of the CWC.  The goal of this core of the survey was to find out to what extent 
certain points of view were broadly held, as well as to explore the political backdrop to 
the work of the CWC. The final section of the questionnaire explored the wider arenas 
into which local works council members’ political activity is embedded, for example in 
the union or in political parties. Respondents also had the opportunity to submit 
comments about the survey itself or about the issues raised in the survey.  
Anonymity 
The survey was anonymous: respondents were not asked to give their name or their 
address. The questionnaires were only marked with the names of the plant in which it 
was distributed in order to keep an overview of the return rate. It was at no point 
possible for me to draw conclusions about individual respondents.  
The questionnaire was accompanied by an explanatory letter signed by me and by the 
data protection registrar at the Science Center Berlin. This accompanying letter gave 
assurance that the collected data would only be used for the purposes for which it was 
collected, reiterated that no individual data would be collected or could be deduced, 
and gave a basic example of the way in which the data could be used.  The survey was 
duly registered with the state data protection agency, as required by German law. 
Distribution of the questionnaire 
In May 2001 the questionnaires were distributed to the local works council members. I 
included a covering letter from me which explained the background to the research. 
Respondents were also given a reply-card on which they could indicate whether they 
wished to receive more information on the research project. They could also request a 
copy of the final report on the survey. Some 80 respondents asked for the final report. 
The questionnaire, the covering letters from me and the data protection registrar, the 
reply card, and an addressed return envelopes were sealed in individual envelopes.  
These envelopes were sent as a package to each works council chairman with an 
accompanying letter asking them to distribute them to their local works council 
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members. As a rule, the envelopes were distributed in the works council members’ 
pigeonholes without further explanation by the works council chairmen. The Chair 
and Deputy Chairs of each local works council were exempted from the survey, since 
they are themselves members of the CWC.  
Table 1: Local works council members at DaimlerChrysler factories  
Number of Works Council members  
not including the Chairman and Deputy 
Chairman  
Plant 
Hamburg 17 
Kassel 21 
Berlin 21 
Rastatt 25 
Düsseldorf 25 
Gaggenau 29 
Wörth 31 
Mannheim 31 
Bremen 35 
Untertürkheim 41 
Sindelfingen 49 
TOTAL ALL PLANTS 325 
 
Response rate  
A total of 325 questionnaires were posted. 215 completed questionnaires were 
returned: this represents a very solid return rate of 66%. Across the plants the return 
rate varied from 94% of the works council in Hamburg to 45% of the works council in 
Mannheim (See Figure 2: Return rate by site).  
The size of the plant and by extension the local works council seems to have had little 
influence on the return rate. Significantly higher return rates were reached from the 
smallest plant (Hamburg = 94%) as well from the largest site (Sindelfingen = 80%). 
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Figure 2: Return rate by site  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Representativeness of survey results  
In order to assess the extent to which the data can be considered representative, the key  
test was to see whether the distribution of returned questionnaires mirrors the different 
sizes of each local works council. The ratio of local works council members to the total 
number of works council members in all plants was therefore compared with the 
distribution of the questionnaires across sites. This analysis yields that that some plants 
are slightly overrepresented while others are slightly underrepresented. While the 
Sindelfingen plant is overrepresented in the data pool by about 3%, the Mannheim site 
is underrepresented to the same degree. The plants at Hamburg, Berlin, and Gaggenau 
are either over- or underrepresented by about 2 %. The ratio of returns from Bremen, 
Untertürkheim, Wörth and Düsseldorf deviates by 1 % from their respective 
proportions of the total population of plant works councils. The returns from the plants 
in Rastatt and Kassel correspond exactly to the relative size of their works councils. 
Since no site is over- und underrepresented by more than 3%, the data is not 
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significantly skewed towards any site. The data can therefore be considered to be 
representative. (Figure 3: Representativeness compares the ratio of returned 
questionnaires per site with that site’s portion of all works council members). 
Figure 3:  Representativeness  
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In Summer 2002 I began working at IG Metall Headquarters in the department of 
union policy and strategy in the workplace. Next to working within the EWC Team, I 
was also a member of the team which had been recently set up to develop a more 
coherent strategy towards central and group works councils and to better support the 
union officials who served as their advisors. In January 2003, I took on the position as 
head of the IG Metall’s EWC Team.  
While I had long worked closely with CWC and EWC practitioners, I had still been an 
outsider conducting research until I began working for IG Metall. As participant 
observer at both the IG Metall and at the CWC at DaimlerChrysler, in conducting the 
in-depth interviews with CWC members and in administering the postal survey, my 
institutional affiliation lay clearly with Warwick University and the 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. Indeed, this was another contributing reason put 
forward by my “gatekeepers” at DaimlerChrysler: they introduced me to the CWC as 
someone who could provide an outside view.  
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Once I began working for IG Metall, however, I became an insider. Taking on overall 
responsibility for the IG Metall’s EWC activities, together with my ongoing work with 
central and group works councils, brought a number of the questions I had been 
researching sharply into focus.  The more I was confronted with the challenges and 
opportunities provided by cross-site cooperation among employee representatives 
within complex company structures, the more these insights informed the process of 
writing up the findings of my research. Working directly with central, group, and 
European works councils and contributing to the further development of the IG 
Metall’s and the European Metalworkers’ Federation’s policy and strategy on cross-site 
employee interest representation thus enabled me to continually test my evolving 
analysis and interpretations against the wide range of real-life examples I encountered 
on a day to day basis. In particular, this exposure served to hone my analysis of the 
ways in which employee interest representation must be grasped as a multi-level, 
essentially federalist system, in which a balance must be found between diversity and 
unity, regardless of whether this takes place within one country or across borders.  
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Chapter Five: The Central Works Council at 
DaimlerChrysler: a Case Study  
5.1. Introducing the case study: the central works council at 
DaimlerChrysler  
At the time that this study was being conducted, from 1999 to 2002, the provisions of 
the 1972 Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz: BetrVG) were in force.  
DaimlerChrysler thus has local works councils (Betriebsräte) in all its establishments, a 
Central Works Council (Gesamtbetriebsrat) covering its automobile and commercial 
vehicle divisions, and a Group Works Council (Konzernbetriebsrat) covering its activities 
in all sectors; next to automotive production, DaimlerChrysler in 1999 also had 
subsidiary companies active in railway rolling stock and technology (Adtranz, MTU, 
Temic), information and communication technology (debis, Systemhaus, debitel), and 
aerospace (DASA, DASA Airbus, Eurocopter, MTU-M, and Dornier).   
This study focuses only on the Central Works Council (CWC) (Gesamtbetriebsrat ), 
which covers the motorised vehicles division which produces  passenger cars and 
commercial vehicles. (i.e., lorries,  buses,  vans, and special-purpose vehicles such as 
fire engines, ambulances, street sprinklers, etc ). 
The CWC at DaimlerChrysler 
As seen in Figure 4, the CWC at DaimlerChrysler AG is the peak level of 
representation structures for the divisions in the company producing passenger cars 
and commercial vehicles.  
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Figure 4:  Works council structures at Daimler Chrysler AG (1999
Figure 4:  Works council structures at Daimler Chrysler AG (1999) 
Gesamtbetriebsrat 
Central Works Council 
of DaimlerChrysler AG 
(30 members + guests) 
Rastatt (27)
Berlin (23)
Kassel (23)
Hamburg (19)
Wörth (33) 
Möhringen (33) 
Gaggenau (31)
Düsseldorf (27)
Sindelfingen (51)*
Untertürkheim (43)
Bremen (37) 
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Mannheim (33)
Sales and Service
41 establishments in 5 
regional districts 
Guests:  
Evobus (CWC) DB 
Ludwigsfelde (WC),  
DB Lenkungen (WC), 
MBVG (CWC) 
IG Metall Rep. 
Youth and Apprentice Rep. 
Disabled employees’ Rep. 
24 members: 
Chair and Deputy-Chair from 12 
Plants 
5 members
9 guests 
R&D 
4 sites 
1 member
Konzernbetriebsrat : Group Works Council 
Includes representatives from the companies DaimlerChrysler, Evobus, 
DB Lenkungen, MBVG, DB Ludwigsfelde, Adtranz, MTU, Temic, debis, 
Systemhaus, Debitel, DASA, DASA Airbus, Eurocopter, MTU-M, Dornier 
Automotive Division:
passenger cars & 
commercial vehicles 
* Figures in parentheses indicate the number of local works council members.  
Table 2: The Works Councils at DaimlerChrysler AG in 1999 
Total number 
of works 
council 
members 
Total number of 
employees 
represented 
Works councils (Betriebsräte) at: 
 Blue collar White collar 
12 plants 380  132,938 96,737 36,201 
41 dealerships and service 
establishments; logistics/ parts 
warehouses 
341 16,589 7,814 8,775 
4 R & D sites 36 1,546 15 1,531 
TOTAL 757 151,073 104,566 46.507 
 
The CWC at DaimlerChrysler AG is made up of 30 full members. The CWC meets in 
plenary ten times per year. Although the BetrVG does not stipulate that the chair and 
deputy-chair of the local works council are to be delegated to the CWC, this is more or 
less automatically the case at DaimlerChrysler, as in  many other German companies.  
Manufacturing Plants 
The works council of each DaimlerChrysler factory in Germany delegates two 
members.  Although the CWC at DaimlerChrysler very rarely puts issues to a formal 
vote, the fact that the plants together represent 88% of the employment in the company 
means that the production sites in effect dominate the CWC.  
Sales and Service Establishments  
Next to the 12 production plants, DaimlerChrysler AG also has 41 Sales and Service 
establishments across Germany. Spread as they are across forty-one sites, these Sales 
and Service establishments (Niederlassungen) (S&S) elect nearly half the works 
councillors in the company although they only represent just under 11% of the total 
workforce.  
The BetrVG stipulates a maximum number of 40 CWC members, unless alternate 
arrangements have been negotiated under §47(4) of the BetrVG. If each of the 41 sales 
and service establishments and each of the four research and development sites were 
to delegate members directly to the CWC, then it would have well over 100 members.  
The CWC therefore negotiated an agreement with the company whereby the works 
councils of the sales and service establishments and the R&D sites delegate as groups. 
The four research and development sites collectively delegate one member to represent 
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them in the CWC. The 41 sales and service branches are organised into five regional 
districts (Bezirke), each of which is entitled to send a representative to the CWC. The 
chairs and deputy chairs of each local works council in the sales and service 
establishments meet at least twice a year at five regional district conferences following 
meetings of the CWC. A chair and deputy-chair are elected from each district; the 
chairs of these regional district conferences are the representatives of the S&S 
establishments in the CWC. Perhaps more importantly, they also comprise the S&S 
commission (NLK: Niederlassungskommission) of the CWC, which serves as a central 
works council for the forty-one Sales and Service establishments. In other words, there 
is effectively a CWC within the larger CWC at DaimlerChrysler for the sales and 
service sites.  
In 1999, the logistics (parts) departments of the company were due to be reorganised 
into Euro-Logistic Centers (ELC) and Global Logistics Centers (GLC). For the time 
being, these are included in the representation structures of the Sales and Service 
establishments. This may not remain the case, as they are increasingly directed from a 
different managerial arm than are the S&S. This means that effectively they have a 
different managerial counterpart than do the S&S and are consequently “out of the 
loop.” A case could be made that the ELCs and GLCs set up their own CWC  
structures. For the time being though, the specific interests and issues of importance to 
the GLCs and ELCs are taken up by the S&S Commission in the CWC in the form of a 
regular agenda point and a request for a (regular) meeting with the company’s 
Executive Director of Logistics.  
Guests in the CWC 
According to the BetrVG, only those establishments which formally belong to the 
automotive division of DaimlerChrysler AG are officially entitled to be members of the 
Central Works Council  for the automotive division.  However, there are a number of 
subsidiary companies belonging to the DaimlerChrysler group which are also active in 
the automotive division.  Next to production sites and sales and service establishments 
in the former East German states which for legal reasons have remained separate 
companies, these include subsidiary companies such as Mercedes Benz Lenkungen 
GmbH, an outsourced part of Mercedes Benz AG which makes steering systems, and 
EvoBus GmbH, which makes buses.  
The activities of these subsidiary companies are intricately linked to the activities of the 
main automotive division of Daimler Chrysler AG. In this sense, the legal company 
structure does not reflect the operative links between companies belonging to the 
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group.  These subsidiary companies are represented in the top-level Group Works 
Council, but they are not by right members of the CWC.  However, because industrial 
relations in both the main DaimlerChrysler automotive division and the subsidiary 
automotive companies have implications for one another, the activities and policies of 
the works councils at the subsidiary automotive companies are politically relevant to 
the CWC. Representatives of these subsidiary companies are therefore invited to attend 
CWC meetings as guests, so that their respective IR strategies can be better aligned 
with one another and with the main automotive division.  
The CWC Secretariat 
The day-to-day work of the CWC is supported by nine full-time staff who make up the 
CWC secretariat. Compared with other German companies of comparable size and 
reach, the elaborate secretariat at DaimlerChrysler is perhaps matched only by that at 
Volkswagen. As Herbert Lucy, Chairman of the Central Works Council  from 1973 to 
1989, writes in his biography, it was his insistence on expert assistance which laid the 
foundation for today’s well-staffed secretariat.  
When Lucy took office in 1973, the CWC secretariat consisted of a single administrative 
secretary. Soon thereafter, management agreed to hire a former engine fitter who had 
gone on to become captain in the military to act as ‘office manager’ for the CWC. Even 
this reinforcement quickly proved insufficient, so Lucy requested further expert 
assistance. He writes, 
I asked Schleyer [Personnel Director] to approve the hiring of a second CWC-
Secretary. At first, Schleyer refused, upon which I said to him: “Please take note 
that I will in future refuse any proposal which I am not in a position to assess. I 
will not let myself be taken for a ride.”  In reply to his objection that everything 
had gone fine until now, I answered that I was now Chairman and that he would 
have to get used to it. Either he supplied me with enough personnel or he would 
have to assume that nothing much would move at the negotiating table. This was 
language he understood (Lucy 1993: 103). 
In the end, management consented to fund two further experts for the CWC secretariat: 
an expert in time and motion studies, who advised Lucy on piecework rates, wages 
and salaries, and an economist who supplied Lucy with economic analyses.  
In 2001, the CWC secretariat boasted three secretarial assistants, one lawyer, one 
economist, one sociologist and three former works council members. This mixture of 
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both professionally trained external staff and experienced in-house ‘political’ figures  
drawn from the ranks of the works councils  is intended to ensure both the 
professionalism and expertise of the work of the secretariat as well as a political 
closeness to the realities of workplace interest representation and the experience of 
working in the company.  
Meetings of the CWC 
Thus, a meeting of the CWC at DaimlerChrysler can be attended by as many as 45 
people:  
Table 3: Participants in CWC meetings at DaimlerChrysler in 1999 
Members of the CWC: 
12 Chairs of  the 12 plant works councils 
12 Deputy-chairs of 12 plant works councils 
5 Representatives of dealerships & service districts 
1 Representative of R & D sites 
30 TOTAL full members 
  
Also attending 
5 guests from subsidiary automotive companies: 
 Chair of CWC at Mercedes Benz Vertriebsgesellschaft (MBVG), a separate dealership and 
service company with establishments in the new German Länder 
 Chair and Deputy-Chair of the Works Council at DaimlerChrysler Ludwigsfelde, a production 
company in the new German Länder 
 Chair of the CWC at Mercedes Benz Lenkungen GmbH 
 Chair of the CWC at EvoBus GmbH 
  
4 further guests: 
 IG Metall full time official responsible for DaimlerChrysler at national level 
 Employee representative on the Supervisory Board at DaimlerChrysler 
 Chair of central youth and apprentice representation council 
(Gesamtjugend- und Auszubildendenvertretung:  GJAV ) 
 Chair of central disabled persons’ representation council  
(Gesamtschwerbehindertenvertretung: GSBV)  
 
6 Assistants from the CWC  Secretariat 
 
TOTAL: Up to 45 participants in all  
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The CWC substructure: commissions, negotiation committees, project 
groups and working groups 
In accordance with the BetrVG, a nine-member executive committee of the CWC at 
DaimlerChrysler has been established – at least on paper.  As provided for by the 
BetrVG, the CWC has also set up wide range of subcommittees.  It is here that the real 
work of the CWC takes place: in the standing commissions, negotiating committees, 
project groups, and working groups. There are about 14 formal standing commissions 
and at least 26 negotiating committees, project groups, and working groups. Taken 
together, the standing commissions, negotiating committees, project groups, and 
working groups form a highly complex and wide ranging sub-structure to the CWC 
itself.   
The role of these commissions, sub-committees and project groups will be discussed 
further in Section 5.3 below.  See also Figure 21:  Committees, Commissions, Project 
Groups, & Task Forces of the CWC at DaimlerChrysler (1999) 
Annual works council assembly (Betriebsräteversammlung) 
As required by Section 53 of the BetrVG,  an annual assembly of all the executive 
committees of all the local works councils at DaimlerChrysler AG is convened, 
normally in October. The first day is reserved for the representatives from the Sales 
and Service establishment, while the second day includes the plant representatives as 
well. Up to 300 works council members participate in this event. At this meeting, the 
CWC distributes a written Annual Report, reports on its activities, and fields questions 
and statements from the works council delegations. The employer is also required to 
report on the social and financial affairs and trends in the company, and to respond to 
questions and statements from the works council delegations.  
Commonly referred to as the ‘October Revolution’ by CWC members and local works 
council members, it is here that the CWC sees itself as being called to account for its 
activities over the year.  The complete Managing Board of  DaimlerChrysler is also 
present for part of each day.  For many works councillors, and in particular for those 
from the S&S branches, this represents the only opportunity to address both the 
managing board directly (i.e., to bypass the CWC as interlocutor) as well as to address 
the CWC itself.   
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The Members of the Central Works Council    
Before moving on to examine the working of the CWC in more detail, it is useful to 
have a closer look at the 30 full members of the Central Works Council  at 
DaimlerChrysler as it was staffed in 1999.  
Table 4: Full members of the CWC 
Full Members of the CWC: 
12 Chairs of  the12 plant works councils 
12 Deputy chairs of 12 plant works councils 
5 Representatives of dealerships & service districts 
1 Representative of R & D sites 
30 TOTAL 
 
Figure 5: Gender and group affiliation of CWC members 
Gender and Group Affiliation of CWC Members
28
2
17
13
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Men Women White Collar Blue Collar
C
W
C
 m
em
be
rs
 
Gender 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the vast majority of CWC members are male. As will be seen 
in Section 5.2 below, 15% of works councillors at the local level are women; however, 
because the position of Chair or Deputy Chair is the informal prerequisite for 
delegation to the CWC at DaimlerChrysler, the only two women who are full members 
of the CWC are the Deputy Chair of the Berlin plant (who has since been elected 
Chair), and the representative of the R&D sites.  Among the nine guests who attend 
CWC meetings, however, there are two more women: the Chair of the Central Works 
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Council  of the separate dealership and service company in the new German States, 
and the Deputy Chair of the local works council at the production plant in 
Ludwigsfelde, which lies just outside Berlin. Interestingly, both are from the former 
East Germany, where women have traditionally played a more active role in workforce 
representation than they did (or still do) in former West Germany.   
White-Collar and Blue-Collar 
In absolute figures, the proportion of white- and blue-collar representatives is skewed 
in favour of the white-collar representatives. Until 2001, the BetrVG required that both 
white- and blue-collar representatives be delegated to the CWC in order to ensure the 
representation of minority interests.  This differentiation has since been dropped; it is 
expected to remain the rule at DaimlerChrysler, however.  This means that the 12 
plants each delegate one  white-collar representative, who as a rule is the Deputy 
Chairperson of the local works council.  With one exception, the Sales and Service sites 
are represented by former sales (i.e., white collar) employees. The representative of the 
R&D sites is also a white-collar employee.  
It should be borne in mind, however, that since decisions within the CWC are taken by 
weighted majority vote, the blue-collar representatives could outvote the white-collar 
employees by a ratio of over two to one. (See Table 2 above: The CWC at 
DaimlerChrysler in 1999) Now that the distinction between white and blue-collar 
workers has been rescinded, however, each representative of each site casts votes equal 
to half of the workforce of that site. Since at DaimlerChrysler the CWC is expected to 
retain the tradition of white-collar and blue-collar delegates from each site, this means 
that the relative voting power of nominally white-collar representatives is significantly 
skewed upwards.  
Terms of office in the local and Central Works Council 
Figure 6 illustrates the accumulated terms of office of the CWC members in both their 
local works councils and the Central Works Council.  
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Figure 6: Terms of office of CWC members at the local and central level 
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Notes:  
Works council terms of office/election periods were changed in 1972 from a 2-year term to 
a 3-year term, and in 1987 from a 3-year term to the current 4-year term. 
8 CWC members were elected to local office in mid-term elections.  
Generational Shift in the CWC 
At the outset of this study in 1999, a generational shift in the Central Works Council  
had recently taken place. As can be seen in Figure 6, about one quarter of the CWC had 
only been a member for less than four years, and half had only been members of the 
CWC for eight years. The longest-serving member has served since 1971; he called 
himself the “memory” of the CWC. As can be seen in Figure 6, the length of their 
experience at the local level is fairly evenly spread out over the past 20 years, which 
means that they bring to their work a wide range of experience at the local level.  Most 
had been members of local sub-committees, or had held other local works council 
offices before being elected Chair or Deputy Chair.  In this sub-committee work they 
will have gained specialist knowledge in a number of fields.  
What is striking about the composition of the CWC at DaimlerChrysler is that its 
members are relatively young compared to other central works councils in the 
automobile industry. About half the members are in their early to mid-forties. 
According to the national union officer who advises the DaimlerChrysler Central 
Works Council , there was no series of “coups” which led to this, it just happened that 
the leadership of the local works councils went through generational shifts at much the 
same time.  
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Works Council Career Ladders 
Most of the CWC members have worked for DaimlerChrysler, or companies which 
became DaimlerChrysler, since the beginning of their working lives. One CWC 
member pointed out that he was on his seventh employee ID card. Many of the CWC 
members have had what can be called a classic works council career: after having 
served as youth and apprentice representatives during their vocational training with 
the company, they went on to be elected to the local works council, and have 
successfully stood for re-election ever since.  Others, in particular the white-collar 
representatives worked for many years for the company before being elected to the 
works council. It is impressive that nearly all members can say without hesitation 
when they were first elected to the local works council, even if it was many years ago.   
Training   
Nearly all the CWC members have had extensive training in employee representation 
provided by the IG Metall. Such training often begins with youth and apprentice 
representation. Then there is a series of training courses on general works council 
work, which includes labour law and basic economics, for example. This basic training 
is complemented by a range of specialist courses on pay schemes, ergonomics, history 
of the labour movement, job classifications, presentation skills, or vocational training, 
to name just a few examples.  
Trade Union Activities  
All are members of the IG Metall union. At least one of the white-collar representatives 
used to be a member of the former white-collar union DAG until he transferred to the 
IG Metall. Most if not all were also members of the local shop stewards committees 
(Vertrauenskörper). 
Nearly all the CWC members hold offices within the local branches of the IG Metall; 
many are also members of its regional or national-level lay committees. This is not 
surprising, since most DaimlerChrysler plants are the largest employers within the 
local IG Metall branch office; their workforces are always represented in the local 
collective bargaining committee and in the local executive committees of the IG Metall. 
Aside from these functions, a number of CWC members are also active in specialist 
committees at the local level, for example in the local white-collar committees, local 
vocational training commissions, or in local tripartite commissions. Several CWC 
 110
members are also active as lay members of the local labour courts16. About half the 
CWC members are also active in political parties; several even hold local office. 
However, many CWC members pointed out that next to the demands of other duties in 
the local works council, Central Works Council, Group Works Council, or European 
Works Council, it is their time-consuming and travel-intensive involvement in the 
CWC in particular which has prompted them to curtail their voluntary activities at the 
local level.  
5.2. The CWC’s constituents: the members of the local works 
councils 
The sub-units within this federal system of interest representation are the local works 
councils. It is useful to examine who these constituents of the CWC are. Issues such as 
age, gender, the length of their experience at the company and in the local works 
council can expected to shape their perceptions of their role as works council members 
in general and of the work of the CWC in particular. Trade union and other forms of 
political activism can also be expected to have an influence. Their knowledge about 
other sites can be expected to shape their insight into the cross-site implications of the 
work of the CWC.  Their assessment of the work of the CWC is based on their access to 
information about the work of the CWC or the situation at other sites.  
The first section broadly outlines the demographics of the local works council 
members. The second section addresses how long they have worked for the company, 
how long they have been works council members, and how much time they spend on 
works council activity. The third section explores the various influences on their own 
individual opinion-forming processes, highlighting the role played by cross-site 
contacts and their opportunities to become directly involved in the work of the CWC.   
The data presented here is drawn from the postal survey of the works council members 
from the plants only. The members of the central works council, i.e., the chair and 
deputy chair of each local works council, were excluded from the sample, however, 
since the survey sought to investigate the CWC from the point of view of non-
members. Because the works council structures which cover the 41 Sales and Service 
establishments are so complex, and their concerns quite different from those of the 
factories,  it was beyond the scope of this study to cover these. The factory works 
                                           
16 The system of Arbeitsgerichte, or labour courts is roughly analogous to the UK employment tribunals. 
Next to the official judge, representatives of employers and of employees/trade unions serve as lay judges 
(ehrenamtliche Arbeitsrichter). They have full voting rights – and indeed, the lay juges can theoretically 
outvote the official judge.  
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councils cover nearly 133,000 employees, or 88% of the total workforce of 
DaimlerChrysler in Germany.  
Age, Group Affiliation, and Gender 
Figure 7 illustrates the age distribution of the works council members across all 
DaimlerChrysler factories in Germany. Roughly three quarters are between 36 and 55 
years old, 12% are under 36 years of age, and 11% are over 55. There are no works 
councillors younger than 25. The distribution of age cohorts in each individual works 
council does not differ significantly from the overall age distribution illustrated in 
Figure 7.  
The works councils’ composition corresponds to the classic stereotype of the 
automobile industry workforce: they are mostly made up of male blue collar workers.  
85% of all works council members are male, and 79% are blue collar representatives. 
The amendment of the BetrVG in 2001 subsequently did away with this formal 
distinction between blue collar and white collar constituencies.  
Figure 7: Age, gender and group affiliation of local works council members 
Age Distribution 
Age distribution
12%
33%
44%
11%
25-35 36-45 46-55 over 55
Years of Age
 112
 
Gender and Group Affiliation  
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The Works Councils and Trade Unions  
All respondents were members of a trade union: 94% were members of the IG Metall, 
5% were members of the Christian Metalworkers’ Union (CGM), and 1% belong to the 
white-collar union DAG, which has since merged with other unions to become a 
conglomerate services union. The CGM is only represented in four sites, not across the 
whole company. The DAG is only represented in two local works councils.  
The length of trade union membership runs roughly parallel to the length of 
employment illustrated in Figure 13, below: over two thirds of all respondents have 
been union members for over 20 years, a further quarter of all respondents have been 
members for 11-20 years, and the remaining 4% (as a rule the younger works 
councillors) have been union members of the union for less than 11 years.  
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Figure 8: Trade union membership among  local works council members  
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The respondents are also active union members. 82% were or had been shop stewards 
(Vertrauensleute). One third also held a local union office (for example as a member of 
the local delegates’ assembly). Just under one fifth held elected office at the regional 
level (for example as a member of the collective bargaining commission) and 7% also 
held elected office at the national level. This high degree of lay union involvement 
bears testimony to the importance of the close interrelationship between works 
councils and trade unions.  
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Figure 9: Union offices held by local works council members 
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This interrelationship was also clearly reflected in the responses to the questions about 
the influence of the trade union on their work as works council members. A total of 
97% of respondents indicated that the exchange with the trade union played an 
important role in their opinion-forming processes. Nearly three quarters of all 
respondents (73%) assessed the input from their union to be very important in shaping 
their work on the works council.  
When the respondents were asked to indicate which organization or group of persons 
had the greatest influence in determining their own political position, only 30% named 
the trade union (see Figure 10). From this it can be concluded that while the trade 
union may play a highly influential role in helping to shape the overall principles that 
guide the work of the works council members, the union ranks behind local actors such 
as the workforce or fellow works council members in shaping the opinion of individual 
works councillors.  
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Figure 10: The influence of the union in opinion-forming processes  
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As could be expected within the German system of industrial unions, the 
overwhelming majority (94%) of works council members are members of the IG Metall. 
Since individual officers of the IG Metall advise the local and central works councils, 
works councillors were also asked to assess whether they see the IG Metall as playing 
an important role in supporting and advising these bodies. The responses by IG Metall 
members and others did not differ significantly: 88% of the former and 85% of the 
latter indicated that that IG Metall plays an important role in advising the works 
councils. While the thirteen respondents who are not IG Metall members tended to 
assign the IG Metall a slightly less important role, these results indicate that the IG 
Metall has a high profile in the work of the local works councils (See Figure 11).  
Figure 11: The advisory role of the IG Metall  
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 Nearly all respondents (99%) have been formally trained in works council work. An 
equally high proportion (98%) has participated in strikes in the past.  
Party membership and activity 
The works councillors were also asked whether they are members of a political party 
(without being asked to specify any particular party). The goal of this question was to 
ascertain whether other political activities might be brought to bear on their work as 
employee representatives. Just over one third of all works council members was a 
member of a political party; of these, about one third either currently held a party 
office or had held office in the past. All age groups were equally represented in this 
sub- sample, which indicates that party membership has not gone “out of style”.  There 
was also no statistical relationship between party membership and the length of office 
as works councillor; in this sense, party activism does not seem to be politicising. 
Interestingly, the rate of party membership does vary by site, however: in some sites 
the proportion of works council members who were members of a political party was 
significantly higher than in others.  
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Figure 12: Political party membership and offices 
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Long experience at DaimlerChrysler 
The individual works council members can draw upon many years’ experience in the 
company: 95% of all works councillors have worked for over 10 years at what is today 
DaimlerChrysler. Over two thirds of all works councillors have even worked for the 
company for over 20 years. Only 10 respondents have worked for DaimlerChrysler for 
less than 10 years.  
There is a solid balance between experience within the company on the one hand and 
experience on the works council on the other. Interestingly, when the survey was 
conducted in 2001, just over half (52%) of the works councillors were only in their first 
or second term. The often heard criticism that works council members have too little 
direct experience on the shop floor or in administration is not borne out. Since nearly 
one third (29%) of the respondents have been works councillors for over 12 years, the 
works councils can also draw on extensive experience in employee representation.  
Implicit and explicit knowledge about processes and strategic approaches as well as 
the history of employee representation in the company is thus not lost.  The 
distribution illustrated in Figure 13 is indicative of all sites with two exceptions: in 2001 
about half of the works council in Berlin were in their first term, while in Bremen 46% 
of the works councillors had been members for over 24 years.   
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Figure 13: Length of experience at DaimlerChrysler and in the local works 
council 
Length of Employment at DaimlerChrysler
1% 3%
28%
67%
1-5 years 6-10 years 11-20 years over 20  years
Local Works Council Members
 
Term of office of local works council members
27% 26%
19%
11%
18%
1st  term 2nd term 3rd term 4th term 5th term or
more
 
 
Works Council Activity 
Nearly 90% of respondents serve full-time as works council members. The BetrVG 
provides for works council members to be released from their normal duties in order to 
fulfil their duties as employee representatives. The number of full time works 
councillors rises with the size of the works council. The remaining works council 
members are released from duty on a case by case basis. In larger companies, however, 
it is common practice that far more works council members are de facto released from 
duties on a full time basis than would be required by law. In order to present a more 
accurate picture, the questionnaire did not explicitly ask whether respondents were full 
time works councillors; instead, respondents were asked to indicate how many hours 
per week they spend on works council activities.  
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Figure 14: Hours spent on works council activity per week  
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Nearly 90% of the local works council members surveyed are full-time works council 
members. In absolute figures, then, 193 respondents work full time as employee 
representatives; if we extrapolate the survey results to the population of all the works 
councils at the plants, 290 men and women in the plants spend their entire working 
day tending to the needs of the 133,000-strong workforce.  The proportion of full time 
works councillors in the Sales and Service establishments is most likely significantly 
lower, since the individual works council have on average only seven members, and 
the workforces are much smaller at each establishment.  
Opinion forming in the works council  
The works councils were asked with whom and how intensively they exchange 
opinions and information in the process of formulating their own individual position. 
Figure 15 illustrates their responses graphically. Within larger plants in particular, 
there is an implicit system of departmental works council representation: wherever 
possible, candidates for the works council are drawn from each department or shift in 
order to achieve a representative composition of the works council. It emerges that the 
works councillors identify to a very high degree with their individual constituencies: 
without exception, all respondents indicated that exchanges with close work colleagues 
play an important role in their own opinion-forming processes; 89% said that that such 
exchanges play a very important role.  
Since most works council members are de facto full-time works councillors, they don’t 
actually have any “close work colleagues” aside from their colleagues on the works 
council. The fact that nearly all respondents nonetheless cited the departments which 
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delegated them testifies to their strong feeling that these departments and shifts 
represent their local constituency; they are responsible for representing their views 
within the works council. The assessment of exchanges within the works council itself 
as well as with the trade union as “very important” ranked closely behind, with 82% 
and 73% respectively.  
Interestingly, many works councillors draw upon contacts to works councillors in 
other sites: 90% indicated that the position of the CWC was an important part of their 
opinion-forming process, and 85% have contact with other works councillors across the 
company.  
Such contacts almost certainly play a role in ensuring a productive exchange of opinion 
and experience beyond formal participative structures. Works councillors also draw 
upon several sources external to the company, such as the media, family and friends 
and political parties.  
Respondents were also given the opportunity to indicate other organisations or groups 
of persons which influence their opinion-forming process. Six respondents 
supplemented the category “trade union” by citing the local shop stewards specifically. 
Six works councillors mentioned their direct exchanges with the employer, in 
particular with the personnel department and with local top management. Six further 
respondents discuss issues with works council members and trade unionist from other 
companies. Politicians, the church, and the handicapped employees’ representatives 
were mentioned by two respondents each. The following organisations or groups were 
mentioned by one respondent each: the German union confederation DGB, youth and 
apprentice representatives, the local migrant workers’ representative,  the “Alternative 
Metalworkers’” organisation, academics, local societies and associations, social 
services, and local community organisations.   
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Figure 15: External influences on works councillors’ opinion-forming 
processes 
"How important is the role played by the following groups  in your 
own opinion-forming process?"
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In a further question, respondents were asked to indicate which single organisation or 
group had the greatest influence on their own opinion-forming process (see Figure 16). 
These responses allow a more differentiated understanding of the wide-ranging 
sources of influence related above. Here again, three key groups stand out: 
“Colleagues”, “Trade Union”, and “Fellow Works Councillors”.  
Figure 16:  Single most important influence on opinion-forming processes 
"Which is the single most important group in influencing your own 
opinion-forming process?"
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 Influence of the CWC and cross-site contacts 
For some respondents, albeit a minority, however, the most important discussions take 
place beyond the plant; as many as 6% of respondents consider that the CWC and 2% 
consider that works councillors from other sites play the most important role in their 
own opinion-forming process. Since none of these respondents are themselves 
members of the CWC, this highlights the important role that participation in 
commissions plays in making the work of the CWC accessible to local works council 
members and in providing the opportunity to meet and exchange opinion with local 
works council members from other sites. Citing the source “CWC” as the most 
important source also indicates that the local works council members appreciate the 
cross-site implications of many issues.  
90% of respondents indicated that the work of the Central Works Council plays an 
important role in forming their opinion about local issues. For 52%  the CWC even 
plays a “very important” role.  Similarly, for 85% of respondents, exchanges of opinion 
and experience with works council members form other sites play an important role in 
shaping their own position. These results underscore the value accorded to cross-site 
contacts and sources of information and ideas within the closely interwoven network 
of interdependent sites at DaimlerChrysler.  
Since none of the respondents are themselves members of the CWC, their only access 
to the CWC is via the reports from their CWC members and through their own 
involvement in the work of the commissions. It is chiefly through the work of the CWC 
that the local works council members have contact to the works council members in 
other sites.  
Sources of information about sites and the CWC 
If the CWC plays such an important role in the individual works councillors’ opinion-
forming process, it is useful to examine how they are informed about the position or 
activities of the CWC.  
For nearly all respondents, reports about the work of the CWC from their Chair (97%) 
or their Deputy Chair (92%) was an important source of information.  90% of the 
respondents supplemented these reports through their own direct inquiries; 86% of 
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respondents  also drew upon their contacts with works councillors from other sites in 
order to get information.  
As required by Section 53 of the BetrVG, the CWC holds an annual works councils 
conference in which it reports directly to all the executive committees of all the local 
works councils. For 77% of respondents, this was an important source of information 
about the work of the CWC. The annual report which is compiled for this conference 
was also an important source of information; however, only 23% of respondents 
considered this to be a “very important” source of information. In the light of the 
widespread involvement of local works council members and the fact that they 
regularly receive reports from the works council Chair, the significance of an annual 
conference and of the written report pales in comparison.  
Figure 17: Sources of information about the work of the CWC 
"How important are the following sources of information about the 
activities of the CWC?"
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Personal contacts and direct personal experience 
If 85% of local works council members regularly contact works councillors at other 
sites, then presumably they do so on the basis of their own personal networks. For a 
few works council members, these contacts may have been carried over from when 
they themselves worked at another plant: this only applies to a small minority of works 
council members, however. The annual assembly of the works councillors may also 
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serve to spark such personal cross-site networks. But the single most important basis
for such personal networks lies in the wide scale involvement of local works council 
member in the work of the CWC.  
 
On the assumption that direct personal experience in another site could shape local 
 
 
ar on 
Figure 18: Number of works council members who have worked at another 
works councillors’ perception of the relevance of cross-site issues, respondents were
asked to indicate whether they had ever themselves worked at another site. A total of
33 works council members had experience from other DaimlerChrysler sites. Since the 
newest plant in Rastatt had actively recruited employees (and works council members) 
from nearby DaimlerChrysler sites, it is not surprising that 16 members (fully 86%) of 
the Rastatt works council  brought with them experience from other sites. But in every 
other works council except those in Berlin and Untertürkheim there were works 
council members who were able to bring their own experience at other sites to be
the work of the local works council. (See Fig 18.)  
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 Active involvement in the work of the CWC sub-committees 
Just under half of all respondents (48%) were or had been members of commissions, 
project groups, working groups or task forces of the CWC; 3% were or had been active 
in as many as 4 such subcommittees.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this level of involvement of local works council 
members in the work of a Central Works Council is largely unprecedented in the 
German system of multi-tiered interest representation. The implications of this large-
scale involvement of local works council members in the work of the commissions is 
further examined in Sections 5.3 and 5.6. 
Figure 19: Membership in cross-site committees 
Membership in cross-site committees
no committees
52%
1-3 committees
45%
over 4 committees
3%
 
 
Meaning of and access to CWC work  
According to 61% of the respondents, the work of the CWC has high relevance to their 
day-to-day work in the local works councils. This can be considered further evidence 
for an acute awareness of the close political and issue-based interlinkage between the 
local and central levels. According to 60% of respondents, however, there are not many 
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possibilities to become involved in the work of the CWC. This is somewhat surprising, 
since just under half of the works councils are involved. Overall, 44% of the 
respondents were of the opinion that it was not always clear to local works members 
member what exactly the CWC does. This suggests that despite the existing reporting 
structures and the inclusion of the local works council members, the content and the 
utility of the work of the CWC is not always transported back to the individual works 
council members.  
Figure 20: Relevance of and access to the work of the CWC 
Relevance of and Access to the CWC
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Conclusion: no site is an island  
Taken as a group, the works councils are on the whole fairly homogenous. A cross-
tabulation analysis of the data presented above revealed that there are only negligible 
differences if any between the various sites. This is true both for the demographic 
characteristics of the population as well as regarding their own decision-making 
processes and their assessment of the relevance of and access to the CWC. Where 
important site-specific features were evident, these were presented above.   
It is possible that the strong role and relevance accorded to the CWC might have been 
influenced by the fact that the core of the postal survey explicitly focussed on the CWC. 
However, as will be seen in Section 5.6, there is a widely-held perception that there is a 
very important cross-site dimension to their work as works councillors.   This 
 127
perception is consistent with the important role accorded the CWC by the local works 
council members surveyed.   
5.3. The role of the CWC commissions, project groups, working 
groups, etc. 
The work of the CWC is supported by an extensive network of thirty-nine sub-
committees, commissions, project groups, and working groups which are elaborated 
upon below. This is the real operative level of CWC work; indeed, it is here that the 
nuts and bolts of CWC strategies are assembled.   
The Works Constitution Act requires the establishment of two committees: a Central 
Works Committee, and a (Central) Economic Committee. The law also provides for the 
establishment of further sub-committees. As can be seen in Figure 21, the CWC has 
made ample use of these provisions, setting up a vast network of nearly forty 
commissions, working groups, negotiating committees, task forces, and project groups.  
Next to providing working structures to prepare the work of the CWC, this elaborate 
substructure serves to anchor the work of the CWC into the network of nearly 60 local 
works councils across the company. In 1996, the CWC secretariat counted some 145 
people besides the CWC members themselves who were involved in the work of the 
CWC.  These 145 people are members of the local works councils; some are members of 
up to nine different subcommittees. Through a range of cross-memberships and links 
between subcommittees, this network goes beyond top-down and bottom-up channels 
of communication between the CWC on the one hand and the local works councils on 
the other.  
As a rule, each plant is represented in each commission. Sometimes the representative 
is that plant’s Chairperson and thus its CWC member, sometimes it is the head of a 
local subcommittee. This mixture of political authority and issue-based competence is 
seen to be an important guarantee for the commissions’ work. This inclusion of non-
CWC members is seen to play a positive role, since they bring issue-based competence 
to bear on the commission’s deliberations. At the same time, the inclusion of non-CWC 
members means that often a plant’s Chairperson is not personally involved in the 
commission’s work. Here too, issues of control and trust arise. This underscores the 
importance of reporting back, of closing the loop between the work of the commission, 
the local works council and the CWC.  
One drawback to this elaborate array of specialised committees is that if an 
overarching issue arises there is a significant need for coordination.  There is also the 
challenge of communicating the work of the sub-committees upwards to the CWC and 
downwards to the local works councils. 
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Figure 21: Committees, Commissions, Project Groups, & Task Forces of the CWC at DaimlerChrysler (1999) 
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There is to some extent an implicit hierarchy within the plethora of different 
commissions, project groups, working groups and task forces. The commissions are 
seen to have a clear, formal competence to make or prepare decisions. The working 
groups serve primarily as forums for information and the exchange of ideas. Yet some 
so-called working groups, such as the working group on sales structures, have 
conducted negotiations with management. The project groups, by contrast, effectively 
act as commissions when they take up negotiations with management, for example.  It 
became clear that among the CWC members there is some confusion about the precise 
names and function (and formal mandate) of each particular type of subcommittee. 
Despite all attempts by the CWC members to sort the substructure into a coherent 
whole, it emerges that there is actually no underlying structure or rule; instead, these 
substructures must be viewed as a complex network full of ambiguities and 
inconsistencies which have taken root over time.    
The infrastructure of the CWC  
Legally required committees 
The BetrVG requires that the CWC set up a Central Works (Executive) Committee, 
which is discussed further below, as well as a (Central) Economic Committee. The law 
also provides for an institutional connection between the CWC and other auxiliary 
peak representation bodies, such as the Central Youth and Apprentice Representation 
and the Central Disabled Employees Representation: the Chairpersons of these two 
auxiliary committees are entitled by law to attend meetings of the CWC. In practice, 
and as is common practice in all central works councils, the CWC also operates in close 
cooperation with the employee delegation on the Supervisory Board; three of the 
employee-representatives on the Supervisory Board are members of the CWC. A 
fourth member of the Supervisory Board attends the CWC meetings as a guest, and the 
full-time official of the IGM who advises the CWC is also a member of the Supervisory 
Board. There are thus personal links between all the peak-level employee 
representation bodies.  
Parity Commissions 
At the top level of the company, six parity commissions have been set up: as the name 
indicates, these commissions are made up of equal delegations of employer and 
employee representatives. The employee delegation to these commissions usually 
includes at least one member of the CWC; other members are delegated from the local 
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works councils. These structures mirror the parity commissions which are set up at the 
local level; their overall task is to define standards or resolve conflicts where necessary 
at the peak cross-site level.   
There is a central parity commission which covers all the plants. The structures 
covering the wide and differentiated network of Sales and Service sites is more 
complicated, however: next to a top-level Sales and Service parity commission, there is 
a set of four separate parity commissions charged with defining the criteria for 
workplace assessment and time allotments. These criteria or factors form the basis of 
job descriptions and customer billing; the fact that there are four separate parity 
commissions set up to deal with these issues on behalf of the 41 Sales and Service sites 
demonstrates the need for central coordination of these issues. It is clear that 
decentralisation and the resulting variation need to be kept in check; there are 
apparently limits to the degree of differentiation which is sustainable.  
The various Sales and Service establishments are all quite different: they range from 
older, often rather impractically built sites, to newer ergonomic and optimally laid-out 
sites. Put simply, this means that a task which is carried out at an older, less optimally 
designed site can take significantly more time or effort to complete than it would at one 
of the more modern sites, which were built with precisely these tasks in mind.  Any 
given repair job, for example, is broken down into various tasks; each of these discrete 
tasks is assigned a fixed value. Depending on the assessment of each workplace, these 
values vary from site to site. The time allotted to complete each task also varies. The 
whole repair job is thus calculated as a composite of the values of each separate task. 
This calculation is not only the basis for the company’s billing system; it is also the 
basis for the calculation of piecework remuneration. These workplace factors and time 
allotments therefore have a direct impact on an employee’s earnings. Depending on the 
layout of the repair workshop, it might not be possible for an employee to complete a 
repair job as quickly or as efficiently as an employee at another plant. Effectively then, 
an employee can earn more at one site than at another simply due to the fact that the 
workshop has a more modern and efficient design which enables him to complete 
more tasks in less time than his counterpart at another site.   
It is this variation across sites which must be evened out at the central level: the 
workplace assessments and time allotments must be agreed both among employee 
representatives from various sites as well as between employee representatives and the 
employer. The parity commission on workplace assessment deals with the precise 
definition of the criteria which form the basis for the assessment of each workplace. 
Similarly, the parity commission on time allotments deals with the price definition of 
the criteria which form the basis of piecework rates. Put simply, the employer has an 
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interest in a standardised system of workplace assessment, so that job descriptions and 
billing systems are comparable according to a certain standard, while the employee 
representatives have an interest in an system which ensures an equitable and generous 
assessment while adequately taking into account the high degree of variation among 
sites.  
In summary, the parity commissions at the CWC level in effect serve to coordinate the 
work of the parity commissions which are set up at the local level: where necessary, 
they are also responsible for defining common standards and resolving conflicts. The 
employee-side delegation is made up of at least one member of the CWC plus further 
members drawn from local works councils and local parity commissions. It is, in effect 
a system within a system: a multilevel structure to coordinate workplace assessment as 
part of the larger multi-level system of works councils and central works councils.   
Permanent Commissions of the Central Works Council:  
In 1999 the CWC at DaimlerChrysler had 15 permanent commissions. The remit of 
these commissions range from the wage commission to the canteen commission (See 
Figure 21.) Their size varies between 14 and 25 members. In some commissions, sites 
are represented by both its CWC member and a further local works council member.  
Like the parity commissions, the permanent commissions are in effect a multi-level 
system embedded within the multi-level system of the CWC.  These CWC 
commissions effectively function as an extension of the sub-committees set up at local 
level for each specific issue area.  Each commission is chaired by a member of the 
CWC,  and as a rule, every site delegates at least the chairs of the respective 
subcommittees at local level.  
The composition of the committees is meant to ensure the inclusion of both issue-based 
competence and site-specific views. The purpose of the commissions is to work 
through issues, to function as a sort of back room – to prepare, but not to take 
decisions. However, it is clear to all that in preparing decisions, in the process of 
weighing alternatives, the commissions are in effect already structuring decisions. This 
is why it is seen as so necessary that all the sites be represented, to have one’s hand in, 
so to speak.   
Several key commissions, such as the Wages Commission or the Workplace Safety 
Commission, have also set up so-called “core commissions” from among their 
members. (See Figure 21) These core commissions are explicitly mandated to negotiate 
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on behalf of that commission and the larger CWC. They also do much of the 
groundwork for the commission. The core commissions are explicitly representative: 
each site delegates one member. Furthermore, where the core commissions are 
nominated out of commissions that deal only with the plants, such as the Plants Wage 
Commission, then there is always one representative of the corresponding Sales and 
Service commission, in order to ensure the articulation between the strategies and 
policies pursued in both divisions.   
The names of the commissions illustrate the wide range of the issues dealt with by the 
commissions. There are the classic catch-all commissions, dealing with such issues as 
personnel policy and wages. In some cases, such as for wages or workplace 
organisation, there are separate commissions for the plants and the Sales and Service 
sites.   Another group of commissions deals with issues specific to certain groups of 
employees, such as white-collar employees, or apprentices. Other commissions deal 
with specific issues, such as workplace safety, employee data protection, workplace 
organisation and design, or the administration of the bonus-based employee 
suggestion scheme. Then there are formal negotiation commissions, which conduct 
negotiations with the central management on such issues as remuneration systems, or 
the introduction and application of information technology.  
Project Groups, Working Groups, and Task Forces 
Next to the standing commissions, a wide range of project groups and task forces have 
been set up. Some deal with ongoing issues, such as equal opportunities for men and 
women, or the development of ergonomic workplaces. Others have been set up as ad 
hoc groups to monitor changes across the company, such as the implementation of the 
EU Display Screen Directive, the introduction of the Euro, or the introduction of 
English as a corporate language in the course of integrating Chrysler. Other task forces 
monitor more long-term issues, such as the employee pension plan, the application of 
the personnel software package SAP, or data processing in storage and inventory 
systems, in particular with respect to employee data protection. Still others track 
potentially difficult issues such as the administration of long-term working time 
accounts. Another project group was set up to monitor the introduction of European 
and global logistics centres.  
The Project Groups are normally assigned a task for a fixed term; some run for only 6 
months, others are set up for up to five years.  At the end of this time, they are 
expected to deliver a final report and disband. Sometimes a project groups grows out 
of  the whole CWC, such as the project group which monitored the introduction of the 
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Euro. Other projects arise out of the work of a single commission, such as the task force 
on long-term working time accounts.   
Recent years have seen an increase in the range of topics that did not fit into the classic 
commission categories, but to which the CWC saw the need to develop a coordinated 
response.  In response, a range of new project groups were set up. Pointing to the 
extreme example of a one-man project on employee car-leasing programmes, one CWC 
member argued that it demonstrated the fact that – even if only one person deals with 
the issue – some issues simply must be dealt with at the CWC level for reasons of 
fairness and efficiency (23/3).  
The proliferation of project groups is seen by some with scepticism: “Of course we need 
smaller groups who prepare the work of the CWC. But I have a problem with some project 
groups that start to develop a life of their own” (10/5). Furthermore, as another CWC 
member pointed out, while the iteration and delegation between the CWC and the 
formal commissions is quite transparent, the delegation and reflux of some of the 
project groups is less clear-cut: “Sometimes they report back to the Chairman of the CWC, 
sometimes they report to a commission, or several commissions, or wherever, sometimes we lose 
sight of who is actually discussing what with what aim” (9/4)  
It was not always this way; it is only since the mid-1990s that the work of the 
commissions and project groups, etc., has become so extensive (29/2). Until the early 
1970s, the work of the CWC was quite underdeveloped compared to today. Herbert 
Lucy, Chairman of the CWC from 1973 to 1989, pushed management into furnishing 
the CWC with a secretariat, with their own offices, and secretarial and professional 
support. It was he who set up the basic structure of commissions that had been ad hoc 
at best until then. According to one respondent, this was one key reason why he was 
re-elected even though he represented a relatively small plant: he had new ideas about 
how to organise the work of the CWC (3/2-3). As one long-serving CWC member 
commented, “Commission work today is nothing like what it used to be. Way back when, 
when I joined the CWC, Herbert Lucy had just set up a CWC secretariat with one secretary. 
Herbert Lucy developed all this, saying that if I want to do good CWC work then I need experts, 
I need solid preparatory work, for the commission work I need people from the plants, not just 
the CWC members” (28/3). 
Before the mid-1990s, the issues were highly compartmentalised within the CWC. The 
secretariat provided administrative and professional support. Most importantly, the 
commissions were not just institutions of the CWC, they were also used to work 
through issues that local works councils were faced with at the local level. In effect they 
provided services to the local works councils. The local works council called upon the 
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expertise of the CWC commissions, the commissions called in outside experts to act as 
consultants on behalf of the local works councils, management representatives were 
asked to present their views, and the commissions even organised training sessions on 
specific issues for the local works council members. Through the work of the 
commissions, current topics could be much more thoroughly addressed and positions 
developed more solidly than would ever have been possible at each local level. As one 
respondent pointed out, the local works councils have always benefited from the work 
of the CWC and its commissions (3/5). 
The commissions were also not always small, effective groups. Representativeness 
was, as ever, a key consideration; not only did each site have to be represented, but 
larger sites were entitled to more seats. In the past, the larger plants were often 
represented by two people, while smaller plants sent one representative. It was not 
until the middle of the 1990’s that the commissions became smaller and more issue-
specific. Rather than applying a rough system of proportional representation by plants, 
a few CWC members were asked to take on responsibility within a commission and 
then local works councils were invited to delegate members (3/3). 
5.4. Constitutional politics in the Central Works Council  
Føllesdal (2003) highlights some of the philosophical issues which have arisen from 
empirical findings regarding federalism. Chief among these is the issue of stability: 
Føllesdal (2003) suggests that “(con)federal political arrangements are inherently 
unstable; rather, they tend toward disintegration or towards centralisation. Such 
instability should come as no surprise given the tensions typically giving rise to 
federations in the first place.”  
In response to this inherent instability, Føllesdal (2003) points out that “constitutional 
politics” are a marked feature of federations, as political actors strive to renew or reset 
the balance between the allocation of autonomy and decision-making authority, the 
appropriate forms and topics of cooperation, and the overall need to prevent 
fragmentation.  
The seminar held by the CWC in Summer 1999 provides a prime example of such 
constitutional politics. Once per year, the CWC meets for a weeklong meeting under 
the auspices of the IG Metall union to review its political planning for the coming year. 
The change in CWC leadership a half year before the 1999 seminar also prompted the 
CWC to review its own working structures. As will be seen, these at times 
controversial discussions revolved around key “constitutional issues”, such as the 
allocation of offices and decision-making authority.  
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This seminar was conceptually planned  in advance by the secretariat in close 
cooperation with the CWC Chairman. I reproduce the essential points of the seminar 
programme here:   
THE PROGRAMME OF THE “IGM SEMINAR”, JULY 1999 
 
I.    The Agenda of the CWC: assessment and definition of topics 
a. Six working groups:  
i. Personnel policy; working time; and social policy 
ii. New remuneration system and profit share 
iii. Employee suggestion scheme/total quality management; health and safety 
iv. Vocational training; further training; education 
v. CWC and employment security 
 
b. Report to plenary on the following:   
i. Stocktaking for each issue: What has been achieved? Which of the issues are still 
relevant? How should they be further pursued? 
ii. What issues should the CWC focus on, with which goals? 
 
II.    The CWC and its supporting structures:  
Working groups to discuss and report back about the role and contributions of the:   
a. Supervisory Board 
b. Central Works [executive] Committee 
c. Economic Committee 
d. Negotiating Committee 
e. Central Works Council 
f. Commissions 
g. Project Groups 
h. Group Works Council 
i. European Works Council  
 
 
III.    The CWC’s internal and external public relations 
Working groups to report to plenary their assessment of  
a. Which media (Intranet, Business TV, flyers, internal newsletters, email)  are best suited 
to reach which target audiences (workforce, the local works councils, the trade union 
delegation, and external public opinion)  
b. How can each medium be optimally used?  
c. What (external) professional/technical support may be required?  
 
 
The aim of the first section of the seminar was to assess and if necessary redefine the 
CWC’s political agenda. Six separate working groups were to discuss various sets of 
issues which had been on the agenda the previous year, such as personnel policy, 
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training, remuneration, health and safety, profit-sharing schemes, social policy and 
working time. The remit of each working group was to assess how much progress had 
been made in the course of the previous year, whether the topics were still relevant, 
what remained to be done, who should do it, and whether new aspects or topics 
should be added.  
The second focus of the seminar lay on the CWC’s own working structures and 
processes. The aim was to seek ways to improve the working practices of the 
individual working groups, to define the role and function of the committees, to find a 
balance between day-to-day work and strategy development, and to identify ways to 
improve the efficiency of the individual committees. Specific attention was paid to the 
perceived need to avoid redundant work by improving the coordination and 
cooperation between the various committees. Discussion was to focus on the general 
flow of information and communication, clarification of competences and 
responsibilities for content, and accountability. Overall, the discussion on these issues 
was to be guided by the following questions: “What’s currently being done? What 
should be done? What must be changed so that this can be done? And, finally, where 
might problems of implementation arise?” 
The third and final topic of the seminar was the question of the CWC’s internal and 
external public relations. The goal was set to ascertain how and by which media the 
CWC wants to present itself within the company as well as outside the company. The 
key questions here revolved around the relationship between the CWC and the local 
works councils, the workforce, management, and the media.  
The real focus of the seminar lay, perhaps not surprisingly, on the CWC and its 
supporting structures. Two themes in particular proved highly instructive for me:  the 
first was a discussion of the role and competence of the commissions. This issue is 
discussed in more detail below. The second key issue which dominated the weeklong 
session was the discussion surrounding a proposal by the new Chairman to reorganise 
the leadership structures of the CWC, in particular by reviving the long-defunct 
Central Works Committee.  Far from being a bureaucratic/technocratic idea, the 
controversy surrounding his proposals revealed much about the very self-
understanding of the CWC. 
The crux of the new CWC Chairman’s proposal to reorganise the decision-making 
processes within the CWC was his proposal to ”reactivate” the central works 
committee; this “executive” committee, has in practical terms long ceased to function at 
DaimlerChrysler, even though it is explicitly foreseen by law. 
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The composition and role of the Central Works Committee by law 
Before examining the discussion in more detail, it is first necessary to outline the legal 
context of his proposal.  
The central works committee is analogous to the works committee set up at the local 
level: it is an executive sub-committee charged with running the day-to-day affairs of 
the central works council.  In fact, Section 51 of the BetrVG refers to the analogous 
application of many provisions about local works committees .   17
Section 51 of the BetrVG lays out the composition of the  central works committee as 
including by right the chair and deputy-chair of the central works council; the number 
of additional members depends on the size of the CWC. For a central works council the 
size of that at DaimlerChrysler with its 30 full members, the Central Works Committee 
would thus consist of 9 members in all.   
As for the function or competence of the central works committee, the law refers to the 
provisions for local works councils in Section 27 (3): The works committee shall deal with 
the day to day business of the works council. The works council may by majority vote of its 
members delegate tasks to the works committee for independent action; the foregoing shall not 
apply to the negotiation of works agreements. Section 28 (1) provides that the (central) 
works council may also set up further committees and assign them specific tasks.  
The composition and role of the central works committee in practice  
As briefly outlined above, the BetrVG thus provides for the establishment of an 
(executive) central works committee to run the “day-to-day” business of the CWC. 
And indeed, the CWC at DaimlerChrysler has a central works committee—on paper, 
anyway.   
By law, it should comprise only 9 members; in fact, the BetrVG implies a maximum 
limit of 11 central works committee members. Yet the so-called Central Works 
Committee at DaimlerChrysler has 14 members: each of the 12 plants is represented by 
the Chair of its local works council, the Sales and Service establishments are 
represented by the chair of the Sales and Service Commission, and the R&D sites are 
represented by their CWC representative.   If they adhered to the BetrVG, the CWC 
                                           
17 Section 51(1) of the Works Constitution Act refers directly to provisions about local works committeees 
contained in Division III: Sections 25 (1), 26, 27 (2) and (3), Section 28 (1) 1st and 3rd sentence, and (2), 
Sections 30, 31, 35, 36, 37 (1) to (3) and Sections 40 and 41.  
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would only have had 9 seats to allocate among all these different sub-units; in light of 
the golden rule at the CWC that fair representation is the  key to its legitimacy, the 
decision was made to expand the composition of the Central Works Committee to 
include all significant sub-units within DaimlerChrysler: i.e., each individual factory, 
the Sales and Service division and the R&D division.  Again, and as is distinctive of 
federations,  the principles of parity and representativeness  play a fundamental role in 
the internal logic of the CWC.  
Thus, DaimlerChrysler departs from the basic federal structure laid out in the BetrVG 
by expanding it to better take into account the need to ensure a coherent interlinkage 
between the central and local levels.  As for the day-to-day business, we have seen that 
the “day-to-day” business of a CWC as large as that at Daimler is handled by its 9-
person secretariat. Beyond that, the CWC has taken advantage of the opportunity to set 
up further committees by setting up a vast and seemingly comprehensive network of 
over 30 committees, project groups, and working parties.  
The role if any of the central works committee, then, is primarily political. It should be 
noted, however, that the BetrVG specifies that the Central Works Committee is not 
empowered to conclude agreements on behalf of the CWC.  
According to respondents and the documentation, the Central Works Committee at 
Daimler convenes rarely if ever. This tradition – or lack thereof – goes back several 
decades.  The last two CWC Chairmen since 1945, Herbert Lucy and Karl Feuerstein, 
worked informally with a small “kitchen cabinet” rather than with a formally 
convened Central Works Committee, relegating issue-specific work to the 
commissions, committees, project groups, etc.  
One highly relevant and active group has arisen out of this more or less defunct 
Central Works Committee however: this is the 5-person “Negotiating Commission”. 
This key group is also carefully representative: it comprises two members from the 
automotive  division, two from the commercial vehicles division, and one member 
from the Sales and Service division. Attention is also paid to a balance between blue-
collar (3 members)  and white collar (2) members.   
The proposals to re-organise the leadership structures of the CWC 
After Erich Klemm took office in early 1999, he proposed to widen the circle of 
colleagues with whom he regularly exchanged information and ideas. He proposed to 
“reactivate” the defunct Central Works Committee as a “Preparation and Coordination 
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Committee”. He argued that it would be more democratic and transparent than to 
continue with his predecessors’ “kitchen cabinet” tradition.  
The implications of this proposal were obvious from the start: the wider the inner circle 
around the Chair, the less relevant would be the role of the plenary CWC. This trade-
off was clear to all participants and informed the discussion that followed.  
After some discussion, there were four proposals  on the table. Taken together, they 
essentially laid out the whole spectrum from largest to smallest “inner circles”. The 
discussions about the appropriate composition of such an executive committee of the 
CWC is a case study in the constitutional politics typical of federations. It reveals much 
about the CWC’s way of working, the concerns of its members, and wider issues of 
power and influence.  
Proposal 1:  reactivation of defunct (enlarged) Central Works Committee 
This inner circle would have 14 members: the works council Chairs from each 
of the 12 production plants,  plus the Chair of the Sales and Service division 
commission, and the representative from the R&D division.  The composition of 
this enlarged Central Works Council is heavily skewed towards blue collar 
representatives: the works council Chair of 11 out of 12 production plants are 
formally blue-collar representatives,  while the representatives of the plant at 
headquarters, from the Sales and Service sites and the R&D sites are all three 
white-collar representatives.  
Proposal 2:  Central Works Committee composed according to Section 51 
of the BetrVG   
Nine members: Chair and Deputy Chair of the CWC, plus seven additional 
members elected from among the CWC members.  
Proposal 3:  “Negotiating Commission” plus Committee Chairs  
10 members: the five members of the existing Negotiating Committee (two from 
Auto, two from Lorries, one from Sales and Service) plus the Chairs of the five 
official CWC commissions (Personnel Commission, Wages and Salaries 
Commission, White-Collar Employees Commission, Organisation and Data 
Commission, and Health and Safety Commission)   
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Proposal 4: “Negotiating Commission” only   
Five members: two from Auto, two from Lorries, one from Sales and Service. 
 
The CWC members were asked to break into working groups in order to discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages each of the following models of a “Preparation and 
Coordination Committee”. A synopsis of the conclusions of each working group is 
presented in Table 5. These conclusions were put to the plenary CWC for further 
discussion.  
Arguments for and against Proposal 1:  reactivation of defunct (enlarged) Central 
Works Committee 
The arguments for assigning a more important role to the enlarged 14-member Central 
Works Committee revolved around the fact that all significant sub-units within 
DaimlerChrysler would automatically be represented.  This composition rule treats 
small and large sites equally. Furthermore, since membership would be an automatic 
function of office (local chairmanship), there would be no need to discuss or debate 
who is a member. Decisions taken could be expected to be binding, since the group 
would represent the formal majority of the CWC i.e., the respective Chairs of the local 
works council would be expected to be able to commit their works councils. Opinion-
shaping would be faster, and more efficient. This committee would be an effective 
communication platform, since there would be no need to organise for new 
information or coordination flows. Finally, since not least for pragmatic reasons it 
assumes a clear demarcation from the Negotiating Commission, the Central Works 
Committee would not affect the work or proven reputation of the highly trusted 
Negotiating Commission.  
At the same time, this proposal was criticised on the grounds of representativeness: 
while it would include all sites and represent the formal majority of the CWC, it would 
effectively exclude the subsidiary companies, and more controversially, the 
representatives of the white-collar employees. Because it would include by right the 
Chairs of the works councils of the production plants, it would be strongly skewed in 
favour of blue-collar employees: the only representatives of the white-collar employees 
would be the Chair of the Sales and Service Commission, the Chair of the R&D 
Commission, and the Chair of the works council from the plant at company 
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headquarters, who is actually a white-collar representative since they represent the 
majority of the workforce at company headquarters.   
Pragmatic reasons against this proposal were also put forward. A group of 14 members 
would be too large to be able to engage in real discussion and content-based work. 
There would be no systematic inclusion of specific issue-based expertise, since 
membership would only be based on office and site, rather than qualification, 
experience or specific expertise. And because of the many demands on its members’ 
time, it would be unlikely that all 14 members would be able to attend all of the time: 
the resulting sporadic and uneven attendance would impair the necessary continuity 
that such a cooperation and preparation committee would need.  
But what decided the issue were the arguments based on the effects on the 
political/democratic dynamics of CWC work.   The proposal essentially amounted to 
the CWC halving itself.  If significant discussions are taken by one half of the group, 
what does this mean for the role of the remainder of the CWC? The role of the plenary 
CWC would effectively be reduced to merely nodding through decisions taken by the 
proposed Coordination and Preparation Committee: after all, these are the chairs of the 
local works councils, representing the formal majority of the workforce, able to commit 
their local councils.  Even if decisions were to be formally taken in plenary, the so-
called Preparation Committee would naturally take anticipatory decisions, fully 
expecting their recommendations to go through as proposed. It would be largely 
impossible for the other members of the CWC to influence decision-making; indeed the 
proposal was seen to entail a real risk of suppressing critical discussion.  
Arguments for and against Proposal 2:  Central Works Committee composed 
according to the BetrVG  
Members pointed out that compared to the 14-member enlarged Central Works 
Committee, a 9-member Central Works Committee composed according to law would 
not necessarily represent the majority of votes on the CWC.  It would therefore run less 
risk of abusing its position. A nine-member Central Works Committee would thus 
necessarily be accountable to the CWC. Furthermore, the balance between 
representation of white and blue-collar workers would be ensured, since the law 
required that each group be represented in proportion to employment figures. It would 
clearly not be possible for each site to be represented however; the fact that 
membership would not be a neat extension of existing structures was seen to be 
problematic. Since the seven additional seats would be up for election, some members 
welcomed the fact that committee members could be freely chosen from among all 
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CWC members on the basis of individual candidature or specific issue-based expertise, 
rather than their status. For others, however, this was an argument against this model: 
committee membership would have to be decided by consensus, which would give rise 
to potentially divisive debates about who (or which site) is a member and who isn’t, 
and why. The CWC was divided on the issue of efficiency or workability of the model. 
Some felt that a group of nine members could be expected to work efficiently and 
consistently, while others argued that even a group of nine members would be too 
large to be able to regularly conduct extensive issue-based discussions. A nine-member 
CWC would furthermore have to organise entirely new means of securing adequate 
feedback and information channels. Finally, there would be no systematic inclusion of 
issue-based expertise.  
Arguments for and against Proposal 3:  Negotiating Commission plus Chairs of 
five key commissions 
This model shared many of the perceived advantages of the 9-member Central Works 
Committee provided for by law: it was pointed out that it would be required to obtain 
legitimation from the whole CWC since it would not automatically represent the 
majority of its votes, and that its relatively small size meant that it could work 
effectively and continuously. All of the working groups welcomed the fact that this 
model would ensure the highest degree of issue-based competence and expertise, since 
it would systematically include the Chairs of the key commissions. Such a coordination 
and preparation committee would therefore be firmly rooted in the actual work of the 
CWC as a whole. The political and technical expertise of the commissions could be 
brought to bear on the inner sphere, which would in turn serve to strengthen the role 
of the commissions. Indeed, this model was seen by many as a “natural” extension of 
the CWC’s working structures, since it would draw upon existing channels of 
participation and feedback, and thus enable wider inclusion in the opinion-making 
process.   
The lack of representativeness of this model was severely criticised, however: while 
some sites would be represented doubly, others would not be represented at all.  And 
while the advocates of this model pointed out that the automatic inclusion of 
commission chairs would preclude debates about who is a member, others pointed out 
that this was in the long run a dangerous flaw in the model: it was conceivable that in 
future the commission chairs would not be chosen on the basis of expertise or trust, but 
rather on the basis of the site from which they are delegated simply in order to ensure 
that they have access to the inner circle of the CWC’s leadership. This last argument 
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provides another indication that site representativeness is one of the most important 
criteria in people’s minds.  
Arguments for and against Proposal 4:  Negotiating Commission only 
The final steering committee model which was up for discussion was to upgrade the 
role of the existing 5-member Negotiating Commission. Here the criteria of 
accountability crystallised most clearly.  While decisions could be well prepared and 
extensively discussed in a small circle, the CWC would clearly remain dominant in the 
background. Any final decisions would rest firmly with the CWC. Of course, not all 
sites could be represented, nor could the expertise of the commissions be 
systematically included, but this was seen as less problematic since no issue could be 
decided – even informally – without the approval of the whole CWC.  On pragmatic 
grounds, it was judged that this group could work most effectively: its small size 
meant that it could not only discuss sensitive issues more comprehensively and 
openly, but that it could also be convened at short notice should the need arise.  
It was pointed out, however, that to upgrade its role from its current case-by-case 
mandate would run the risk of overburdening the Negotiating Commission and its 
members. It was also pointed out that a steering committee made up members who not 
only represented the biggest sites, but who also hold all the key CWC offices runs the 
risk of consolidating too much power in too few hands. On the other hand, the 
negotiating commission has a proven reputation for integrity and negotiating skill, and 
it enjoys a high degree of trust and acceptance among the CWC members. It was 
welcomed that there would be no divisive debates about who is a member. In terms of 
representativeness, it is perceived as being well-balanced, since it includes 
representatives from both the automotive and trucks divisions, as well as two 
representatives of white collar employees. It was pointed out that while it might be 
entrusted to hold preliminary discussions, the Negotiating Commission was not an 
appropriate or legitimate external representative of the CWC. Since the main role of the 
steering committee would be an internal one, however, this was not seen to be 
problematic. It was also pointed out that the more discussions were relegated to this 
steering committee, the greater the need to coordinate positions and feed its 
discussions back to the CWC and its committees.  
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Table 5: Synopsis of the working groups: Advantages and Disadvantages of 
each proposed model for a “Preparation and Coordination Committee for the 
CWC”   
Proposed 
models 
Advantages Disadvantages 
   
Proposal 1: • Exclusive • Inclusion of all plants & NDL 
 o represents formal majority of CWC • Site-specific interests of all are 
included  (Enlarged) 
Central Works 
Committee: 
o not everyone can participate in 
process of opinion-forming  • No conflict between “large” and “small” 
sites o Balance between different groups of 
employees (i.e., white and blue 
collar) not maintained  
14 Members • No discussion about who is a member, 
since membership is automatic (leads 
to high acceptance)  o No inclusion of specialised issue-
based commission work & expertise • Decision-making more binding  
o Most if not all members of inner 
circle are works council chairs  
• Faster opinion-shaping 
• Effective communication platform: 
Minimizes need to ensure alternative 
flows of  communication  
o Some strained relationships 
between Chair and deputy chairs  
o Subsidiary companies not included  • Already exists, no new committee 
o Currently unclear who is delegated 
according to what criteria from the 
different sites 
• Assumes/requires clear demarcation 
from negotiating committee 
 • Group too large 
o real discussion & content-based 
work unlikely in such a large group 
o too many members: unlikely that all 
members will be able to participate 
all of the time, since members 
already have too many different 
appointments to keep Æ no 
continuity 
 
• Role of full CWC unclear 
o full CWC takes on different meaning 
o What is role of “remainder CWC”?  
o Anticipatory decision-making, 
expectation that CWC will follow 
o Inner circle effectively a half-CWC: 
other half of the CWC would feel 
excluded  
o Danger of split in CWC work 
o Decision-making can hardly be 
influenced 
o Risk of suppressing critical 
discussion 
 
No legal basis, formally open to attack 
(e.g., by works councils)  
 
   
Proposal 2: • Inner circle compelled to obtain 
legitimation through CWC 
• Not all sites represented 
 • Commissions excluded: no systematic 
inclusion of issue-based expertise  Central Works • Smaller group can work more 
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Committee effectively  
Composed 
according to 
Section 51 
BetrVG:  
9 Members 
(2+7) 
 
 
• Meaning of CWC greater than in 
current arrangement with 14 members   
• less risk of abuse of majority 
“majoritising” 
• White and blue collar workers 
represented in proportion to 
employment figures 
• individual candidature, thus 
membership could be based on 
expertise, not status 
• Can play leading role  
• Clear legal base, legal requirement 
fulfilled 
 
• Decision-making process less binding  
• Membership must be decided by 
consensus 
• Debates about who is a member and 
who isn’t… 
• Group too big for extensive content-
based discussion 
• Increased need to organise adequate 
information flow 
• Impractical: Members already have 
too many different appointments to 
keep 
   
Proposal 3: • Some plants represented doubly, 
others not at all  
• Inner circle compelled to obtain 
legitimation through CWC  
Negotiating 
Commission + 
Committee 
Chairs:  
• Possible lack of balance between 
different divisions  
• Small size makes group work more 
effective & efficient  
• Selection of future committee chairs 
will be in consideration of site rather 
than issue-based qualification 
• Inclusion of  committee chairs means 
no discussion about who is a member, 
leads to high acceptance 10 Members 
(5+5) • Too big for real discussion, content-
based work? 
• Issue-based expertise ensured through 
inclusion of commission chairs 
• No legal base, formally open to attack  • less risk of abuse of majority 
“majoritising”  
• Highest degree of issue-based 
expertise, networking, & feedback 
• Strengthens role of commissions 
• Wider inclusion in opinion-making 
process  
• Uncomplicated discussions  
• Adequate feedback most likely 
      
   
Proposal 4: • Not all plants represented • Inner circle compelled to obtain 
legitimation through CWC  • No systematic inclusion of 
commissions Negotiating 
Commission 
only: 
• Small size makes inner circle work 
more effectively & efficiently  • Will not improve discussion culture in 
the CWC • Can act at short notice  
5 Members • Greater need to ensure coordination 
and flow of feedback in all directions 
across all committees. 
• no discussion necessary about who is 
a member, leads to high acceptance     
• balanced composition 
• Risk of overburdening • high trust 
• Promotes mistrust • less risk of abuse of majority 
“majoritising” • The issue of power 
• Not an appropriate/legitimate 
representative of the CWC 
• Decisions can be prepared without 
having been de facto already taken  
• Impractical: members already have 
too many different appointments to 
keep 
• Final decision-making rests firmly with 
the CWC 
• CWC remains dominant in the 
background • No legal base, formally open to attack  
 • Stays in old function with case-by case 
mandate  
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 The CWC’s decision to keep the inner circle as small as possible 
The discussion lasted well into the next day of the meeting.  The CWC members were 
asked to cast two votes:  they were first asked to name the option which they would 
find unacceptable under any circumstances, then they were asked to name the 
proposal which they found most appropriate. The results of these votes were quite 
clear: for 18 CWC members the option of the enlarged Central Works Committee was 
unacceptable, and for 14 CWC members, the option of enlarging the Negotiating 
commission was the best option. The remainder of the votes were spread among the 
other options (See Table 6). 
Table 6: Results of the vote on leadership of the CWC 
Proposed models Most appropriate Under no circumstances 
(Enlarged) Central Works Committee:   
7 18 
Central Works Committee   
Composed according to BetrVG:  4 5 
Negotiating Commission + Committee 
Chairs:  
  
9 8 
Negotiating Commission only:   
14 4 
 
After final deliberations, the CWC decided to widen the mandate of the Negotiating 
Commission by assigning it a concrete preparatory and coordinating role. Rather than 
the large inclusive inner circle proposed by the new CWC Chairman, the CWC opted 
for a smaller exclusive inner circle which, by virtue of its exclusivity, would ensure that 
actual decision-making power remained firmly with the plenary CWC. What guided 
the discussion was the understanding that the larger any inner circle, the smaller the 
role of the plenary CWC. As a result, the risk was high that the role of the CWC as a 
whole would essentially be reduced to accepting foregone conclusions.  
Several key criteria crystallised in the course of the discussion. Within the pluralist 
composition of the CWC, a key issue was that of representativeness: it matters who is 
part of the inner circle, i.e., which sites and which groups have direct access to what 
could develop into the locus of decision-making.  It was clear from the outset that if 
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any political mandate were to be delegated to a steering group, this would inevitably 
have an effect on the role of the CWC as a whole. At the extreme, the role of CWC 
could be reduced to simply nodding through key decisions taken by the steering 
group, thus undermining not only the importance and legitimacy of the debates 
conducted in the CWC itself, but also the role of the work of the commissions.  Linked 
to this is the issue of legitimacy or accountability: who “prepares” decisions on whose 
behalf? Indeed one working group coined the word “to majoritise” to refer to the risk 
that the position of majority could be abused, thus further marginalising minority 
positions.  
Pragmatic arguments about possible tradeoffs between size or composition on the one 
hand, and efficiency or effectiveness on the other were also brought to bear on the 
debate. Chiefly, these were discussions about what realistically constitutes a workable 
group size, when does inclusiveness turn into unproductive diversity, and in particular 
whether or not the political and technical content-based expertise of commission work 
needed to be included in the steering group. As can be seen in the discussion of the role 
of the commissions (Section 5.3), it was unrealistic to expect that it might be possible to 
go from the broad network of specific bases of discussion and expertise developed in 
the various commissions, committees and project groups to a narrow steering group: 
on the contrary, there is a shared expectation within the CWC that before a decision is 
taken on any particular issue, it should be opened up to the whole CWC for discussion.  
One group noted that three out of the four models lacked a sound legal base, arguing 
that this would leave its activities open to attack. This argument was somewhat  
specious, since regardless of the formal legal base of its steering group, all the CWC 
would need to do to ensure the legality of its work would be to take a decision as a 
CWC. The real risk lay in the de facto domination by the steering group, not its unclear 
legal base.   
It is particularly revealing that the CWC was acutely concerned to neutralise the issue 
of who is or is not a member of such a steering group. The risk of potentially divisive 
debates on this issue was noted in all six working groups. A high value was placed on 
automatic mechanisms to define the membership of the steering group, thereby 
neutralising this issue: if membership is a function of office and/or site representation, 
then the CWC need not go through what was expected to be a difficult and potentially 
factious  process of coming up with a consensus on this highly sensitive issue. The 
underlying realist attitude of the CWCs’ members is clear here: the fact that a 
consensus is needed to determine who is to be a member is seen as a potentially 
divisive issue, rather than one which might actually strengthen the group identity of 
the CWC. Particularly insightful was the concern voiced by one working group that if 
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the chairing of a commission automatically guaranteed a seat on the steering 
committee, then the selection of commission chairmanships might in future be made in 
consideration of site affiliation rather than issue-based expertise or personal 
qualifications or reputation.  What this implies is that in the minds of the CWC 
members, the need to ensure that one’s site is represented will at the end of the day 
override all other issues or considerations.  
In the end, the importance of representativeness and guaranteed access was 
paramount: what decided the debate was the need to maintain the role of the CWC as a 
whole, since it was only here that agreed mechanisms of representation and fair access 
for all regardless of site, status, or group could be ensured. Interestingly, what came to 
light was an early recognition that any changes in the composition and meaning of a 
steering committee would have direct repercussions on the meaning and role of the 
CWC as a whole; it was obvious from the start that this was not just a discussion about 
more efficient structures under new leadership, but that any changes would have 
important implications for the political dynamics of CWC activity and its established 
and valued division of competence between the whole and its parts. This explains why 
the CWC in the end decided against its new Chairman’s proposal and opted for a 
minimalist model of a 5-person steering committee. While there was no question of the 
Negotiating Commission being anything more than broadly representative, it did 
satisfy the need for transparent representativeness while at the same time ensuring that 
the CWC would always be able to have its say in order to correct potential biases or 
even abuse of power. Several pragmatic arguments were also in favour of this small 
flexible model. There was an acceptance that the new CWC Chair would at times want 
or need to convene a select and trusted circle, much as his predecessors had done.  No 
one knew what this informal conferring might lead to. So what tipped the scales in the 
end was the shared realisation that no matter how deeply the Chair might discuss key 
issues with the Negotiating Commission, the plenary CWC would always have the last 
word. Importantly, even those sites who would have been represented in any steering 
committee model were acutely aware of – and sympathised with—those 
representatives from more marginal sites or groups. In the interests of maintaining the 
inclusive character of the whole CWC, the minimalist steering committee model was 
chosen.  
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5.5. The role of the CWC in the federalist system of interest 
representation 
Asked what the role of the CWC was, one respondent put it as follows:  
“The main role of the CWC is for one, to agree regulations that are generally binding for 
the whole company, and then of course an important issue is to prevent being played out 
against each other, so to make sure that those rules which apply, apply in the same way 
for everyone, otherwise it leads to a situation like we had with the breaks policy, that one 
site is played out against the others and that’s a really great technique that management 
is working with there. They throw us a chunk so that we all jump all over each other, and 
attack it like dogs that bite each other and tear each other apart, just to get this chunk of 
meat” (11/3). 
This vivid statement captures two of the rationales behind federalism as summarised 
by Føllesdal (2003). Firstly, cooperation develops in response to an external challenge – 
in this case, management’s attempts to play sites against one another. Secondly, there is 
an inward-looking recognition that coordinated strategy and common rules of the 
game is a common good which can only be achieved at the central level.   
What emerges out of the interviews with CWC members is a universal consensus that 
the CWC is meant to fulfil above all a political function—next to negotiating cross-site 
agreements jointly, the CWC is expected to coordinate policy; coordinating policy 
amounts to jointly agreeing guidelines for local policy or strategy. The chief purpose 
for such coordination is to prevent the sites being played off against each other. Even 
the more functional descriptions of the CWCs task—to negotiate top-level, 
encompassing agreements on cross-site issues – have the background reasoning that 
it’s about laying down the same rules for all sites; if competition between sites is 
inevitable, then the task of the CWC is to establish as level a playing field as possible.  
The key point is that the work of the CWC is as much about negotiating ground rules 
among its members as it is about negotiating as the CWC with central management on 
behalf of all sites. These are two of the primary rationales behind federal political 
orders: uniting in the face of a shared external challenge, and countervailing the 
fragmenting effects of differentiation within a complex system of mutually dependent 
sites.  
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Functional vs. political characterisations of the CWCs work 
Nearly all CWC members in effect cited two roles for the CWC: on the one hand to 
negotiate binding agreements for issues that have cross-site implications, and secondly 
to coordinate the work of the local works councils. The first is clearly provided for in 
the BetrVG, but the latter is a political- strategic decision. As different as the tasks and 
their justifications are, however, the CWC members seldom rigidly differentiate 
between the two—the dividing line between the two is fluid.  
Functional responses focussed on the CWC’s responsibility for dealing collectively 
with issues that clearly affect more than one site, while more political characterisations 
highlighted the CWCs role in coordinating and unifying works council policy across 
the company.  
The Rules of the Game: functional conceptions of the role of the CWC 
Some respondents focussed explicitly on the functional justification/legitimacy of the 
CWC’s work, citing its competence to negotiate generally binding framework 
agreements for all issues which have cross-site implications, as provided for in the 
Works Constitution Act (BetrVG).  Here, some respondents cited the areas in which the 
CWC is undisputedly legally competent, such as profit share plans for the whole 
workforce, the health insurance or pension schemes, or health and safety regulations 
regarding workplaces with display screens (8/3, 1/3, 21/5). The fact that respondents 
called these “classic CWC topics” demonstrates that the CWC members are keenly 
aware of the issues for which the CWC is clearly competent in terms of the BetrVG.  
Others, however extended the role of the CWC to cover all issues which have cross-site 
implications. “The role of the CWC is to negotiate on issues that go beyond the ability of local 
works councils to regulate. Sure, this stems from the law, it’s also true for many other issues in 
which there are common interests across different plants” (10/2, similar wording in 23/2).  In 
the light of the fact that the CWC enjoys significant legal leeway in taking up issues, 
the distinction between “central” and “local” issues will be discussed below in more 
detail.  
Rationales for such ‘functional’ descriptions of the CWC’s tasks included ensuring the 
“same framework conditions on all sorts of issues, the same preconditions for all sites” (2/3); “to 
set up uniform rules for all sites […] to make sure that those rules which apply,  apply the same 
everywhere” (11/3); “cross-site rules, to ensure that we don’t have a different rule in every 
plant” (26/2); “to negotiate agreements that can’t be negotiated at the local level” (23/2, similar 
wording 10/2);“to coordinate agreements that affect everyone” (9/3). 
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United We Stand, Divided We Fall: political characterisations of the role of the 
CWC  
The CWC’s coordinating role is not limited to coordinating individual policies, 
however, as the functional descriptions cited above might suggest. To many CWC 
members, the primary role of the CWC is to keep the various divisions and branches of 
the company politically and strategically aligned with one another.  Respondents used 
such images as the links of a chain or a closing of ranks; many referred to the CWC as a 
“Klammer”, a clamp or bracket that holds objects together.  
There are many sources of potential divergence. Each site needs to function as part of 
the whole.  Each plant needs to hold up its end of a consistent political strategy. 
DaimlerChrysler is a truly mixed bag of large and small manufacturing sites which 
either make parts, do final assembly or both,  R&D sites, and Sales and Service 
establishments. For representatives from smaller plants, the Sales and Service 
establishments, the research and development sections, or the guest representatives 
from subsidiary companies, the CWC serves to keep all the bits and pieces of the 
company moving in the same direction. Here, the exchange of information and the 
coordination of strategy was seen as the most important task of the CWC, since there is 
less scope to actually closely coordinate the approach to individual issues across such 
diverse sections of the company.  
Beyond the heterogeneity of the different individual plants in terms of size, products, 
and prosperity, one of the main fault lines lies between the passenger vehicles division 
on the one hand and the commercial vehicles division on the other. For many 
respondents, the most crucial task of the CWC is to hold these two divisions together. 
According to CWC members, this cohesion between the two key divisions is 
increasingly threatened by company policy which increasingly aims to treat different 
parts of the company differently.  
It is the need to meet this threat of whipsawing head on which is at the forefront of 
many respondents’ assessment of the role of the CWC. For nearly all CWC members, 
this issue hovered in the background, and when asked what role the CWC fulfils, 
nearly half of the CWC members explicitly mentioned the need to counteract company 
attempts to play sites off against one another.  
This is the rationale behind the CWC’s role in enabling the exchange of information 
and in coordinating political and strategic approaches. Management “is always trying to 
play sites off against one another, and that’s why it’s so important that we compare notes, that 
we see, what are the others doing, where is it all going, what’s happening over there” (8/3).  
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“Individual sites’ vulnerability to blackmail has to be prevented, in future we’ll have to play a 
stronger role here” (4/3). “The CWC needs to make sure that uniform rules are applied, so that 
sites are not played off against one another”(28/3).  “The CWC cannot in any way permit 
attempts to play sites off against one another” (34/2). “That’s a new problem, sites are played 
off against one another in ways that never used to be. And that’s where the CWC has a strong 
function, a very collegial approach” (28/3). “The danger is there, that the sites enter into a 
rivalry with one another, and pointedly only ever perceive their own interests, surely not in a 
malicious way, but it’s often a question of, well, survival is maybe exaggerated, but it really is 
about important question […] so I can’t imagine that we could deal with this sensibly without 
the CWC” (30/7). “The blackmail policy goes across the whole company, across all the plants. It 
is sometimes so brutal that every plant gets blackmailed, that the concession from one site is 
blackmailed out of them to the extent that a supplier contract from one plant to another is made 
dependent on their ability to compete with any other supplier in the world“ (22/4). Citing the 
uniform arrangements for on-call duty technicians, which had been negotiated at 
CWC-level for all the Sales and Service establishments, one CWC member said that 
that had “prevented a competitive rivalry between establishments, in which the weakest site is 
always the loser”(10/3).  
One of the representatives of a subsidiary company described the guest’s role in the 
CWC as follows: “the goal of the exchange of information and the coordination in the CWC is 
to prevent being played off against one another. So that [the CWC] sees why we [in subsidiary 
companies] may have agreed to certain things, why maybe we had to agree certain things, but 
also so that my local works councils see where is the benchmark [set by the CWC], and try to 
stay as close to that as possible. That’s my own role in the CWC, too“ (19/5). 
Several CWC members referred to a recent incident, in which one site had found itself 
unable to resist making important concessions that were not agreed within the CWC.  
“For me the CWC is very important, that it’s an institution, that you can’t split it, otherwise 
when I see how it happens, how [one site] can agree something and the next thing you know 
they’re systematically putting pressure on the smaller sites, and if the CWC isn’t steadfast, then 
that will split us, and that can’t be allowed to happen”(24/5). Referring to the same incident, 
another CWC member said, “it was clear to me, once that agreement was signed, that we 
were next, and that’s why I think the main role of the CWC is that we don’t exclude each other, 
that we don’t let, well, rivalry come up”(4/4). 
CWC members are clearly aware of the fact that differentiation carries with it grave 
dangers, and that the CWC plays a central role in preventing fragmentation. As one 
CWC member put it, “a wild proliferation [of policies and conditions] on the same issue 
should never happen, at that moment, we’ll split up, and the CWC is clinically dead”(24/5).  
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The CWC as a permanent forum for communication and exchange 
The CWC also serves as an important regular communication platform between works 
councils (23/2). One respondent referred to the CWC as a works council network (16/3); 
another pointed out that “this exchange is one of the most important issues, I hold that 
exchange between individual councils  and the individual works council Chairs to be very, very 
important” (8/3). As another respondent put it, “the goal of all this cooperation in the CWC 
and the commissions is simply to know from one another what’s going on, what’s happening 
where. So I want so know the local agreements, want to know what’s being agreed there, and it’s 
just as important to me that the others know what we’re doing locally” (19/5). 
Standardisation of working conditions?  
The CWC has a clear task in shaping policy (“Gestaltungsfunktion” 27/4) for all issues 
shared across the whole company. “At the CWC we have a level, where we really formulate 
our political goals together, you know, really in the sense of where, what and how” (26/29). 
“The CWC should pull together successes and if possible transfer them to the whole company. I 
don’t understand why everyone across the country should have different rights, different 
conditions, that’s what the CWC is there for. But if you ask me if the CWC achieves that, then I 
have to say ‘no’” (13/3). Interestingly, this respondent qualifies his own very high 
expectations with “if possible”, revealing the limitations of any expectations of 
standardisation.   
In fact, all respondents stop short of expecting the CWC to ensure standard working 
conditions. It is widely accepted that there will be divergence, that there are perfectly 
justifiable reasons for local variations: it is up the CWC to recognise when variation 
becomes counterproductive to its aims and to act accordingly.  
The chief political aim, then,  is that of achieving a balance between unity and 
differentiation.  “The biggest task is that of coordination, cohesion, to see where the whole 
thing is going, to build unity, that’s the main task. To achieve this coordinating task and 
develop policies that point the way forward, to set a certain framework” (33/4). There is a 
perceived need to “achieve a balance between sites” (6/3) “ in terms of working conditions” 
(21/6), “to establish common ground” (10/2), and “cooperation between the plants, the Sales 
and Service branches and the subsidiary companies” (34/2).  The CWC needs  “to maintain 
unity, keep an eye on parallel developments, keep us from drifting apart. With very few 
exceptions we’ve managed that” (31/2).  One respondent also explicitly accorded the CWC 
a clear protective function for individual works councils and sites (27/4). 
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Cooperation is a means to an end. Many respondents highlighted the need to develop 
and maintain a common approach as a prerequisite for unity and concerted action. The 
CWC needs to develop “a common approach, everything that has to do with commitments 
[among CWC members], to find an approach that we can all carry together“(8/3).  
When asked to what extent the CWC succeeds in developing and implementing such a 
common approach, one CWC member replied, “in part, yes. Those sites with strong works 
council work are in a position to implement more or less the approaches which were agreed in 
the CWC” (11/3).  
CWC and top-level management 
The CWC is the counterpart to top-level management of DaimlerChrysler’s automotive 
and commercial vehicles operations.  Access to top level management is cited as an 
important aspect of the CWCs work by several respondents. Since for many CWC 
members their only contact to top-level management is in the context of the CWC, it is 
somewhat surprising that this aspect is not cited as often as one might expect. Yet the 
relative scarcity of references to contact with top-level management strengthens the 
impression that the main thrust of the CWC’s work is internal, i.e., in bringing together 
representatives of each site.  
According to one respondent, the Chair of the CWC always has “to have the ear of the 
executive management board” (8/3). The CWC wields influence at the top of the company, 
and can influence landmark decision-making at that level far more than any local 
works council can (33/4, 12/2, 10/4, 27/4). Indeed, the CWC’s access to top management 
is one important avenue for its work: to get an issue moving, the CWC can  throw its 
weight behind an issue by initiating discussions with central management (27/4). The 
CWC also serves as a “lightning rod” for local works councils who are in difficulties 
(15/15). 
As one respondent pointed out with respect to interaction with top-level management, 
the role of the CWC is not limited to issues in which it is formally competent, such as in 
negotiating framework agreements where local management is not competent to act as 
a negotiating partner. The CWC also plays a role in cases in which local management is 
not willing to take up negotiations (7/4). In such cases, pressure is brought to bear on 
local management via top-level management.  
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The role and competence of the Commissions  
It is no understatement to say that that the work of this elaborate network of 
commissions, project groups and task forces is the very foundation for the work of the 
CWC. It is here that issues are thrashed out, that common positions are developed, that 
the nitty-gritty of interest aggregation actually takes place. As will be seen below, the 
delegation of responsibility to these commissions is not entirely free of ambiguities. On 
the one hand, they need enough autonomy to be able to work effectively, on the other, 
the CWC is careful to keep the reins in its hands.  
Furthermore, and as will be seen below,  the fact that the commissions allow for the 
systematic inclusion of local works council members has important implications for the 
functioning of this multi-level system as a whole.  
Discussions within the CWC about reorganising and  streamlining commission 
activity 
As discussed in Section 5.4., the Seminar held by the CWC in July 1999 focussed on its 
working structures. Next to the discussions about the role and remit of the preparation 
and coordination committee, a key focus of the 1999 Seminar lay on the elaborate 
substructure of commissions, project groups and task forces  
The discussions about the collective leadership structures of the CWC revealed much 
about the CWCs own understanding of its roles and decision-making structures. The 
discussions about the role and responsibilities of the substructures of the CWCs is 
similarly revealing.  
There is a clear consensus that the purpose of the commissions’ work is to structure the 
work of the CWC.  At the same time, CWC members recognise that this elaborate 
network of substructures needed clarification, or – as one CWC member put it --  the 
overgrown garden needed to be pruned and weeded (Interview notes).  
In the seminar, the CWC members and guests formed working groups to discuss the 
role of the various committees. I had the opportunity to act as facilitator for the 
working group which was asked to focus on the following questions: “What does the 
CWC expect from the subcommittees?” and “ What does the CWC have to do so that 
the committees can do their job?” Since the CWC members had been asked to go to the 
working group focussing on a subcommittee of which they were themselves members, 
the CWC’s ‘key players’ participated in the other groups, while the working group 
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focussing on the CWC itself was the catch-all group for everyone else. Therefore, those 
CWC members who play a less active role in commission work joined ‘my’ working 
group on the CWC. The discussions about the CWC’s expectations which are 
summarised below therefore more likely reflect the views not of the key players, but of 
the potentially marginalised CWC members instead.  
The working group on the CWC reached the following conclusions about what the 
CWC could expect from the subcommittees:  firstly, the committees are expected to 
deliver concrete, decision-ready proposals. For its part, the CWC must provide the 
commissions with a clear mandate and a clear formulation of their objective. The 
commissions must thoroughly explore issues from every angle, take into account the 
wide variety of different interests and views, and develop alternatives where 
appropriate. They need to work efficiently so that the CWC can focus on the truly 
controversial issues. They must have the courage to commit themselves  to a clear, 
unambiguous position. A key prerequisite for effective commission work is a high 
degree of mutual trust and an open working atmosphere. No one should ever feel 
sidelined; instead all points of view must be taken into account. Overall, the work of all 
commissions and committees must be transparent; ideally, everyone in the CWC 
should have an overview not only of which issues are being dealt with by the various 
commissions, but also of the state of play within each commission.   
The commissions are also clearly seen as a bridge to the local works councils and, by 
extension, to the workforce. The working group therefore recognised that the 
commissions must ensure the flow of information to and from the workforce. They 
must ensure acceptance among the workforce for the work of the CWC. They must be 
perceived as being both competent and trustworthy. Finally, the commissions play a 
role as sensors: according to the working group, the commissions must not only work 
through the issues they have been assigned, but they must also remain sensitive to 
potentially new topics and issues. They have a responsibility to carry these new issues 
into the CWC.  
This is certainly a tall order. But the work of the commissions is recognised as a 
fundamental part of the work of the CWC; accordingly, as will be seen below, 
members of the CWC reiterated these expectations in the interviews.  
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Assessing the need for a central approach: Cross-site till proven 
otherwise 
It may only be a slight exaggeration to claim that in a company as complex and 
intertwined as DaimlerChrysler, any measure is assumed to have cross-site 
implications until proven otherwise. Whether the CWC has identified policy areas in 
which strategic coordination is needed, or whether they anticipate that new measures 
introduced by management will require a coordinated response, the myriad issues 
confronting the CWC need to be sorted through, their potential implications identified, 
sticking points isolated, and possible responses coordinated across sites.  
The commissions are at the forefront of this process of sifting through the profusion of 
issues. They represent an important forum for filtering out areas for CWC activity. The 
work of the commissions can also be quite explorative: they provide the opportunity to 
air concerns, and to discuss whether a problem is widespread and whether its solution 
might benefit from being a cross-site one. This was one of the functions highlighted by 
the working group at the CWC seminar in 1999 (see Section  5.4.). Whether or not the 
CWC actually becomes active, then, the CWC and the commissions serve to cement an 
exchange of information and experience as a precondition for cross-site cooperation.  
The commissions offer the opportunity to explore a coordinated, collective response. 
As one CWC member put it, “Even if the CWC doesn’t actually do anything, at least you 
have the possibility to respond in a coordinated way. It’s good to know whether my concern is 
shared by colleagues from other sites, whether our approach might even be supported by other 
plants” (30/8). He went on to highlight the need to include the different points of view 
and interests from a very early stage: “There’s such a huge range of issues we’re dealing 
with […] So it’s important at CWC level to bring together the points of view of the different 
plants, different ideas, thoughts, approaches, and then to develop it into a joint approach” (30/8) 
The need to reduce complexity 
Besides exchanging information and sifting through the multitude of issues arising out 
of the local sites, the commissions serve to reduce the complexity inherent to the 
company-wide implications of any given issue. When asked to explain why 
commissions are necessary, several CWC members highlighted this need to  structure 
the work of the CWC on increasingly detailed issues, since there is no way that the 
whole CWC can grasp all the details for any given issue (31/3; 6/4; 8/9-10; 32/3; 23/3). 
The host of interlinked topics confronted by the CWC must first be picked apart and 
worked through by the commissions, then decided and implemented by the CWC. 
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To provide a sharp focus out of the blurry complexity of an issue is not only a technical 
task: it is clearly recognised as a political task. The fundamental task of the 
commissions is to distil the political essence of an issue so that the CWC can make a 
politically informed decision. “The issues have become so specific and specialised, so 
demanding, that the CWC can no longer simply assess the situation politically and decide 
accordingly. The commissions must work through the factual issues in great detail and must 
also define and stick to a clear political orientation in their discussions with management, which 
is something that is no longer possible within the CWC, because the variety of topics and tasks 
has got to be so huge. The commissions must have a knack for bringing the whole wide spectrum 
onto a single platform in the CWC, so that even the last member understands what’s at stake. 
This is what sets a commission apart, not speaking gobbledygook, but preparing and presenting 
the actual factual content in such a way that its significance is instantly recognisable, that the 
political dimension is thus recognised, and that the CWC can, based on these presentations,  
take a decision” (33/5). As another CWC member put it, “ The commissions need to 
crystallise out exactly what’s at stake, what are the pros and cons of any proposed strategy, 
what are the essentials. I don’t need a 5-page draft agreement –  just tell me what’s at issue so 
that we can form an opinion” (15/10). 
The problem of overlaps, or specialisation as the antithesis of complexity  
At first glance, the network of commissions, subcommittees and substructures appears 
straightforward if elaborately systematic and comprehensive. It seems as though every 
issue has its place. However, from time to time, this specialisation of committee work is 
counterposed by overarching issues; specialisation runs counter to the complexity of 
many of the issues on the agenda of the CWC. Some issues simply cannot be clearly 
demarcated as the remit of the one or the other commission; instead a measure may 
have repercussions which impinge upon the work of several commissions. The fact 
that real-life complexity is the antithesis of specialisation highlights the need for 
increased coordination if the potential effects of a single, overarching measure is dealt 
with in different commissions.  
For example, at the time that this research was being conducted, the company was in 
the process of developing and introducing a new production system. Since the 
introduction of a new production system can result in an overhaul of existing task 
allocations or job descriptions, it is clearly an issue for the Personnel Commission. 
Since the remuneration system may need to take such new or revised task allocations 
or combinations into account, the Wages and Salary Commission and the Central 
Parity Commissions may need to become active.  New forms of organisation of the 
planning stages of production, in particular if these draw upon performance-related 
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data, may mean that the Organisation and Data Commission needs to keep an eye on 
the planning process. Finally, any new forms of work organisation that are developed 
within the framework of the a new production system must be dealt with by the 
Commission on Workplace Organisation and Design; the Workplace Safety 
Commission must ensure that standards of health and safety protection are adhered to; 
and since any new forms of work organisation must be covered in the training policies,  
the commission responsible for vocational and further training may need to take the 
issue on board as well.  What may read as a rather Kafkaesque list of committees is in 
the context of the CWC’s ways of working simply a reflection of the need to 
accommodate such inevitable overlaps.  
Representativeness 
Not surprisingly within such a federalist system, the issue of representativeness is a 
recurring theme. It is the key criteria underlying the perceived fairness, transparency 
and solidity of the work of the commissions, project groups, task forces, etc. It is of 
utmost importance that every plant can have its say in the commissions’ deliberations.  
As one CWC member put it, “It’s not about people, it’s about sites. I don’t work in the 
commission as a representative of myself as a private person, I’m there to represent my site 
(32/3).  
Even if within the commissions, work is delegated to smaller working groups, it is 
always important to allow representatives from every plant to scrutinise the results. 
“It’s easier to thrash [a problem] out in small groups of four or five, then that gets put before the 
commission, so every plant can have its say before it is brought before the whole CWC” (6/4). 
And even if a minority opinion does not find its way into the final outcome of the 
commission’s work, then there’s another chance to put forward plant-specific points of 
view once the issue is brought back into the CWC (6/5). 
As a rule, the commissions are chaired by a CWC member from one of the larger sites. 
Some CWC members see this tradition rather pragmatically.  As one CWC member 
from one of the smaller sites pointed out, “the chairmanships of the commissions usually 
reflect the needs of the biggest plants. That may be good, since many issues need chairmen with 
strong power resources, they also have to be able to assess what would be acceptable in the 
biggest plants and what wouldn’t. Implementation of an agreement or a strategic decision is 
much easier in a smaller plant like mine, it’s much easier and faster, that’s not the case in the 
bigger plants” (9/2).   
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Several CWC members clearly recognise the commissions’ work as another arena of 
centralised interest representation and aggregation.  It was pointed out that “you need 
to have good people to send to the commissions, otherwise you can forget it. There’s no point in 
having someone there who just says ‘yes’ and ‘amen’: I need – we need – to  be in a position to 
put forward and defend the interests of our site” (15/10). Another sees commission work as 
an additional source of influence for his local site: “My local member can help to put across 
our positions in the commissions. There’s maybe not much that a local works council member 
can do, but it is another source of influence on the CWC, it’s lobbying, really. And if that works 
out, then it’s an advantage” (2/7). He sees local works council involvement as upgrading 
the position of the local site in the CWC (2/6). 
Issues of power and control: control via iteration 
The CWC is confronted by a dilemma. On the one hand, the sheer scope and sheer 
complexity of their work requires that it be spread across many shoulders. At the same 
time, they are well aware of the fact that in structuring issues and preparing positions, 
crucial political decisions are made along the way by the commissions. There is no 
such thing as a purely technical decision.  In their work, the commissions select and 
reject a range of solutions and criteria. The CWC is required to make a leap of faith, to 
entrust this work to the commissions. At the same time, they are understandably 
reluctant to delegate complete decision-making authority to others.  
While there is a widespread recognition that decisions taken by the CWC need to be 
structured by the commissions beforehand, and that this process of structuring 
decisions is already fundamentally political in nature, there are also mechanisms in 
place which aim to ensure that the whole CWC is kept in the loop while the basis for 
decision-making is being prepared. The solution found by the CWC to deal with this 
issue can be called iterative delegation.  It is a combination of trust and control.  The 
treatment of issues by the CWC and the commissions is iterative: when an issue is first 
raised, it is first discussed in the CWC, before being assigned to a commission for 
further deliberation. The initial discussion in the CWC serves to identify the main 
sticking points, as well as the any potential fault lines across the plants. The interim 
results of the commissions’ work are regularly presented in the plenary CWC. It is here 
that objections can be raised, corrections or shifts proposed. Throughout the process, 
CWC members and the CWC Chair informally keep an eye on developments within 
the commissions, too.  
There is thus a broad consensus that the commissions should provide the CWC with an 
outcome about which decisions can be taken, but at the same time the iterative process, 
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as well as the reservation of the final decision in the CWC ensures that everybody still 
can have his or her say.  “Yes, the commissions should provide the CWC with material which 
is ripe for a decision. But there’s still enough opportunity to discuss it in the CWC. It’s not as 
though the commissions are assigned an issue and the next thing you know they’re presenting a 
final agreement. In between there are interim reports, in which objections can be raised or 
changes can be suggested. And even if a draft agreement is presented, the CWC still files and 
polishes the various points and paragraphs” (1/4). According to another respondent, 
“what’s presented in the CWC as the basis for a decision is either a call for help, ‘we’re stuck, 
this is where we’ve got to, what should we do now’ or it is truly a solution proposed by the 
commission that is put to the CWC for a final decision. But in between the issue is shuttled  
back and forth between the commissions and the top leadership or the whole CWC (22/7). 
As one long-serving respondent pointed out, “Herbert Lucy’s  trust [in the commissions]  
was not boundless. Of course he made sure that issues could be thoroughly dealt with, that the 
organisational support was there, he really pushed the commissions to confront issues, to make 
sure they really worked hard and didn’t opt for easy answers.  But he never let them take the 
final decision, he always made sure that the core decision was made in the executive committee 
or in the CWC, and then delegated to the commission with a clear mandate to negotiate in a 
certain direction. It was similar under Karl Feuerstein” (3/6). Another CWC member made 
it clear that issues of control are always involved in delegation: “The substructure has to 
be in place so that you can delegate, but delegating makes it harder for some Chairs or even the 
CWC Chair to keep all the pieces together” (15/10). 
As another CWC member put it, “It is essential that the issue and the general political 
direction is first launched in the CWC, then the details are worked out in the commission to a 
certain degree, but then the issue has to be brought back into the CWC (16/5).  “The journey is 
always interrupted along the way, to check back with the CWC. We don’t just go off and 
negotiate something and then come back with the final result“ (11/5). Another CWC member 
likened the CWC to “a security brake. The CWC is always involved in the  fundamental 
discussions, sometimes issues are sent back to the commissions if what the commission came up 
with simply does not accord with the whole CWC’s understanding of an issue. So in the CWC 
we always have the opportunity to say, ‘C’mon, go back to the drawing board.’ I think that’s a 
pretty good process” (24/4).  
Notwithstanding these control mechanisms, trust is recognised as a key feature of 
delegation. The members of the CWC recognise that they as a group cannot possibly 
cope with all the complexity; they therefore need to distribute that work across an 
extensive network of working groups.  If they are prepared to assign an inherently 
political task to a commission, then they must also be prepared to trust the commission 
to accomplish that task. “Maybe I can define the borders right and left within which the 
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commission should find its solution, define our overall tendency as a CWC. But having both 
[control over the outcome and relief from the workload], that doesn’t work…That’s the real test: 
you can’t on the one hand satisfy the expectation that decision-making authority and 
competence should be delegated and at the same time insist on  the right to check everything 
that everyone else does. That just doesn’t work” (22/7). As another CWC member put it, “I 
don’t think it’s good if all the decisions are made in the commissions, and the CWC is presented 
with a fait accompli. The CWC must make the final decision, but a certain amount of 
independence has to be left to the commission. It’s a fine line, really” (16/5).  
5.6. The role of the local works councils within the federalist system 
of interest representation 
Føllesdal (2003) has pointed out that one of the key philosophical issues raised by 
federalism is the appropriate allocation of authority. He points out that it is necessary 
to critically assess ”the alleged grounds for federal arrangements in general, and the 
allocation of authority between sub-units and central bodies in particular.”   
The role and competence of the local works councils within the federal political order 
of the CWC therefore bears close examination.  
Shared sovereignty 
Federalism is about sharing sovereignty. As pointed out in Chapter Three, the formal 
allocation of authority between the local works councils and the central works councils 
is laid out in the BetrVG.  
This allocation of authority relies on the principle of subsidiarity, whereby a decision is 
to be taken at the lowest possible level, unless delegating it to a higher level would 
ensure higher comparative efficiency or effectiveness in achieving its goals. The 
competence is defined in relative terms rather than absolute terms. Put simply, the 
CWC as a central body has as much authority  as it collectively perceives is 
appropriate.  Where there is little or no perceived need for cooperation, there will be 
less cooperation. Conversely, where, as will be seen to be the case at DaimlerChrysler, 
there is a widely shared perception of mutual interdependence among sites, there will 
be a high degree of authority delegated to the central body.  
In other words, the local works councils decide collectively what the CWC can and 
cannot decide. The fact that the local works councils do, as a rule, reserve the right of 
final decision as provided for in the BetrVG only strengthens this notion of “borrowed” 
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powers within a federal political order. The legitimation for handing over political 
powers to another body must be strong indeed. At the end of the day, it is an entirely 
political decision which is not taken by the few, but by the many, which renders it all 
the more complex. It is this issue which lies at the heart of this dissertation and to 
which we return again and again.  
The importance of local autonomy 
The actual policy and strategy of employee representatives is determined within the 
contested arena of competing and sometimes overlapping competences of the local 
works councils and the central works council. 
Section 50 of the BetrVG states clearly that the central works council “shall not be 
deemed to be a higher organ than the individual works councils.” Local works councils 
are thus not ancillary, not subordinate.  In practice, however, this distinction may only 
be a formality: an overbearing CWC may risk cowing local works councils into 
acquiescence.  Local works councils are autonomous, but in light of the wide range of 
CWC activity at DaimlerChrysler in particular, there is some concern among local 
works council members that an overbearing CWC undermines their freedom to act as 
they see fit.  As one CWC  member recounted, he is sometimes greeted by local works 
council members with “smug comments, like ‘so what has the all-powerful CWC decreed this 
time?” (18/26). 
Because this is a widespread view in other companies, and in particular because I 
encountered this view in my conversations with local works council members at 
DaimlerChrysler, I included the issue of local works council autonomy in the postal 
survey of local works council members.  
Asked whether they were satisfied with the way in which the CWC respected the 
autonomy of the local works councils, 70% were somewhat satisfied or very satisfied. 
Because the distribution of authority and competence is often clarified informally, it is 
instructive to look a bit more closely, however. For the majority of respondents, the 
distribution of decision-making competences seems to be fairly balanced. A glance at 
the minority opinion however, allows a more focussed view: according to 44% of 
respondents, the CWC pulls too much decision-making authority upwards at the 
expense of the local works councils’ autonomy. According to 26% of respondents, local 
works councils for their part delegate too much decision-making authority to the 
CWC— in other words, the CWC is burdened with too many problems that the local 
works councils should solve on their own. In implementing its collective strategies, 
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according to 36% of respondents, the CWC sometimes puts local works councils under 
a great deal of pressure.   
Figure 22: The CWC and the local works councils  
(local WC Members only:) The CWC and the local works councils
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Coming together or holding together?  
Føllesdal  (2003) has pointed out that democratic interlocking federations, such as that 
at DaimlerChrysler, alleviate rather than give rise to secessionist tendencies (Simeon 
1998, Simeon and Conway 2001, Linz 1997). It has been argued above that the CWC is 
clearly a case of “interlocking” rather than “separate” federalism. There are myriad 
cooperative ties that bind the various levels together; the data supports the argument 
that it is this tightly meshed network of contact, communication and common policy 
development that provides the foundation for the CWC’s cooperation.  
It has been suggested that federalist movements tend to solidify and strengthen rather 
than contain fragmentation, and that attempts to contain the centrifugal forces which 
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prompt “federalist responses” in the first place are inherently unstable. Føllesdal (2003) 
suggests that previous research about the genesis of federal orders is marked by a 
sampling bias towards “holding together” federalism; this  “makes it difficult to assess 
claims that federal responses perpetuate cleavages and fuel rather than quell 
secessionist movements.”   
Indeed, the experience at DaimlerChrysler suggests that federal systems can act to 
bridge cleavages and fuse the parts together. I have argued above that the CWC more 
aptly falls into the category of “coming together federalism”. Firstly, the basic premise 
of the BetrVG is that there will be a local works council wherever this is legally 
possible. Cross-site institutions such as central or group works councils are established 
as a second step wherever there is more than one local works council. In this sense, the 
system builds upon the local level, rather than breaking up a central level to allow 
more autonomy for the local levels, as would be the case in “holding together” 
federalism. Furthermore, at DaimlerChrysler, the basic skeleton framework of cross-
site cooperation provided by the BetrVG has developed into a fully-fledged and 
expansive system of close policy coordination which is supported by a nearly 
universally shared understanding of the need for such close and tightly intermeshed 
cooperation. This shared understanding is evident not only in the perceptions of the 
CWC members themselves, but also in the points of view and expectations expressed 
by the local works council members (See Section 5.5).   Overall, this dynamic 
underscores the movement towards “coming together federalism” rather than 
“holding together federalism”.  
Delegation means inclusion 
CWC members and local works councils can rely on the principle that their effective 
veto right is protected most of the time. There is thus little or no risk in delegating 
responsibility for an issue to the CWC, as long as the local works council reserves its 
right of final decision. On the contrary, the delegation of authority actually increases 
the intensity of involvement of the local sites in the centralised deliberations on the 
subject at hand: the very need to develop a solution which meets the needs of the sub-
units enough to ensure their acceptance of the final result means that the sub-units are 
actively included in the search for a common solution. The reliance on borrowed 
authority via delegated responsibility in order to develop a common position which 
must then be formally accepted by each local works council increases the central 
body’s need to  intensify the degree of participation, and to thus ensure the inclusion of 
local views, interests, and needs into the process of (voluntary) joint policy 
formulation.  
 166
Of course, the effective right of veto wielded by the local level has its limits: it does not 
protect a dissenting local works council from being put under immense pressure by 
other sub-units or the central body itself. Indeed, 36% of the local works councillors 
surveyed felt that the CWC sometimes put the local works council under immense 
pressure. Only three CWC members agreed that this was sometimes the case, although 
19 CWC members only “somewhat” disagreed that the CWC puts pressure on the local 
works councils to comply. Implicit log-rolling or the logic of repeated games also play 
a role: a dissenting works council may be punished for its defection with regard to 
another, completely separate issue. In this sense, if the logic of a collective response is 
compelling enough for the CWC to take action, then the defection of one or several 
local works councils from the deal struck may in the long run backfire on the dissenters 
themselves.  
The interface between the CWC and local works councils 
If the key function of the CWC is to coordinate, then this coordination refers not only to 
interest aggregation with respect to developing joint negotiating positions for explicitly 
cross-site agreements, but it also means coordinating the work of the local works 
councils. This is achieved by two routes: firstly via the CWC members themselves, and 
secondly via the systematic inclusion of local works council members in the work of 
the CWC. In effect then, local works councils are at the same time constituents of the 
CWC as well as active participants in the work of the CWC. Rather than simply 
providing a mandate, they are a party to the work of the CWC. They are directly 
implicated in the work, of the CWC not just judges of it.  This in turn solidifies their 
role as constituents.  
Local Works Councils as Constituents  
The CWC must continuously work to ensure that its activities are seen to be legitimate. 
In this sense, the local works councils which delegate their Chair and deputy Chair to 
the CWC are treated as constituents. By virtue of their leadership role at the local level, 
the members of the CWC have an important role to play in communicating the 
strategies of the CWC to the local level as well as in securing local support for CWC 
activities.  Yet these local works council chairpersons must each act according to the 
constraints and opportunities of the local works councils—these ultimate decision-
makers are one step removed from the deliberations within the CWC  and they have 
their own expectations of autonomous decision-making authority.  Unless they are 
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offloading an issue judged too thorny to tackle at home, they will tend to jealously 
guard their own decision-making autonomy.  
Obviously, then, the CWC members cannot act alone: they need their works councils to 
go along with them. “On the issue of adhering to agreements and what you do with them, the 
CWC can’t do that, that’s where the local works councils come into it” (20/3).  As another 
CWC member put it,  “the main task of the CWC is to coordinate all sorts of issues and topics 
that we’re working on, and to try to reach a common agreement or arrangement. It would be 
nice, of course, if someone [in the CWC] said, ‘we’ll decide together and then that will be valid 
for everyone’, but that’s not the way the Works Constitution Act is constructed. That makes it 
difficult sometimes” (15/5). Or, as another CWC member put it, “the main task can only be 
to set up frameworks and crash barriers, between which the local works councils can implement 
those topics they have at the local level” (20/3).  
CWC members recognise the need to ensure that their local works council are well-
informed about their work at the central level.  Within the non-hierarchical system of 
works councils,  it is essential that they have the support of their local works councils 
in order to underscore the legitimacy of CWC activity.  
CWC members accept the need to lobby for the CWC, to work hard to convince their 
local “constituents”. Some local works councils are marked by strong factionalisation, 
which makes the advocacy for their CWC members more difficult; where there is a 
strong internal opposition in place, they need to invest even more effort into 
convincing the local works council as a whole that the CWC is acting appropriately. 
Moreover, even if there may be only very limited factionalisation, several works 
councils are highly politicised, which means that elaborate and wide-ranging 
discussion must often take place in order to communicate the whys and wherefores of 
CWC decisions or recommendations.   
In one particularly divided local works council, the CWC member relates that “the 
CWC is seen as a huge monster that devours the local works council. The minutes of every 
CWC meeting are picked apart, every agreement that the CWC proposes is hacked apart […] 
that's not in itself bad, but sometimes the point gets completely lost in the process” (7/8-9). 
As another CWC member pointed out, it is essential that enough information is 
communicated on an ongoing basis if the support of the local works council is to be 
won. “I think this is very important, that we inform them continually. Then there’s a different 
understanding of the CWC, otherwise it turns into this overriding committee [that just] decides 
something […] Or you get a backlash, and that’s bad” (33/12). When asked how much lobby 
work he had to do, he replied “well, not so much, because if you always include the 
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background, if you explain why this was settled in this or that way, then you quickly get into a 
content-based discussion and then you also reach a position quite quickly, where you say, ok, 
it’s this and this…but there’s one thing that we don’t do here, we don’t discuss everything to 
the last detail, instead we say, ‘this and this is on the agenda, the CWC is responsible, what do 
you think of this issue’ and then there’s an opinion-forming process and then we know what 
position or message we’re to bring into the CWC” (33/12). 
Another CWC member highlighted the importance of starting discussions very early 
and of identifying any ‘red lines’.  “You need to leave lots of time and space for political 
discussions. The key challenge for me or my deputy is to decide based on the discussions how far 
can we go, what is doable, and at what point to we say ‘OK, we’ll go along with the CWC 
anyway’ and at what point do we say ‘no, we won’t do that under any circumstances” (26/4). 
Several CWC members pointed out that the reception in the local works council ranges 
from “indifferent to highly critical, depending on the issue” (1/7).  
How well the CWC is seen to have resolved an issue also plays a role. “Criticism of the 
CWC ranges from saying the result is not uniform enough, or they conceded too much, to those 
who say that they should’ve let us [local works councils] have a go, we would’ve come up with a 
better agreement” (15/14). For other issues, the CWC is seen as a lightning rod which  
enables the local works councils to deflect criticism.  
According to several CWC members, the need to enlist the support of the local works 
councils has increased in recent years. “It used to be that all the works council had to do was 
to go out and sell whatever gilt-edged agreement Herbert Lucy made. So works councillors went 
out among the workforce and took all the credit. […] But then came the times when the 
agreements weren’t all positive, so the works councillors took credit for all the good bits and 
blamed the CWC for the bad bits. And suddenly Karl Feuerstein had to make sure that local 
works council members went out and got support for it, that  all local works councils 
implemented something exactly as it had been agreed [at the CWC] (15/14). 
CWC members are also confronted by high expectations by local works councils.  
“The works council gets so much information from us, it sometimes really tests the limits of 
what is reasonable, but overall there’s a full acceptance, so no criticism. But sometimes I feel like 
we’re going against a wall, the weight of what they expect of us is so great […] They expect of 
course that in the central committees we act to further the interests of the site, and they also 
expect us to push forward issues in the CWC that benefit our site overall” (31/7).  
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Top-down and bottom up communication 
CWC members recognise that it is difficult to transmit the full scope of their work to 
the local level. The topics are so detailed and the process of balancing and bringing 
together so many different points of view and strategic considerations is so complex 
that it is difficult to ensure comprehensive information.  
Several CWC members pointed out that they need to improve the depth and quality of 
reporting back to the local works councils.  “We need to strengthen our ability to transfer 
the discussion into the local works council. And the best way to do that is to make sure that the 
commission members report back to the local works councils, too, not just us. We need to bring 
all that back into the local committee, make sure it’s not kept in the commission (26/3) At the 
same time, as one CWC member pointed out, “there’s so much going on at the local level 
that it’s hard to find the necessary time to report as fully as I’d like about what’s going on in the 
commission” (11/7). 
While it is seen as essential that the commissions thrash out the detail, several 
respondents also highlighted the problem that the full breadth and depth of the 
discussions cannot be transmitted back to the local works councils or back up to the 
CWC.  Communication also requires that those who communicate are skilled in doing 
so: “the company is so big, the abundance of issues is so great, and so it all has to broken down 
to the basics […] to the core issues, people need to have the right feel for that, especially if there 
was a conflict in the commissions. So that’s not always easy” (8/7). 
As the results of the postal survey of local works councillors confirm, CWC members 
inform their local works councils members comprehensively. The key to ensuring 
support and cooperation on an ongoing basis, however lies in actively including the 
local works council members in the work of the CWC. Rather than being passive 
constituents whose support must be won, individual works councils are made partners 
in CWC policy formulation. Their acceptance, their impression that CWC activity is 
appropriate, is won by sharing responsibility.  
Local works councils as active participants: The integration of local works council 
members into the work of the CWC  
Next to the systematic formal involvement of the local works councils as constituents 
in authorising the work of the CWC, the local works councils are firmly and widely 
embedded into its day-to-day work. The key to ensuring the necessary support for 
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CWC policies lies in actively including the local works council members in the work of 
the commissions.  
The involvement of local works council members via the committees and project 
groups is one of the most salient features of the work of the Central Works Council at 
DaimlerChrysler. According to the CWC secretariat, some 145 local works council 
members are involved in at least one commission, project group, or task force. Several 
local works council members are involved in up to nine different commissions.  
The extensive participation of local works council members in the work of the CWC 
serves three key purposes: first, it enables a profuse exchange of information between 
the local and central level in employee representation as well as among sites; second, it 
serves to spread the burden of policy development across many shoulders; and third, it 
systematically brings the interests and specific needs of all the local sites to bear on the 
collective work of the CWC, thereby anchoring and legitimating the work of the CWC 
at the local level.  
The local works council members who are integrated into the work of the CWC via its 
issue-based commissions are often the chairpersons of the local works council 
committees for any given issue. This means that they are experts in the field; they are 
specialists in, for example workplace organisation or job classifications. As highlighted 
above, the fact that the commissions and project groups are usually mixed groups 
made up of both CWC members and local works council members means that the 
commissions can draw upon both political authority and issue-based expertise. 
According to the CWC members,  the involvement of local experts firmly grounds the 
commission’s work in the practical and political requirements at the local level.  
One key benefit for the local works council members is that the work of the CWC is 
opened up to include more people than just the “top two”.  In many cases, as many as 
10 local works council members from the site are involved in the work of the  CWC’s 
commissions.  
The effects of this varies according to the size of the local works council. For smaller 
plants with smaller works councils, this can mean that half of the works local works 
council is involved in the work of the CWC; in such sites, the work of the CWC is 
firmly embedded into the day-to-day work of the local works councils.  On the other 
hand, for some of the largest works councils, direct exposure to the ongoing work of 
the CWC is limited to a relatively small group of works council members.  As the CWC 
member from the largest plant in Sindelfingen pointed out, because of the size of his 
local works council, only about one in five local works council members is actively 
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involved in the work of the CWC. “It’s limited to a small circle of specialists. As a rule we 
send the chairmen of our local sub-committees, so that’s only a small circle of about 10 people” 
(1/6).  Familiarity with the work of the CWC is thus not as widespread as it is in 
smaller works councils.  
Interlinkage between local and CWC levels 
Most CWC members pointed out that the active and direct involvement of local works 
council members in the work of the CWC contributes to the overall coherence of  
employee-side interest representation and policy-making across the company. “A 
number of our people who are locally in let’s say key positions are involved in the CWC 
commissions. So we have an optimal anchorage and interlinkage between these two levels” 
(31/6). “There’s hardly a subcommittee here at the local level which doesn’t send a member to 
the CWC commissions, so the work is very closely interlinked” (28/4).  “If we have some issue 
in the CWC then it’s just good sense to discuss it with our colleagues here in the plant together 
with the local committee, so to collect feedback and opinions from all different levels and to hold 
discussions, and we involve the local works council very closely into these discussions so that 
way we have a much stronger content-based interlinkage between the issues we’re dealing with 
at the local level on the one hand and at the level of the CWC on the other” (31/7).  
Local works council members as CWC ambassadors 
The local works council members serving on the committees act in effect as 
ambassadors of the CWC to the local level.  They help to transport issues back to the 
local level, and also to garner support for the CWC’s policies. As one CWC member 
put it, the involvement of so many employee representatives from the local level “helps 
to anchor the CWC much wider and deeper into the work of the works councils across the 
country” (30/8). For another CWC member, the very legitimacy of the CWC’s work 
derives from the working links between the CWC and the local works councils 
(Interview notes).  “It’s important that they’re well informed, that we basically don’t keep 
anything related to the CWC from them, but that we report openly instead, and openly reflect 
the discussions in the CWC and that way make clear why certain decisions were made in the 
CWC. Everybody who’s involved in the CWC commissions does that so we don’t have any 
problems in that department” (32/7-8)  
Some CWC members have quite consciously distributed the opportunity to participate  
in the CWC commissions across many shoulders in their local works councils. “ We 
make a point out of the fact that it’s not just the works council chair and the deputy-chair who 
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are in commissions, we’re only in one commission each, but that we have regular works council 
members in nearly all the other commissions (26/3). Another CWC member pointed out 
that “for a lot of works council members it’s a bit of an honour for them to go to the CWC, 
firstly it’s far away, you can make a real contribution […] they’re not in awe or anything, but 
they get to go there and meet other people, and it’s all top-level stuff, and it’s great to be taken 
into account” (33/13). 
The close involvement of local works council members in the work of the CWC thus 
serves to build political support for the work of the CWC. As one CWC member 
pointed out, having local works council members involved in the work of the CWC 
“gives them other avenues of communication, of understanding just what it is that we do in the 
CWC, than if the information were just going through the bottleneck of my report or the report 
of my deputy, even at the risk that the message may not be uniform” (8/9).  
The involvement of local works council members fosters understanding for the work of 
the CWC: “so many local works council members take on responsibilities at the CWC […] and 
as soon as someone takes on a role in the CWC then their opinion changes, because then it’s all 
his responsibility too” (16/8). This assessment is confirmed by the results of the postal 
survey: members of commissions were markedly more likely to view the work of the 
CWC more favourably than were non-members. This effect is perhaps seen most 
starkly in the question about the role of the CWC: Overall, 69% of respondents felt that 
rather than limiting its activity to those issues which could only be dealt with at a 
central level, the CWC should take on a more active role in distilling common concerns 
an in cultivating overall collective responsibility for common issues. While local works 
councillors who were not involved in the work of the CWC commissions were just 
under twice as  likely to support an expansive role for the CWC, those who are 
involved in commission work were over three times as likely to support such an 
expansive role (See also Figures 28 and 29).  
Interlocking structures of activity and communication: sources and 
exchange of information 
The CWC members also value the cross-cutting channels of information via the 
commissions as a crucial additional source of information about activities and 
strategies in other sites. “I get valuable feedback and new ideas, and so do my local works 
council members in the commissions, on what’s going on at other sites, on what possibilities 
there are to deal with certain issues”(2/7). One CWC member pointed out that the report 
from the CWC and the work of the various commissions has been a standard point on 
the agenda at local works council meetings for over 20 years. “It’s so important that 
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people know what is going on at other sites, how they deal with problems we have in common” 
(29/3). 
As another CWC member put it, “What’s also a very important part of this process is 
mutual information processes, what’s happening regarding the different issues within the 
different plants, such as fixed term work contracts and temporary workers, so that we can see 
what developments are taking place in the individual plants and how we might be able to 
coordinate our responses and approaches […] I don’t think this level of information exchange 
and mutual advice would function without the commissions and working groups, because the 
sheer scope of information and detail  is too large” for the CWC as a whole or the Secretariat 
to transmit (30/8). Another CWC member stressed that that it is important that there is 
a sense of duty to communicate what is actually going on in the different plants (29/6). 
The exchange of information extends to pooling the results of their work, “even really 
easy things, like exchanging texts for flyers or speeches on issues that we have in common. I’m 
happy to share our work, and I’d like to benefit from others’ work. There’s no need to reinvent 
the wheel” (29/5). 
It is important to note that the commissions are not only important sources of 
information for the local works councils, but for the CWC members themselves as well.  
As one CWC member from the north pointed out, “When they do something new and 
innovative down south, they don’t always remember to tell us about it[…] We’re much better 
informed now through the work of the commissions, it works very smoothly (29/5).  
This network of local works council members is also valued as a source of more, better, 
and faster information about what is going on at other sites (2/6). It also gives rise to 
wider personal networks. One CWC member who chairs a commission pointed out 
that through his work on the commission, he has his own contacts into every site 
which he can rely upon in addition to his contact to the Chairs of every plant.  
Another CWC member who is not himself a member of a certain commissions 
remarked, “I get all the information I need about the commission from my local members, they 
reflect back to me what the state of play is, and then we discuss how we should position 
ourselves and what can we contribute and then it all goes via that route. It’s much better than if 
I had to be the one in all the commissions” (9/2). As another CWC member put it, “if anyone 
is concerned about not being in the loop if they’re not members themselves, then they have a 
problem at home, not in the CWC. They need to make sure that the loop is intact, that their site 
representative reports back” (32/3). 
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Living with asymmetry  
Several CWC members point out that when it comes to implementing the work of the 
CWC, for example in implementing a local agreement along lines agreed at the central 
level, it becomes clear that the reflux to the local level is quite uneven. For some this is 
due to the sheer complexity of the issues involved. “The level of discussions and reporting 
back varies. That’s a weak point, that what the CWC decides politically can’t really be fathomed 
at the local level anymore, for example our discussions about working time, or performance 
evaluation. When I meet colleagues from other works councils, I realise how uneven the state of 
their knowledge is” (26/3). In the words of another CWC member, “There are recurring 
problems of implementation, because the knowledge about the background to these agreements is 
not sufficiently clear at the local level” (9/2).  Others suggest that there are simply different 
preferences at the local level, and that these different preferences are reflected in the 
chairmanships of the various committees. Pointing out that the actual political 
implementation of CWC agreements varies from site to site, one CWC member 
commented that “agreements are always filled with more life in the site where the commission 
chair who negotiated it calls the shots. Certain topics are firmly anchored in one site, another 
topic is anchored somewhere else, and that’s usually where the local representatives or the CWC 
members carried the most responsibility within the commission. That’s probably unavoidable, 
but it shows how hard it is to communicate. An agreement is not the same agreement 
everywhere even if it’s the same text. One needs to have the courage to put it into perspective” 
(11/7-8). 
Transparency 
CWC members are well aware that opening up their working structures to include 
other colleagues means that they relinquish some control over the agenda, over who 
has access to which information.  Several CWC members pointed out that this far-flung 
network of local works council involvement also serves to foster transparency . For 
example, as one respondent pointed out, local works council members are no longer 
solely dependent on their local Chair or Deputy Chair who are members of the CWC, 
but that they could also get information from other members of their local works 
council who were involved in the work of other commissions (3/3).  The fact that  many 
local works councillors maintain contact with their colleagues at other sites is borne out 
by the postal survey results (see Figure 15).  As another CWC member pointed out, 
“Since some of my local works council members are also active in the commissions, they have a 
different access to the work of the CWC, so they do scrutinise more critically” (6/11). Indeed, 
as another CWC member noted, “The network of committees is a very fine one, it also means 
that you’ll never be able to completely cover up anything that you’ve done at the CWC or back 
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home  [...] because of all the friendships and informal contacts among local works council 
members from different sites […] No local works council Chair can ever be certain that a local 
works council member will hold his tongue (31/9).  
This extensive involvement of local works council members into the work of the CWC 
may in part also have been reinforced by the explicitly participation-oriented approach 
to trade union policy in the workplace known as beteiligungsorienterte gewerkschaftliche 
Betriebspolitik. This approach, which sought to extend democratic principles to all 
aspects of daily life, had been developed by the German trade union movement since 
the late 1960s in response to what was increasingly decried as elitist proxy politics 
(Stellvertreterpolitik) on the part of works council leadership. It was in the unions’ 
education activities that this approach took the strongest root: by the mid 1980s, this 
participative/democratic approach, which stressed both the need to actively seek the 
involvement of the workforce at large as well to communicate extensively within the 
works council itself, was firmly integrated into the entire range of trade union 
education provided for works council members and shop stewards.  
 
It was seen in Section 5.1 that nearly all CWC members had had extensive training in 
employee representation provided by IG Metall. 99% of the local works council 
members surveyed had also participated in training seminars.  It is thus quite likely 
that these developments at DaimlerChrysler were also supported by this ethos of 
participation-oriented internal democracy. 
 
5.7. The allocation of authority in practice: who has the last word?  
The institutional design of the federal system of interlocking interest representation at 
DaimlerChrysler, in particular the clear primacy of the local level, goes a long way 
towards ensuring that no level enjoys a monopoly on decision-making power. Issues 
are effectively channelled through the system, thereby ensuring that regardless of the 
final formal outcome, everyone has been able to have his or her say.   
At the same time, it is instructive to investigate which level – the local level or the 
central level – is perceived to have “the last word” in matters of policy or strategy.  In 
other words, who calls the tune? In the postal survey, local works council members 
were asked to assess which level was decisive in determining the underlying policy 
behind employee representation. Respondents were asked to rank the following 
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committees in the order of their importance in determining the actual policy or strategy 
of employee representation: local works council, the committees of the central works 
council, the central works council itself, the group works council, the European Works 
Council, and the Supervisory Board.  
The members of the Central Works Council were also asked to rank the various 
committees. There is one important difference between the two data sets, however: the 
list of committees which the CWC members were asked to rank in order of their 
importance included the executive committee of the CWC, i.e., the Central Works 
Committee, rather than the commissions of the CWC. It emerged early on in the course 
of the interviews with the CWC members that this official executive committee was, in 
fact, defunct -- indeed, five CWC members did not include the central (executive) 
committee in their ranking, saying that it did not exist (see Section 5.4). In order to 
ensure the internal comparability of the data among the CWC members’ responses, this 
question was retained. In the postal survey of local works council members, however, 
the central works committee was replaced with the commissions of the CWC.  
The results of this ranking exercise present an illuminating picture of employee 
representatives’ perception of the role played by the different levels in determining the 
actual policy of interest representation.  
The most overarching levels have the least influence 
For both the “ordinary” local works council members and the CWC members, both the 
European Works Council and the Group Works Council (both of which cover all of 
DaimlerChrysler’s operations in all product divisions, not just the automotive sector), 
ranked low in terms of their influence on overall policy determination. 83% of local 
works council members surveyed and 90% of CWC members ranked the Group Works 
Council at 4th or 5th place. As for the European Works Council, both groups of 
respondents clearly placed it at the lower end of the spectrum: 95% of local works 
council members and all of the CWC members placed it at 5th or 6th place. (Of these, 
62% of local works council members and 69% of CWC members put the EWC last.)  
As for the Supervisory Board, half of which is made up of internal or external (trade 
union) employee representatives, 79% of the local works council members surveyed 
spread its influence evenly over the 4th, 5th and 6th places. By contrast, 76% of CWC 
members ranked the Supervisory Board at 3rd or 4th place, suggesting that in their 
experience, some key issues related to IR at the company level are actually settled in 
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the context of the Supervisory Board, rather than within the multi-tiered system of 
works councils.  
Primacy of the local level, supporting role of the CWC 
A similarly clear pattern emerged with respect to the influence of the local works 
councils on the one hand and the Central Works Council on the other.  
Figure 23 illustrates quite clearly that for a majority of respondents, the local works 
councils rank first before the Central Works Council. For 60% of local works council 
members surveyed, local works councils play the most important role in the 
determination of policy and strategy in employee representation across the company.   
55% of the CWC members also stated that the local level is the most important strategic 
locus. The Central Works Council clearly ranks second in importance from the point of 
view of both the local works council members as well as the CWC members 
themselves: 49% of local works council members and 59% of CWC members ranked 
the Central Works Council as the second most important committee in policy 
determination. The operative or executive level of policy determination ranks third for 
both groups: 38% of the CWC members ranked the Central Works (executive) 
Committee at third place, while 48% of local works council members ranked the 
operative level of the CWC commissions clearly at third place.  
Figure 23: Who calls the tune? The determination of policy 
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 These results can be interpreted to mean that while the local works councils play the 
definitive role in determining actual policy, the CWC also plays a very important role. 
For 27% of local works council members, and for 28% of CWC members, the CWC 
even ranked 1st in terms of its importance in defining overall strategy and policy. The 
clear alignment of the commissions at third place (48%) or even at second place (30%) 
suggests that the commissions are seen to play a crucial role in developing policy and 
strategy, but that the final decisions and thus the final responsibility lies with the local 
works councils or in the CWC.  
In comparison with the other committees, whose ranking was fairly consistent, the 
ranking of the local works council is a bit erratic.  For 60% of the survey respondents 
the local works council ranked first;  nearly one third ranked it at second (16%) or third 
(14%) place. However, for a minority of respondents, the local works councils play a 
negligible role in the actual determination of policy. For 5% of the local works council 
members and 7% (2 members) of the CWC, local works councils ranked fourth, and 2% 
of the local works council members surveyed and one member of the CWC ranked it at 
fifth place.  Finally, 3% of the local works council members but none of the CWC 
members ranked the local works council as least important at 6th place.  
In contrast, not a single local works council member ranked the CWC at lower than 4th 
place. A full 97% of local works council members and all of the CWC members ranked 
the CWC at first, second or third place. This consistently high ranking of the Central 
Works Council may be the result of a bias induced by the survey itself, which was 
clearly focussed on the CWC. At the same time, it could also mean that for some 
respondents, the actual influence of the single local works council pales against the 
collective impact of the very active CWC.   
The representation of sites in the CWC  
The different plants at DaimlerChrysler vary greatly in size, from the smallest factory 
in Hamburg with its ca. 2,000 employees to the giant plant in Sindelfingen which 
employs over 36,000 people. Each site delegates two members to the CWC; in the case 
of a vote, each CWC member has as many votes as employees at the plant from which 
he or she is delegated.  Next to the plants, there are of course the R&D sites and the 
Sales and Service establishments; the latter are grouped into five districts which each 
delegate a representatives to the CWC.  
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In the postal survey, the local works council members from the plants were asked to 
assess whether the different sites were appropriately represented within the CWC. The 
members of the CWC were asked the same questions.  Here, the points of view of both 
the constituents (the local works councils) as well as their representatives (the CWC 
members) were broadly consistent with one another.  
82% of local works council members indicated that they perceive that the different sites 
are appropriately represented in the CWC. All but one of the CWC members felt this to 
be the case, demonstrating a high degree of faith in the basic institutional structure of 
site-by-site representation within the CWC as well as in the system of weighted 
majority voting. This does not mean, however, that the works councillors feel that their 
needs are always taken enough into account: 37% of local works council members and 
six out of twenty-nine CWC members felt that the needs of their site were not always 
sufficiently taken into account in the CWC.  
From the point of view of just over half of the local works council members, the CWC 
often decides in the interests of the largest sites. In contrast, less than a third of the 
CWC members shared this view. As can be expected, this perception was prevalent 
among the respondents from smaller sites, but even representatives from larger plants 
recognised that they enjoyed a privileged position within the CWC. In particular, 38% 
of respondents from the second largest plant at Untertürkheim also agreed that the 
CWC tended to act more in the interests of the largest sites.  
The CWC and the local works councils  
As mentioned above, the actual policy and strategy of employee representatives is 
fixed within the contested arena of competing and sometimes overlapping 
competences of the local works councils and the central works council. A range of 
questions in the postal survey aimed to capture the local works councillors’ perception 
of this contested arena. Here, the perceptions of the local works council members and 
the CWC members differ widely.  
For the majority of local works council members, the distribution of decision-making 
competences seems to be fairly balanced. A closer look at the minority opinion 
however, allows a more focussed view: According to 44% of local works council 
members, the CWC pulls too much decision-making authority upwards at the expense 
of the local works councils’ autonomy. By contrast, only a single CWC member tended 
towards this assessment of the CWC as an authoritarian, overbearing central body. At 
the same time, a large majority of the CWC, 79%, only somewhat disagreed that the 
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CWC tended to pull decisions upwards, while only five CWC members disagreed with 
this statement outright. This indicates that there is at least widespread sensitivity 
towards the danger that the CWC might overstep its boundaries.  
It has been noted that the local works councils are free to mandate the CWC to deal 
with an issue on its behalf; some local works council members I spoke with voiced the 
opinion that some local works councils tended to simply offload issues that they were 
too weak to settle at the local level. This view is shared by 26% of local works council 
members.  However, only five CWC members somewhat agreed with this statement 
that local works councils for their part delegate too much decision-making authority to 
the CWC, while the remaining 24 CWC members did not feel that the CWC is 
burdened with too many issues that the local works councils should solve on their 
own. Here, too, though, 69% of the CWC members only “somewhat” disagreed with 
this assertion, thus suggesting that they recognise that the temptation may at times be 
high for a local works council under pressure to try to duck an issue by delegating it to 
the CWC.  
5.8. The challenge of dual allegiance  
Institutional frameworks which define the allocation of authority are not sufficient 
unto themselves. The whole system must be underpinned by political support and the 
desire to coordinate activities. According to Føllesdal, however, “many authors note 
that the challenges of stability must be addressed not only by institutional design, but 
also by ensuring that citizens have an ‘overarching loyalty’ to the federation as a whole 
in addition to loyalty to their own sub-unit (Franck 1968; Linz 1997). Norman (1995) 
and Choudhry (2001) have explored the political philosophies of federalism; central 
topics here are the legitimate bases, content and divisions of such a public dual 
allegiance.  
Føllesdal points out that “the appropriate consideration that voters and their sub-unit 
politicians should give to the interests of others in the federation in interlocking 
arrangements must be clarified if the notion of citizen of two commonwealths is to be 
coherent and durable” (2003).  
This statement touches upon a core theme of this study: how does cross-site interest 
aggregation take place? To what extent are local interests brought to bear on central 
strategy formulation?  How is a common overarching interest identified or developed 
in the light of possibly diverging local interests? How much differentiation is 
sustainable before it leads to fragmentation?  The members of the CWC are acutely 
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aware of this dilemma of dual allegiance: they refer to it as being in a quandary, or a 
catch-22 situation. Yet they also demonstrate a high degree of tolerance for ambiguity.  
The survey data reveals that the local works council members, i.e., those who are in 
Føllesdal’s terms “the voters and sub-unit politicians” are also quite comfortable with 
the notion of dual allegiance. On the one hand, it is their understanding that they are 
primarily responsible for their own local level, yet they appreciate the role and the 
necessity for CWC activity, they expect it to take an active role in curtailing excessive 
cross-site differentiation, expect it to sort things out.  
Allegiance to the local level  
The BetrVG takes as its starting point the autonomy of the local works council; works 
councils are elected locally and they are committed to their local constituency. Within 
the local works councils, a range of different groups are represented, whose interests 
are not always reconcilable.  Several questions in the postal questionnaire aimed at 
precisely this riddle. The local works councillors were asked to whom they feel the 
most obliged, if it comes down to having to decide between different interests or points 
of view. This is admittedly a very difficult question to answer. Five respondents failed 
to answer this question, but the fact that nearly 98% of all respondents did manage to 
answer this question testifies to the strength of the works council members’ awareness 
of their own role.  
The results shown in Figure 24 testify to a firmly rooted understanding that the local 
works council is meant to defend the interests of the local site in its entirety. 58% of 
local works council members put the interests of the entire workforce at the local site 
first; in other words, they see themselves as equally accountable to all employees at the 
site, regardless of whether they are white- or blue-collar, or whether they are union 
members, for example.  Roughly one third of the works councillors saw their ultimate 
responsibility more differentially: for example in defending the interests of the white-
collar or blue-collar employees (15%), or the interests of the members of their union 
(14%). 10% felt that their overriding commitment was due the entire workforce of the 
whole company, and 1% each felt that they were in the works council in order to 
represent the interests of their department or the employees of their divisions (i.e., 
automotive as opposed to commercial vehicles).  
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Figure 24: Allegiance to the local level 
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The CWC members have a similarly rooted understanding of their primary role as 
representatives of their site within the CWC. A full 80% indicated that their primary 
loyalty and responsibility lies with the site which delegated them to the CWC. 17% felt 
themselves above all beholden to the entire workforce of the company, while one CWC 
member felt that his primary responsibility was to the minority of white collar workers 
within the company. At the local level, 14% of the local works council members felt 
that if it came down to it, it was their responsibility to represent the interests of the 
union members.  
Figure 28 compares the responses of the “ordinary” local works council members and 
the CWC members. For 58% of the local works council members, their overall 
responsibility within the works council is due all employees at that site: the works 
council is a collective speaker and actor on behalf of the entire local workforce.  
Similarly, given that CWC members are as a rule Chair or Deputy Chair of the local 
works council, it should come as no surprise that even more (80%) accord their 
primary commitment to the local level.  They have been elected to a leadership position 
within the  local works council, and delegated to represent the interests of the site 
within the CWC within a federal system which aims to unify disparate bits and pieces. 
But it goes beyond this: it is clear that within the minds of the local works council 
members at all levels, it is the local site which matters.   
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At the same time, there is an acute awareness among local works council members that 
the different plants within DaimlerChrysler are highly dependent on one another, 
either through intricate production alliances, parallel production structures, or simply 
through their contribution to the overall economic situation of the company as a whole. 
A large majority (81%) agreed that the situation in their particular site is closely linked 
to the situation in other sites. Despite their regular contacts to other sites, however, 
only 49% indicated that they were well informed about developments at other sites.  
As can be seen in Figure 25 below, the awareness of the interdependent relationship 
between the sites is consistently widespread both among non-CWC members and 
CWC members alike: 83% of CWC members compared with 81% of local works council 
members agreed with the statement that the situation at their site is closely linked to 
the situation at other sites. Not surprisingly, members of the CWC feel that they are 
better informed about the situation at other sites than are the local works council 
members. 76% felt that they were well-informed about the situation at other sites. Here 
too, a glance at the minority opinion is illuminating: even though they receive regular 
information about the situation at other sites in the context of the work on the CWC 
and its commissions, nearly a quarter of the CWC members did not feel well-informed. 
This is another reflection of the ever-present ambiguities of the work of the CWC: the 
members of the CWC are well aware of the fact that that not everybody – including 
themselves – reports everything all the time.   
Figure 25: Interdependent sites 
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Local Works Council members have high expectations of the CWC  
In the postal questionnaire, local works council members were asked to indicate their 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a range of  specific aspects of the CWC’s work. 
These responses not only allow an assessment of the CWC’s ability to meet the 
expectations of its constituents, but it also allows us to identify just what those 
expectations might be.  
The first set of aspects (Figure 26) is related to general aspects of the CWC’s work, 
while the second set (Figure 27) refers to the need to reconcile different interests and 
needs of the very different sites.  
The local works councillors are by and large satisfied with the way in which the CWC 
fulfils its overall responsibilities. If one looks closely at the second set of more 
differentiated, site-specific issues, in particular with respect to the need to weigh and 
reconcile at times conflicting interests, then the opinions of the respondents are more 
divided. Respondents were asked to choose from among a range of assessments, from 
“very satisfied”, “somewhat satisfied”, “somewhat unsatisfied”, to “very unsatisfied”. 
In order to sharpen our view of the positive and negative assessments, the results have 
here been collapsed into two categories “satisfied” and “unsatisfied”.  
Figure 26: Local works council members’ assessment of the overall 
performance of the CWC  
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71% of local works council members were satisfied with the way in which the CWC 
conducted negotiations on their behalf with central management. 58% of the works 
council members valued the CWC as an „early warning system“ about changes across 
the company, but the fact that 42% did not feel that the CWC gave enough prior 
warning suggests that they see a more important role for the CWC in ensuring that the 
local level has more and earlier information about upcoming changes in other parts of 
the company that might affect their site.   
59% of the local works council members surveyed were satisfied with the way in which 
the CWC ensures a solidaristic approach. But only slightly less than 13% were actually 
„very satisfied“ with this. However, out of the 41% who were not satisfied with the 
role played by the CWC in ensuring adherence to the principle of solidarity, less than 
8% were actually “very unsatisfied”.  Overall, 73% were satisfied with the way in 
which the CWC performs its duties in general.  More precisely, just over half of the 
respondents (53%) were “somewhat satisfied” and 17% were “very satisfied“. Only 
three respondents, or 2% of all respondents, were „very unsatisfied“ with the overall 
performance of the CWC.  
Interest aggregation in the CWC  
A range of statements in the postal questionnaire focussed on the necessary weighing 
and aggregation of possibly diverging interests. The response pattern here was fairly 
divided. The majority of respondents were satisfied, but the size of this majority is 
decidedly smaller than in the assessment of the CWC’s work overall discussed above. 
The response behaviour also suggests that that the questions about weighing various 
interests in the CWC were especially difficult to answer. While nearly any other 
questions in the questionnaire which were left unanswered were only declined by one 
to two respondents at most, between six and seven respondents (about 3% of all 
respondents) chose not to answer these questions about interest prioritisation within 
the CWC.  
About 60% of respondents were satisfied with the way in which the CWC takes the 
needs and concerns of the different sites into account. But only 6% were “very 
satisfied”. Only 56% of respondents were happy with the way the CWC actually 
balances the concerns of the different sites against one another; the proportion of those 
who were “very satisfied” was only 5%. Asked whether the CWC successfully balances 
the interests of prosperous sites with struggling sites, 52% were satisfied, and of these, 
7% were “very satisfied”. Only about 52% were satisfied with the success of the CWC 
in balancing the concerns of large and small sites against one another.  
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The postal survey only covered works council members from the plants; next to the 
works councillors in the factory there are nearly as many works council members 
spread across the 41 Sales and Service sites. 53% of the works council members from 
the plants felt that the CWC successfully managed to balance the concerns of the Sales 
and Service establishments against those of the plants. However, the fact that a 
strikingly high number of respondents (23, or nearly 11% of all respondents) left this 
question unanswered suggests that many did not feel themselves to be in a position to 
answer this question in the first place. Furthermore, the fact that 90% of the responses 
concentrated on the weaker answers „somewhat satisfied“ and „somewhat 
unsatisfied“ underscores the apparent unease of respondents in answering questions 
about the Sales and Service establishments. Apparently, an awareness of the situation 
in the sales and services division is not firmly anchored in the CWC. 
Figure 27: Interest aggregation and balance in the CWC: Local works council 
members’ assessment 
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Not a paradox: dual allegiance 
Local works council members and CWC members were asked to define their ultimate 
expectation about the role of the CWC. 69% of the local works council members and 
90% of the CWC members agreed with the statement that „the CWC should take on a 
more active role in distilling common concerns and in cultivating overall responsibility 
for common issues.” A minority of 31% of the local works council members surveyed 
and 10% (or only 3 members) of the CWC felt that its activity should be „exclusively 
limited to such issues which must be uniformly regulated across the company”.   
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Figure 28: Dual allegiance I 
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Both local works council members and CWC members made a point of commenting 
that a decision for one or the other alternative could only be made on a case by case 
basis. That this question was clearly difficult to answer can be seen in the fact that 5% 
of respondents (11 works councillors) declined to answer this sensitive question at all.  
Indeed, because the question was formulated in a rather rigid “either/or” form, the 
question was designed to do no more than sound out the works councillors’ 
fundamental understanding of the ideal role of the CWC.   
It was shown above that the works council members, whether or not they are members 
of the CWC, see their primary responsibility as being towards the workforce of their 
particular site. It has also been seen that the local works council members and the CWC 
members have high expectations of the CWC.  
If we put these two issues (local commitment and high expectations of the CWC) side 
by side, the following picture emerges:  
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Figure 29: Dual allegiance II 
Dual Allegiance among local works council members 
and CWC members 
90%
69%
80%
58%
CWC
members
local works
council
members
if it comes down to it, I
represent the workforce at
my site
I favour an expansive CWC
 
 
What at first glance might seem contradictory actually illustrates the phenomenon of 
“dual allegiance”; it is a pronounced confidence in the „federal“ system of cross-site 
interest representation. On the one hand, the works councillors’ own priority 
commitment lies clearly with their local site or groups within their local site. On the 
other hand, there is a widely held acceptance of an overriding responsibility and 
competence of the CWC in the interests of all sites: the figure above illustrates the high 
degree of acceptance or expectation that “the CWC should play a more active role in 
the development of common concerns and in fostering collective responsibility and 
action.”  The works councillors clearly recognise that their localised authority to make 
decisions requires a certain degree of coordination across sites.  They are willing to 
submit to this coordination: in this sense there is an allegiance, an insight into the 
necessity of central coordination.  Put differently, they count on the interplay between 
at times overlapping or unclear competences in order to ensure that their policies and 
strategies are in the interests of all sites, despite the complexity and uncertainties which 
arise out of this iterative policy-making.  
Enabling solidarity in the Central Works Council at DaimlerChrysler   
It can be concluded that the employee interest representation at DaimlerChrysler rests 
on a solid foundation of shared expectations and roles.  The picture which emerges 
overall is that of a functioning system which balances and, where necessary, reconciles 
diverse interests within the sometimes contested arena of works council activity at all 
levels.  
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By way of conclusion, the following section will discuss the ways in which the central 
works council at DaimlerChrysler fulfils the prerequisites for the generation and 
maintenance of solidarity which were developed in Chapter Three.  
As the description and analysis of the workings of the DaimlerChrysler CWC, and in 
particular of its substructure, demonstrate, wide-ranging opportunities for 
participation are clearly available.  The CWC’s internal debate about its own structures 
was driven by -- and ultimately decided by -- a recognition of the fundamental 
necessity of ensuring the inclusion and representation of all sites in the decision-
making processes of the CWC.  Furthermore, in the words of the CWC members 
themselves, and as confirmed by the survey results, the inclusion of the local works 
council members in the operative work of the CWC  increases the identification of 
individual works council members with the CWC, thereby providing a basis for the 
stabilisation or regeneration of a normative foundation for collective activities. It 
was also demonstrated that the CWC’s ‘substructure’ not only provides open channels 
of information and exchange upwards and downwards, but that it amounts to an 
intricate network of cross-cutting contacts spanning the entire multi-level system. 
Taken together, these discursive and participative elements are the keystone to the 
internal social cohesion (i.e., community solidarity) which was seen to be an essential 
condition for effective action outwards vis-à-vis the employer (i.e. combative 
solidarity) at both the local and central levels.  
It was argued that participative elements must be able to strengthen the capacity of a 
compromise, once reached, to command commitment. The ‘iterative delegation’ 
approach adopted by the CWC, in which the ongoing deliberations in the commissions 
are regularly discussed in the CWC, ensures that the final outcome is likely to find 
approval in the CWC – and by extension in the local works councils. The fact that the 
members of the CWC are themselves in leadership positions at the local level is only 
part of the potential capacity of the CWC to command commitment; after all, their 
leadership position will not automatically suffice to ensure that the local works council 
will comply with the CWC’s approach.  That local works council members are closely 
involved in the work of the CWC and thus share responsibility for its outcomes was 
seen to play a crucial role in ensuring that the local works councils will adhere to 
commitments made as a result of a negotiated solution or compromise.  
Although the wide range and complexity of the issues dealt with in the CWC often 
made it difficult to communicate their full scope, CWC members were well aware of 
the need to ensure the transparency of their decision-making processes. The 
availability of information and opportunities to participate were found to enhance trust 
in the CWC.  The density of interaction among CWC members and local works 
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council members, which was achieved not only through the CWC’s committees but 
also by means of its approach of ‘iterative delegation’,  also supported this culture of 
transparency, legitimacy and interdependence.  
The recognition that power asymmetries must be dealt with responsibly is widely 
shared, and was perhaps most clearly seen in the debate within the CWC about setting 
up a “Preparation and Coordination Committee”.  The representatives of the stronger 
and more influential sites demonstrated their willingness to take a step back, even 
though they would clearly have benefited from alternate arrangements.  The 
overriding priority assigned to the principles of representativeness and inclusion,  and 
the frequency with which key tasks are delegated to others, are further evidence of the 
willingness of more powerful sites to be bound into egalitarian structures and 
processes. 
The acute awareness of the interdependence of sites, and in particular the implicit 
understanding that nearly all local issues have potential implications elsewhere, 
underpins the density of interaction and informs collective decision-making processes 
within the CWC. These ongoing  processes serve to secure implicit and explicit 
agreement about how to deal with conflictual situations if and when they arise, thereby 
offering a preventive solution to the fundamental dilemma of solidarity that the 
greater the divisive pressure from outside to increase competition among those who 
strive to generate solidarity with one another, the more difficult it is to achieve 
solidarity.  
Finally, the consensus among CWC members about the purpose of the CWC, and the 
evidence that these perceptions are shared at the local level as well, suggest that the 
CWC successfully supports the generation of shared values and morals.  The trust in 
these shared values can perhaps most clearly be seen in the CWC members’ marked 
tolerance for ambiguity: CWC members are well aware that they are not privy to 
everything that goes on elsewhere,  but they know that such ‘skeletons in the closet’ 
will not be allowed to become the pivot on which coercive comparisons rest. The moral 
dimension of ‘traditional’ solidarity, the vision and idealism behind their work, are 
clearly shared by the members of the CWC and, perhaps more importantly, by the 
local works council members.  The paradox of ‘dual allegiance’ is explained by these 
shared morals: while each works council is ultimately accountable to his or her local 
workforce, there is a widespread recognition of the need to accept compromises in 
support of other sites. The perception of the role of the CWC is informed by more than 
a pragmatic, even utilitarian recognition that ‘what goes around, comes around’; the 
moral force of the works councillors’ conviction that each representative bears specific 
responsibility within the larger context is compelling. 
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Chapter Six: Implications for EWCs 
Chapter Three explored the ways in which the key tenets of federalist theory and 
democratic theory can be applied to multi-level systems of workplace employee 
participation. Using the institutional framework laid out in the German 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz it was demonstrated that the German system of workplace 
codetermination clearly amounts to a federal political order. At the same time, no 
generalised conclusions about actual practice are possible. The ways in which these 
frameworks are filled out varies widely across German companies according to the 
preferences and priorities of the actors involved. The case study of DaimlerChrysler 
examined a particularly integrative CWC in order better to identify lessons to be 
learned for EWCs  
This chapter compares the rules and practices of German Central Works Councils and 
European Works Councils, drawing upon the key analytical points laid out in Chapter 
Three. The first question discussed is thus the extent to which EWCs can be viewed as 
a simple addition of an additional layer to the multi-level, federalist framework of 
company-based employee representation. The chapter will begin with a constitutional 
comparison of the CWC and EWCs as they are laid out both in the subsidiary 
requirements of the EWCD and in the wide-ranging sets of EWC agreements which 
have been analysed.  
However, as noted in Chapter Three, the application of the federalist constitutional 
language is only a means to an end: it enables us to grasp the ways in which 
centralised institutions of employee interest representation reconcile unity with 
diversity, to identify the specific processes and structures which yield outcomes and 
decision-making processes which are perceived to be binding and legitimate. The 
question is not whether EWCs can be considered federalist per se; it is the extent to 
which features of a federalist system which have been seen to promote binding 
cooperation among sub-units can be assumed to exist within EWCs.  
It will become apparent that because of a number of key questions which are left open 
in law and practice, EWCs only in part fulfil the criteria of a federalist political order. 
This does not mean, however, that EWCs are therefore unable to serve as a forum for 
the generation of solidarity. This chapter will argue that the same approach toward a 
discursive/participative solidarity which was outlined in Chapter Three and illustrated 
in Chapter Five can be adopted in EWCs. Using examples drawn from the experience 
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of several highly integrative EWCs, such as those at General Motors and Ford, it will be 
argued that these open questions can be answered in practice.  
This chapter will provide the basis for the final chapter, which will summarise the 
conclusions of this study and their implications for policy, practice, and further 
research.  
6.1. The European Works Council Directive (EWCD) and negotiated 
EWC agreements: a foundation for a federalist order at 
European company level?  
The European Works Council Directive (EWCD), adopted in 1994, provides for the 
possibility of establishing a European Works Council (EWC) or a procedure for 
informing and consulting the workforce or their representatives in companies 
employing at least 1000 people, of which at least 150 work in at least two of the 
currently 28 countries covered by the Directive.18
Until September 1996, companies and their (national-level) employee representatives 
were free to negotiate so-called Article 13 agreements to cover the entire workforce 
within the European Economic Area. Since September 1996, however, the 
implementing legislation for the EWCD in each Member State requires that an EWC 
agreement be negotiated with an internationally composed “Special Negotiating Body” 
(SNB). The rules detailed in the national implementing legislation of the country in 
which the company has its headquarters19 apply to EWC negotiations held in that 
company. 
Since September 1996, under Article 6 of the EWCD, negotiations to establish an EWC 
can be triggered by a formal request to do so stemming from at least two countries. 
Each country in which the company or group of companies has establishments has the 
right to delegate at least one member to the SNB; further seats are allocated 
proportionally among the countries according to relative workforce size. Should the 
SNB and central management fail to reach agreement within three years of the formal 
request to open negotiations, or should central management fail to respond within six 
months to a valid formal request to open negotiations, then the fallback provisions laid 
                                           
18 The EWCD applies to all Member States of the European Economic Area (EEA), i.e., the EU plus Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, and Norway.  
19 The EWCD also applies to companies or groups of companies headquartered outside the EEA: in this 
case, non-European companies must either nominate a country within the EEA to serve as central 
management for the purposes of the Directive, or if they fail to do so, the legislation of the country in 
which the largest workforce is employed applies. 
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out in the EWCD Directive’s so-called “Subsidiary Requirements” apply, thereby 
establishing an EWC by law.  
The SNB and central management can also agree to apply the subsidiary requirements, 
rather than negotiate a tailor-made agreement. With only four known exceptions20, 
however, all of the at least 760 EWC agreements (ETUI 2002)21 negotiated in the past 
ten years have opted for a negotiated agreement under Articles 6 or 13.  
The incentive effect of the passage of the EWCD is striking. Whereas 49 EWC 
agreements were known to exist when the EWCD was signed in 1994, this figure more 
than doubled to 105 in the course of 1995, and a further 322 agreements were known to 
have been signed prior to the application of the Directive in all Member States in 
September 1996 (ETUI 2002: 15) .  22
In comparing the constitutional character of EWCs and CWCs, two sources are thus 
essential. First, the subsidiary requirements as they are laid out in the Annex to the 
EWCD and as they have been implemented in the EWC legislation in each EEA 
Member State provide valuable clues about the default constitutional character of 
EWCs. Second, the primacy and near universality of the negotiated option has given 
rise to wide differentiation in the provisions governing the composition, operation and 
competence of EWCs. Moreover, practice has evolved beyond the actual rules laid 
down in the agreements; in many cases, issues and rules of constitutional relevance 
have been clarified in the light of actual EWC practice. Nonetheless, by examining the 
national implementation of the subsidiary requirements and by drawing upon the 
numerous studies which have examined both EWC agreements and EWC practice, we 
can reach some conclusions about the constitutional character of EWCs more generally.  
At first glance, the so-called subsidiary requirements detailed in the Annex to the EWC 
Directive (EWCD) lay out an essentially federalist framework for centralised interest 
representation at the European level.  
                                           
20 BSN Glass, Deutsche Bahn, Hauni-Körber, and Moulinex. 
21 Unfortunately, reliable and comprehensive figures about the number of EWCs in existence are not 
available. The 740 EWCs identified by the ETUI are clearly a low estimate, however: while the ETUI counts 
only some 100 EWCs in German companies in all sectors, the IG Metall counts some 96 EWCs in German-
based companies in the metalworking, textile, and woodworking sectors alone. Nonetheless, since the 
ETUI study analyses the largest known sample of EWC agreements, it is an extremely useful resource.  
22 The starkness of these increases might also in part reflect the successes of the ETUI’s concentrated efforts 
to register EWC agreements.  
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However, while the framework, or ground rules, laid out in the German 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz applies to all German companies, there are two important 
sources of variation in EWCs: the first lies in the fact that the Directive and in particular 
its subsidiary requirements have been transposed with slight differences into national 
legislation. The second source of variation lies in the fact, noted above, that virtually all 
EWCs are based on negotiations rather than direct application of the law. This means 
that the actual provisions defining the ‘political order’ of employee representation at 
the European company level vary. In other words, because the EWCD provides for a 
primacy of negotiated agreements, rather than specifying the precise workings 
applicable to all EWCs, each individual EWC is governed by its own rules.  
At the same time, however, studies tracing the development of EWC agreements 
(Carley and Marginson 1998, 2000) have clearly demonstrated that EWC agreements 
have over time converged both towards one another as well as towards the subsidiary 
requirements laid down in the Directive. Furthermore, studies have shown that EWC 
practice has often developed beyond what is detailed in the agreements. 
In this sense, the cross-border institutional arrangements laid out in the EWCD can 
serve as a conceptual blueprint for a federalist system of employee representation at 
the European level. The basic rules about composition, competence, and functioning of 
EWCs satisfy many—but not all— key tenets of federalist theory. As will be seen 
below, they provide the means to at least sketch the outlines of a federalist political 
order at the European level, but the wide variation in individual EWC agreements and 
practice may result in important gaps.  
These gaps have important implications for EWCs’ ability to generate solidarity, and 
will be discussed further in later sections of the chapter. Chief among these open 
questions are the undefined decision-making procedures within EWCs, the rules 
governing the provision of a mandate for the EWC, the potential of EWCs to serve as 
negotiation partners, and the impact of this on national-level IR. 
The following section will more closely examine several key features which shape the 
constitutional character of EWCs: the ways in which representatives are delegated to 
the EWC, its composition, its processes, the rights and competences of EWCs, and legal 
safeguards. Drawing on a comparison of, on the one hand, the provisions of the 
EWCD’s subsidiary requirements as they have been transposed into national 
legislation and the ways in which these questions have been settled in voluntary EWC 
agreements and, on the other hand, the German BetrVG’s provisions governing the 
operation of Central and Group Works Councils, an assessment of the constitutional 
nature of EWCs will be made. The provisions of the EWCD, the national implementing 
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legislation, and their actual operationalisation in EWC agreements combine to yield a 
far less straightforward picture than does the German BetrVG.  
Delegation to the EWC: who is a member?  
It will be recalled from Chapter Three that according to the BetrVG, each local works 
council has the right to nominate two members from among its number to represent 
that site in the Central Works Council. The decision within the delegating works 
councils is made by simple majority.  
As a rule, the members of EWCs are delegated or elected by the local workforces or 
their representatives in the various countries. The method of nomination is left to each 
Member State to regulate in its implementing legislation in accordance with national 
law and custom. It is important to note that these rules are not subject to company-level 
negotiation: the method of delegation to the EWC which are laid down in the national 
implementing legislation apply to all representatives from that particular country who 
are elected to any EWC set up based on the law of any EEA member state (whether 
negotiated or by application of the subsidiary requirements).  
Interestingly, the method of nomination varies; it is, for example, not necessarily 
ensured that the entire national workforce participates in the nomination or election of 
their country representative(s) (Buschak 1998). An overview of the nomination rules in 
the national implementing legislation is provided in Table 7 below.  
A key difference between the BetrVG and the EWCD is that while the BetrVG specifies 
that the local works councils delegate members to the CWC or GWC from among its 
own members, there is no such requirement in the EWCD that the members of the 
EWC be members of local works councils or other forms of employee representation. 
The implementing legislation in each country only requires that the EWC members be 
employees of the company, but leaves it open whether they must also hold office as 
employee representatives. Such a requirement can be – and often is -- specified in the 
individual EWC agreements, however.  
It should be noted that experience has shown that the precise method of nomination or 
election to the EWC is sometimes flouted or ignored in practice—not only by 
management intervention but also on the part of the employee representatives or trade 
unions charged with fulfilling the procedures required by law. At the same time, there 
is no reason to assume that the rules laid out in the German BetrVG are always 
followed to the letter, either. Recent experience with EWCs, however, suggests that 
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these practices are waning, as employee representatives and unions increasingly come 
to recognise the (potential) importance of European-level representation.  
Nevertheless, the possibility that members of the EWC may not be part of employee 
representation systems at the local or national level, let alone that they may not be 
democratically legitimated in some way, represents important limitations to the 
capacity of an EWC to function as a federalist additional layer at the company level. 
Since the notion of federalist ‘collective agency’ rests on an institutional articulation 
between different subunits, it is a precondition that the EWC’s members are also 
involved in interest representation at the local and/or national level if it is to be 
considered a legitimate centralised level of interest representation within a federalist 
system. This does not mean that the EWC cannot play an important role in obtaining 
and disseminating information, but its capacity to act will stop far short of generating 
social cohesion if it has no connection to lower levels of interest representation which is 
seen by all relevant actors to be democratically legitimate.  
Table 7: National EWC Legislation: Method of nomination of domestic 
employee representatives to EWCs 
 National EWC Legislation: Method of nomination of domestic employee 
representatives to any EWC 
Figures indicate sequence of nomination methods where provided for 
Austria Nomination by peak employee representation: Group, central and/or local works 
council(s) (Konzernvertretung, Zentralbetriebsrat, Betriebsrat) and/or works 
committees (Betriebsausschuss) as appropriate. 
1. Works council (comité d’entreprise); 2. Health and safety committee; 3. Trade 
union delegates on the basis of an agreement by the competent Commission 
Paritaire; 4. Workforce election by secret ballot.  
Belgium 
Cyprus 1.Existing employees’ unions; 2: Direct election by the workforce.  
Czech Republic Appointed at a joint meeting of employees’ representatives, votes weighted 
proportionally.  
Denmark 1.Works council; 2. Trade union delegates; 3. Workforce ballot.  
Finland 1. Election procedure based on an agreement; 2. Health and safety delegates  
Trade unions designate from central or local works council (comité d’entreprise, 
comité d’établissement) or union delegation (délégation syndicale): distribution of 
seats in accordance with results of last elections.  
France 
Germany Nomination by peak employee representation: Group, central, and/or local works 
council(s) (Konzernbetriebsrat, Gesamtbetriebsrat, Betriebsrat) or combination 
thereof as appropriate. 
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Greece Trade unions, works councils, or workforce by direct election.  
1. Central or local works council(s) (jointly where appropriate); 2. Workforce ballot. Hungary 
Ireland Secret ballot of whole workforce or by other arrangement as agreed between 
management and employees 
1. Works council (RSU) together with trade union signatories to applicable 
national-level collective agreement; 2. Trade unions and management agree on 
procedure  
Italy 
Latvia Same procedure as trade union representatives at national level. 
Liechtenstein 1. Employee representatives; 2. Direct election by workforce.  
Lithuania 1. Union or workplace employee representatives; 2. Workforce ballot.  
Nomination by délégations centrales or local délégations du personnel. Possibility 
of distinction between white and blue-collar groups of workers.  
Luxembourg 
Malta Workforce ballot.  
Netherlands Nomination by peak employee representation: 1. Group, central, and/or local 
works council as appropriate (groeps ondernemingsraad, centrale 
ondernemingsraad, ondernemingsraad); 2. Secret ballot among workforce.  
Norway 1. Secret ballot by the workforce; 2. On the basis of the rules for electing workers’ 
representatives. 
Poland 1. Appointment by representative trade union, jointly if several unions represented; 
2. Secret ballot on candidates proposed by unions, 50% quorum; 3. If several 
sites: election of EWC members from among delegations from each site, size of 
delegation from each site dependent on relative size of site workforce.  
1. Joint designation by works council (commissao de trabalhadores) and trade 
unions representing at least 5% of the workforce; 2. Nomination of candidates by 
at least 10% of the workforce and election by secret ballot.  
Portugal 
Election by employee representatives, jointly where appropriate.  Slovakia 
Slovenia Elected by workforce in secret ballot. Nomination of candidates by works council, 
representative trade unions, and/or groups of at least 50 workers. 
Comité de empresa or delegados de personal or unions representing majority of 
workforce.  
Spain 
Sweden 1. Representative trade union(s) which have signed collective agreement, jointly 
where appropriate; 2. Nomination by trade union with majority membership.  
United Kingdom 1. Election or appointment by employees’ representatives; 2. Where not all 
employees covered by an existing agreement, direct workforce ballot supervised 
by external election supervision agency.  
Sources: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden: Buschak 1998; Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia: 
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Pichot 2003; Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Malta and UK: own research. Iceland and Estonia: no EWC legislation in 
English, French, or German available at the time of writing.  
Composition of the EWC: distribution of seats  
Under the BetrVG, each local works council, regardless of the size of the local 
workforce, has the right to delegate two of its members to represent the site at the 
Central Works Council. Different workforce sizes are reflected in different voting 
strengths of site representatives.  
Under the provisions of the subsidiary requirements laid out in the EWCD, each 
country in which the company has employees is entitled to at least one seat on the 
EWC. Further seats are to be distributed according to the relative strength of each 
national workforce. All the national implementing legislation has adopted comparable 
rules for EWCs established by act of law rather than negotiation: each EEA country in 
which the company has employees has the right to elect or nominate at least one 
member; there is some variation, however, in the precise key to be applied in the 
allocation of additional seats according to the relative size of the national workforces 
(Buschak 1998; Pichot 2003). 
However, while EWC agreements concluded under Articles 6 and 13 must in principle 
cover the entire workforce (i.e., in all Member States) this has often not been taken to 
mean that each country must be directly represented on the EWC.  
Carley and Marginson (2000: 23) found that just under half of Article 13 (43%) and 
Article 6 (45%) agreements define minimum workforce size as a threshold for a 
country to be directly represented on the EWC. Carley and Marginson (2000:23) also 
note that the thresholds applied tend to be lower in Article 6 than in Article 13 
agreements: in their analysis, two thirds of the former set the threshold at 50 
employees or less, as compared with only a quarter of the latter. According to Carley 
and Marginson, this has resulted in Article 6 agreements providing for a wider and 
flatter scope of representation which is more driven by geographical considerations 
than relative workforce size.  
In practice, the question of thresholds has proven a key stake in the employee 
representatives’ negotiation strategy. Because of the costs of interpretation and 
translation, employers are keen to limit the number of countries directly represented 
on the EWC. As a rule, employee representatives and trade unions only agreed to 
implement thresholds in return for an improvement in other provisions, such as a 
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second regular annual meeting, or the inclusion of countries not covered by the 
Directive, such as Switzerland, the accession countries (before 2004), or even Morocco 
and Turkey. Furthermore, the fact that all EEA countries had the right to participate in 
SNB negotiations under Article 6 also led to a wider scope of representation in those 
EWCs set up after the Directive took effect in national law in 1996. Many EWCs have 
also arranged for written information, such as the minutes of EWC meetings, to be sent 
to sites or countries not directly represented. The aim of such written information 
processes is first to ensure that all employees and their representatives know about the 
existence of the EWC, and second to keep them informed about its work. New 
technologies such as intranet platforms have also been used to communicate the work 
of the EWC to the broader workforce.  
Finally, it should be noted that geographical coverage and workforce size are not the 
only criteria that have been applied to the allocation of seats. Carley and Marginson 
(2003: 25) identified a number of other factors. 15% of the Article 6 agreements they 
analysed provided for divisional or sectoral criteria, thus ensuring that a company’s 
sectoral diversity is reflected on the EWC. 6% of Article 13 agreements differentiate 
between production sites and sales outlets, for example by guaranteeing production 
sites a direct representation in the EWC regardless of workforce size. 7% distinguish 
between white and blue-collar workers, and 6% refer to the gender balance on the 
EWC. Finally, the need to accommodate trade union pluralism, particularly in France, 
but also in Italy, Portugal and Spain, often led to the provision of several seats to 
represent the different unions in these countries in EWCs, rather than as a reflection of 
relative workforce strength (Gohde 2004: 21). Although such alternate considerations 
besides workforce size or geographic coverage are found in a minority of agreements, 
they nonetheless illustrate the significant leeway allowed in defining the composition 
of EWCs. Experience suggests, furthermore, that as more and more early EWC 
agreements come to be renegotiated, employee representatives and management are 
moving away from sheer numbers-based seat allocation in favour of other criteria, such 
as divisions or production sites, in order to take the company’s structure better into 
account.  
In sum, the rules governing the actual composition of EWCs allow for far more 
variation than do those defining the composition of Central and Group Works 
Councils under the BetrVG. In particular, it is rather common that in particularly wide-
ranging companies, countries with smaller workforces are denied direct representation 
on the EWC, whereas local works councils are automatically given the right to be 
represented on the CWC and/or GWC.  
 200
EWC meetings and the political and administrative infrastructure of the 
EWC 
Chapter Three and the case study of DaimlerChrysler underscored the vital role which 
the institutional substructure of the central works council plays in enabling the CWC to 
fulfil its integrative and coordinating role. These committees and the ongoing multi-
directional flow of information anchors the discursive and participative processes 
within the CWC which ultimately support the generation and maintenance of 
solidarity and cooperation.  
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Figure 30: A multi-level system of works councils according to the EWC Directive 
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These findings echo Watts’ observation that federations as a rule have defined “specific 
processes and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental administrative and political 
interaction” (Watts 1991:229). Next to the EWC itself as the “central institution [which 
is] designed to ensure that the interests of regional minorities and groups are 
accommodated in the process of central policy-making” (Watts 1991: 229), there are 
two key processes which serve to underpin the integrative work of the EWC. The first 
is the guaranteed right to meet independently (i.e., in the absence of management), and 
the second is the establishment of an executive committee to run the affairs of the EWC 
between meetings, as well as the possibility of setting up further working groups to 
address certain issues.  
That all three of these processes and institutions are relatively under-developed, 
particularly as compared with both the provisions of the BetrVG and with the 
experience of the CWC at DaimlerChrysler, has important implications for the capacity 
of EWCs to generate a normative basis for collective action and solidarity.  
Meetings of the EWC 
As outlined in Chapter Three, works councils at all levels within the German system of 
workplace codetermination meet as necessary. The actual frequency of works council 
meetings at any level has never been systematically investigated. However, the lack of 
contestation of this right before the German labour courts suggests that this open-
ended definition has not proven problematic in practice. Indeed, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that practice varies greatly across German companies, depending on works 
council members’ own perceived need to meet in fulfilment of their duties.  
The situation within EWCs is at first glance quite different: according to the subsidiary 
requirements, the EWC has the right to meet once per year. According to research 
conducted by Carley and Marginson, 86% of Article 13 agreements and 83% of Article 
6 agreements provide for a single annual meeting (2000: 29). Nevertheless, some EWCs 
meet more frequently than their agreements prescribe: anecdotal evidence suggests a 
great deal of variation and even fairly extreme cases: for example, the select committee 
of the EWC at Corus meets monthly with central management.  
However, in addition to these regular meetings, both the EWC Directive and nearly all 
EWC agreements provide for an extraordinary meeting in the case of circumstances 
such as transfers of production, cutbacks or closures. It was not until the Directive was 
adopted, however, that its provision for extraordinary meetings became the norm in 
both Article 13 and Article 13 agreements (Carley and Marginson 2000: 19). In many 
 203
cases, however, attendance is limited to the members of the select committee (if one has 
been established) and further representatives of sites affected if they are not already 
represented on the select committee.  
It is instructive to look more closely at the frequency of extraordinary meetings, since 
the ability to convene them under specific circumstances which are linked to the 
specific competence of the EWC (see below) comes close to the German practice of 
convening works council meetings as necessary. However, several factors combine to 
make it difficult for EWCs to make use of this right in practice. First, the transnational 
impact of restructuring measures is not always immediately apparent given 
asymmetrical information at the local and national level; second, the need to convene 
an extraordinary EWC meeting will often be at short notice, since by the time the 
transnational impact of a measure becomes apparent, it may already be in its 
implementation stage; third, insisting on the right to convene a (costly) extraordinary 
meeting, in particular if the restructuring measures put workforces in competition with 
one another and thus on the defensive, requires strong coordination or at least 
trustworthy contact across borders; and finally, if the EWC has not played a role in 
cross-national restructuring processes before, it may not be among the catalogue of 
instruments that local and national employee representatives perceive at their disposal.  
However, a survey conducted in spring 2005 of EWCs in metalworking, textile and 
woodworking companies headquartered in Germany suggests that these impediments 
may not be so difficult to overcome (Politycki and Schneider 2005). Of 70 EWCs which 
had been confronted by transnational restructuring in the past two years, 30 EWCs 
and/or their select committees had held an extraordinary meeting with European 
central management. Of those who had not convened such meeting, seven had not 
done so because there was a regular EWC meeting already scheduled in the near 
future. This means that 37 out of 70 EWCs, or 53% of those surveyed, successfully 
made use of their right to convene extraordinary meetings. And in some companies, 
several extraordinary meetings were held. At Bosch for example, seven extraordinary 
meetings were held to deal with problems in specific divisions over the two past years 
alone.  
Taken together, then, the regular meetings, together with extraordinary meetings 
called according to specific circumstances, yield a varied resource for the ability of the 
EWC as a central institution to develop the integrative capacity typical of a federal 
political order.  
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The right to meet independently  
An important right which shapes the ability of an EWC to play a role in coordinating 
and aggregating the interests of the entire European workforce is its right to meet 
independently of management. This right is not only guaranteed in the subsidiary 
requirements, but is also explicitly provided for in nearly all EWC agreements, 
regardless of whether these are so-called mixed bodies (as in the French model) or 
employer-only bodies (as in the German model). As Carley and Marginson (2000) 
found, this right was already fairly common in early Article 13 agreements (65%), and 
became even more common (87%) in Article 13 agreements signed after the Directive 
was passed; according to Carley and Marginson (2000), the right to meet 
independently of management can now be considered universal, as it is to be found in 
all Article 6 agreements they examined.  
However, the subsidiary requirements and many EWC agreements only specify an 
independent meeting among employee representatives prior to the meeting with 
central management. There is no explicit provision that the employee representatives 
have the right to meet following their meeting with management — even though the 
EWCD makes reference to their right to deliver an opinion following extraordinary 
meetings (see below). As Carley and Marginson (2000: 31-32) found, only 22% of 
Article 13 agreements and 51% of Article 6 agreements specify both a preparatory 
meeting and a follow-up meeting. Nevertheless there is evidence that an employee 
meeting both before and after the meeting with management is common practice, 
whether or not it is explicitly provided for in the agreement.  
The real difficulty in practice, however, is the insufficient time frequently allocated for 
such de-briefing meetings. The costs of interpretation and accommodation mean that 
companies often pressure their EWC to hold their internal meeting following their 
meeting with central management in time for the participants to travel home on the 
same day. But unless the employee representatives take the time to jointly assess what 
they have heard, they will not gain the full picture or an appreciation of the specific 
situations at other sites in other countries. As the case study of DaimlerChrysler made 
clear, it is important that all members have a basic understanding of the situation and 
points of view at other sites if they are to be in a position to appreciate the overall 
dynamics of their interdependence.  
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Select committees and working groups  
As outlined in Chapter Three, the BetrVG provides for an executive committee of the 
central works council to run its day-to-day affairs and to serve as first point of contact 
between management and the CWC. As seen in the case study of DaimlerChrysler, 
such institutions play a crucial internal role in coordinating common positions and 
ensuring the flow of information, even to the extent that efficiency was sacrificed for 
transparency and broad participation.  
The EWCD’s subsidiary requirements provide for the establishment of a so-called 
‘select committee’, consisting of at most three members, “where [the size of the EWC] 
so warrants”. At least half of the Member States have not specified a threshold, while 
the remaining Member States have specified size thresholds of between nine and 13 
EWC members. The vast majority of EWC agreements in fact provide for a “select 
committee” to run the day-to-day business. (Carley and Marginson 2000). Its tasks 
include setting the agenda, preparing and organising EWC meetings, liasing with EWC 
members, and drawing up minutes or a communiqué. In many cases, and as provided 
for in the EWCD, they are responsible for information and consultation processes in 
extraordinary circumstances, and otherwise receiving and disseminating information 
both from among the EWC members as well as from management. In some EWCs, 
issue-specific working groups have been set up, for example dealing with health and 
safety at Coca Cola Enterprises and Arcelor, equal opportunities at Ericsson, bringing 
together the representatives of the manufacturing sites at General Motors, or bringing 
together representatives from the sales and service sites across Europe at 
DaimlerChrysler.  
In their analysis of Article 13 and Article 6 agreements, Carley and Marginson (2000: 
35) found that more than eight out of ten (83%) Article 6 agreements establish some 
form of executive committee or bureau.23 Experience in metal sector at least has shown, 
however, that many EWCs set up earlier (and which were less likely to have provided 
for an executive committees) have since established one, either on the basis of a later 
informal or formal agreement with the employer or as part of their own internal rules 
of procedure.  
Interestingly, eight Member States have gone beyond the EWCD in their subsidiary 
requirements by specifying that the members of the EWC’s select committee must 
                                           
23 This represents a significant increase compared to earlier Article 13 agreements, and, as Carley and 
Marginson point out, the spread of executive committees clearly reflects the influence of the EWCD: only 
35% of the Article 13 agreements signed before the Directive came into force and only 65% of the Article 13 
agreements signed between 1994 and 1996 provide for select committees (Carley and Marginson 2000). 
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come from different countries, the Belgian implementing collective agreement 
explicitly leaves the issue to be settled in the EWCs’ own rules of procedure, and 
Luxembourg legislation more generally requires that the members of the select 
committee established by law must represent different companies (though the implicit 
intention may amount to a requirement of multi-national representation).  
Presumably these requirements were laid down with the intention of ensuring a more 
representative select committee. Since none of the large-scale formal analyses of EWC 
agreements (Carley and Marginson 1998, 2000; ETUI 2002) addressed this question, it is 
not possible to determine the prevalence of multi-national select committees. 
Experience and (admittedly unsystematic) evidence suggest, however, that while the 
‘home country’ workforce may occupy more than one seat on the select committee in 
some cases, multi-national select committees are the norm.  
It is striking that among the eight Member States which explicitly require a multi-
national select committee, six are new EU Member States. This suggests that the most 
recently drafted EWC legislation has taken both actual practice and a distinctly 
‘European’ understanding of the EWC as an institution into account (see Table 8 
below). 
The requirement that the select committee of an international group be internationally 
composed is in line with the role which this group can play in ensuring a more dense 
interaction among at least some of its members: as one of the key institutions in 
facilitating cross-border cooperation and participation within the EWC, in particular 
since there are relatively few opportunities to participate at all at this level, it is 
particularly important in this context that the select committee enable a regular 
exchange of views among representatives of different countries.  
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Table 8: Explicit provisions in EWC legislation that members of the EWC 
select committee must come from different countries.  
EWC Legislation 
(Subsidiary Requirements) 
Explicit provision that members of the select must come 
from different countries* 
EWC Directive  No explicit requirement 
and Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy Malta, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom 
Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, 
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia  
Explicitly required 
Luxembourg Select committee members may not be employed in same 
establishment or undertaking 
Belgium Issue left explicitly to EWC’s own rules of procedure  
* Sources: Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia: Pichot 2003; remainder: own research. No 
information available for Estonia, Iceland, or Lithuania. 
The rights and competences of European Works Councils 
The principle of subsidiarity has long been one of the hallmarks of EU policy (Bermann 
1994). In terms of social policy, this means that European regulation can support or 
complement existing rights, but can in no way replace them. This principle is clearly 
stated in Article 12 (2) of the EWCD: “This Directive shall be without prejudice to 
employees’ existing rights to information and consultation under national law”. Some 
EWC agreements have taken up this formulation more or less verbatim (Gohde 2004).  
Like the BetrVG, the EWCD defines the competence of the EWC in territorial terms. 
Unlike the BetrVG, however, the EWCD also contains a non-exhaustive list of issues on 
which the central body is to be informed and consulted.  
According to Paragraph 1 (a) of the subsidiary requirements,  
The competence of the EWC shall be limited to information and consultation on 
the matters which concern the Community-scale undertaking or Community-
scale group of undertakings as a whole or at least two of its establishments or 
group undertakings situated in different Member States.  
Carley and Marginson (2000: 17) found that virtually all Article 13 and Article 6 
agreements in their sample explicitly stated that the purpose of the EWC is for 
transnational information and consultation. Gohde (2004: 38) found that all of the 
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agreements he analysed contain an explicit ‘transnationality’ principle comparable to 
that laid out in the Annex to the EWCD.  
Interestingly, while this provision in the EWCD, the national implementing legislation, 
and most if not all Article 6 and Article 13 agreements bears close resemblance to the 
BetrVG’s definition of the competence of CWCs and GWCs (see Chapter Three), the 
EWCD refrains from specifying further that the EWC is only competent to deal with 
issues which cannot be dealt with at the national level(s). This suggests an awareness 
on the part of the EC lawmakers that certain issues may at the same time be dealt with 
at the national and European levels.  
The issue of sequencing of national-level and European-level information and 
consultation has attracted the attention of scholars, practitioners, policy makers and 
judges: what lies behind this attention is the concern that European-level information 
and consultation might undermine the right to information and consultation at the 
national and/or local level. As will be outlined further below, both in practice as well as 
in jurisprudence, this issue has proven less problematic than was perhaps initially 
expected: information and consultation at national and European levels have been seen 
as complementary rather than competing rights.  
Carley and Marginson (2000) point out that many Article 13 and Article 6 EWC 
agreements have taken the EWCD’s provision one step further by explicitly excluding 
consideration of issues whose impact is confined to a single country and which are 
thus already dealt with by information and consultation arrangements at national and 
local levels. Interestingly, while such more explicit ‘subsidiarity clauses’ could be 
found in nine out of ten Article 13 agreements, they were only found in two out of 
three Article 6 agreements (Carley and Marginson 2000:19). Gohde’s (2004) findings 
underscore this trend: all the agreements he analysed more or less explicitly exclude 
issues which only affect one country. Despite this specific exclusion of national-level 
issues (which goes beyond the ‘subsidiarity’ provisions of the EWCD), however, none 
of the 103 agreements analysed by Gohde (2004) took this logic a step further by 
attempting to define an explicit hierarchy of information and consultation procedures 
at the different levels.  
As is made clear in the preamble to the EWCD, the ‘transnational criterion’ of the 
EWCs competence is the very intention of the cross-border multi-level system 
established with the EWCD. If an issue only affects one country, then it is not a matter 
to be brought before the EWC. If a measure has an impact on more than one country, 
then it is dealt with at both the affected national/local level(s) and the European level. 
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Furthermore, whatever the EWC does, it may not affect the rights and prerogatives of 
employee representatives granted them by national law or custom.  
It must be borne in mind, however, that the enforcement of the ‘transnational criterion’ 
is in practice one of the most thorny issues facing EWCs. While a plant may be closed 
in only one country, it is quite likely that this closure might have important domino 
effects in other countries, for example if production is increased abroad as a result, or if 
production at an internal supplier located in another country is cut back as a result. 
Furthermore, national employee representatives, particularly if they come from a 
country other than the ‘home base’ of the company, often use the access provided to 
top-level European management via EWCs to air grievances which are, strictly 
defined, local problems. Since the issue of whether or not an issue has cross-border 
implications is often problematic in practice, a handful of agreements also contain 
procedural provisions designed to place this assessment jointly in the hands of 
employee and management representatives (Gohde 2004: 39).  
Next to these territorial and (rare) procedural definitions of the EWC’s competence, 
Article 2 of the subsidiary requirements contains a non-exhaustive list of issues for 
consideration by the EWC at its regular meetings:  
The European Works Council shall have the right to meet with the central 
management once a year, to be informed and consulted, on the basis of a report 
drawn up by the central management, on the progress of the business of the 
Community-scale undertaking or Community-scale group of undertakings and 
its prospects. The local managements shall be informed accordingly.  
The meeting shall relate in particular to the structure, economic and financial 
situation, the probable development of the business and of production and sales, 
the situation and probable trend of employment, investments, and substantial 
changes concerning organisation, introduction of new working methods of 
production processes, transfers of production, mergers, cut-backs or closures of 
undertakings, establishments or important parts thereof, and collective 
redundancies.  
In their comparison of Article 13 and Article 6 agreements, Carley and Marginson 
(2000: 18) found that virtually all agreements contain a non-exhaustive list of issues on 
which the EWC is to be informed and consulted. Only a minority of EWC agreements 
expressly exclude negotiations.  
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Table 9: Issues for Information and Consultation in Article 13 and Article 6 
Agreements 
Issue for information and 
consultation in EWC 
Included in 
EWCD 
Article 6 
agreements, 
Post-Directive 
Article 13 
agreements, 
Pre-Directive 
Article 13 
agreements, Subsidiary 
requirements 
Article 2? 
in % 
in % in % 
Economic and financial information Yes 89 91 91 
Employment and social issues Yes 86 87 89 
Business, production, and sales Yes 82 80 46 
Structure Yes 82 61 46 
Transfers of production, mergers, 
cutbacks and closures, collective 
redundancies 
Yes 76 54 39 
Investment Yes 75 70 39 
New working methods Yes 68 63 50 
Organisation Yes 68 61 35 
Environment No 41 26 15 
Health and Safety No 39 33 35 
Training No 31 27 31 
Equal Opportunities No 20 5 8 
Source: Carley and Marginson (2000: 19) 
 
As can be seen in Table 9, the issues listed in Article 6 and Article 13 agreements 
closely mirror those mentioned in the EWCD; indeed, Carley and Marginson (2000) 
found that the later an agreement was signed, the more closely it tended to mirror the 
issues specifically listed in the Directive. Later agreements are also more likely to 
include issues such as training, environmental issues or equal opportunities.  
Carley and Marginson also note that the potentially contentious issue of transfers of 
production, mergers, cutbacks and closures is included in 75% of Article 6 agreements 
but in only 52% of Article 13 agreements. However, it is instructive to look at the 
conditions under which an extraordinary meeting can be called. Here, the EWCs 
competence to deal with issues such issues such as transfers of production, closures 
and cutbacks is clearly defined.  
According to Article 3 of the subsidiary requirements,  
Where there are exceptional circumstances affecting the employees interests to a 
considerable extent, particularly in the event of relocations, the closure of 
establishments or undertakings or collective redundancies, the select committee, 
or, where no such committee exists, the European Works Council shall have the 
right to be informed. It shall have the right to meet, at its request, the central 
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management, or any other more appropriate level of management within the 
Community-scale undertaking or group of undertakings having its own powers 
of decision, so as to be informed and consulted on measures significantly 
affecting employees’ interests.  
Unfortunately, neither the comparison of Article 13 and Article 6 agreements 
conducted by Carley and Marginson (2000) nor the analysis of Article 13 agreements 
conducted by Marginson et al. (1998) cites the incidence of a clear definition of 
‘extraordinary circumstances’ which would trigger an extraordinary meeting. Based on 
the analyses of other key provisions in EWC agreements, however, it can most likely be 
assumed that the definition of extraordinary circumstances also closely mirrors the 
Directive’s specification that closures, transfers of production, mergers and cutbacks 
which affect more than one country justify an extraordinary meeting.  
As the results of the survey conducted by IG Metall (Politycki and Schneider 2005) 
demonstrate, just under half of those EWCs confronted by transnational restructuring 
had made use of their right to hold an extraordinary meeting with management in 
order to address restructuring measures which affect more than one country. Among 
the reasons given for not having convened an extraordinary meeting was the opinion 
that since the EWC only had information rights, it had no influence. Other 
respondents, however, chose to take up contact directly with the employee 
representatives from other affected sites abroad.  
European and national courts as umpires 
Watts points out that federal systems do not operate in a legal vacuum; there is 
normally “an umpire, usually a supreme court, to rule upon disputes over the 
respective constitutional powers of the two orders of government” (Watts 1991: 229). 
As outlined in Chapter Three, in the case of the BetrVG, this umpire function is served 
by the German local and national labour courts.  
The European Court of Justice can only be called upon to judge the legality of the 
interpretation and implementation of EC legal acts, not individual cases. With respect 
to EWCs, the national labour or civil court systems of the country whose implementing 
legislation was applied in the establishment of the EWC are responsible for 
adjudicating in cases of conflict regarding EWC legislation and EWC agreements. For 
multinationals headquartered in one of the currently 28 countries in which the EWCD 
applies, it is the national legislation of the home country which applies. Because the 
procedure for nominating or electing EWC members is exclusively regulated in 
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national law, it is the national courts which are responsible for dealing with cases 
involving the election or nomination of EWC members to any EWC, whether the 
company is based in that country or not.  
EWC jurisprudence within the EEA Member states is still fairly underdeveloped. As a 
recent analysis by the EMF (2005) found, only around 20 cases involving EWCs have 
been taken to court. Of these, only a handful have been concerned with enforcing 
EWCs’ rights vis-à-vis management.24 All cases brought to court in Germany revolve 
around the employees’ rights to obtain the information needed to establish an SNB. 
There have been a number of further cases, not included in the EMF analysis, about 
enforcement of the rules for nomination or election of EWC members in different 
countries.  
However, four cases brought before the French courts have focussed on the 
relationship between EWCs and national-level employee representation. At issue was 
the question of sequencing: whether an EWC had the right to be informed prior to or 
after information and consultation at the national level. These cases – Renault (1997), 
Marks & Spencer (2001), Alstom (2001) and Altadis-Seita (2003) – were all based on 
claims by French employee representatives that national-level consultations about 
restructuring measures could not take place until the EWC had been informed and 
consulted, since the results of the EWC meetings would have a direct effect on their 
strategy and position at the national level. Pointing out that neither European nor 
French law contains any regulation about the sequence of information between the 
national and European levels, the judges ruled that each case had to be judged on its 
own merits. The rulings successively established the principle of ‘useful effect’ (effet 
utile), which means that the judges had to assess whether the activities of the EWC 
would have an effect on national-level information and consultation. In each case, the 
judges ruled that the EWC had to be consulted prior to the closure of national-level 
information and consultation procedures (Correa 2005). 
Article 11(2) of the EWCD specifies that “Member States shall provide for appropriate 
measures in the event of failure to comply with this Directive; in particular, they shall 
ensure that adequate administrative or judicial procedures are available to enable the 
obligations deriving from this Directive to be enforced”. In her analysis of EWC legal 
status and proceedings in the Member States, Büggel (2002) has found that while in 
                                           
24 The most well-known EWC court case is indisputably the Renault case. In 1997, a French court ruled that 
company had breached its obligations under its EWC agreement in having announced the closure of its 
plant in Vilvoorde, Belgium without having first informed and consulted the EWC. The court ordered the 
company to suspend implementation of the closure until it had done so (EWCB 1997).  
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most countries, EWCs have a legal personality as a body and hence the capacity to sue, 
in a few countries, notably Belgium or Finland, it is only EWC members and/or trade 
unions which have that right. Although this key question has not yet been tested in 
every country, it seems reasonable to assume that EWCs and/or their members have 
the legal means to enforce their agreement—at least vis-à-vis management.  
But what about disputes between levels of employee representation? As noted in 
Chapter Three, the vast majority of court cases involving CWCs revolve around 
disputes between local and central levels about who has regulatory authority for a 
certain issue (Däubler et al. 2002). In this sense, the French court cases about 
sequencing information are about a related issue: however, the cases were not about 
which level should be competent to deal with an issue at the expense of another; they 
were about ensuring that both levels were adequately informed and consulted.  
Insofar as the EWC legislation and agreements regulate actions such as participation in 
EWC meetings or access to information, individuals affected would be able to enforce 
their rights, if need be against the EWC and/or its individual members. But until there 
is a clearer picture of an EWC’s ability to act on behalf of its constituent parts, there 
remain some question marks about the existence of an umpire to decide on federalist 
aspects of divided and shared competence.  
6.2. Decision-making in EWCs: an open question 
Probably the most critical open issue of relevance here – and one not hitherto 
addressed in empirical research – is the fundamental question of how EWCs make 
decisions. Leaving aside for the moment the controversial question of whether and 
how EWCs can negotiate agreements at European company level (which clearly 
requires decision-making and a mandate), the ways in which EWCs make decisions is 
also relevant to at least three less contested areas of EWC activity: first, the election of 
the select committee; second, the elaboration of internal rules of procedure; and third, 
the right of the EWC to deliver an opinion in the context of consultation.  
Quite surprisingly, the subsidiary requirements laid out in the EWCD do not specify 
the arrangements whereby an EWC enacted by law is to take decisions. Instead, it 
merely states in paragraph 1 (c) that the EWC “shall adopt its own rules of procedure”, 
presumably leaving the question of voting to those rules of procedure. In the light of 
the detailed rules regarding decision-making in the SNB, the omission of any similar 
rules with regard to the EWC is striking.  
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Apparently, however, this provision was too open-ended for many legislators at 
national level. At least ten Member States have specifically laid down that an EWC 
established in application of the subsidiary requirements shall take its decisions by 
majority vote (see Table 10, below). Among those countries whose EWC legislation 
only specifies that the EWC shall adopt its own rules of procedure (without specifying 
how), only Slovakian and Austrian legislation has specified that this (a priori) decision 
is to be taken by majority vote. Austrian legislation, however, goes a small step further: 
while it does not prescribe majority vote for all EWC decisions, it does require that the 
EWC members decide by majority vote what authority the EWC Chairperson and the 
select committee shall enjoy.  
Table 10: Decision-making within EWCs established according to the 
subsidiary requirements 
EWC Legislation Decision-making in EWCs established according to 
the subsidiary requirements  
EWC Directive   
and France, Denmarka, Ireland, Italy, 
Cyprus, Portugal, Belgium, Malta, 
Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
The EWC shall adopt its own rules of procedure 
Austria  The EWC shall adopt rules of procedure by majority 
vote of its members. The rules of procedure may in 
particular lay down rules concerning:  
(particulars explicitly left to rules of 
procedure) 
1. The establishment, composition and management of 
the select committee […]; 
2. matters with regard to which the right to adopt 
resolutions independently is conferred upon the select 
committee;  
3. the nature and scope of the representative authority 
of the chairman of the select committee.  
[194 (3) 1-3] 
 
Spain, Greece, Hungary, Latvia The EWC shall adopt its agreements by a [simple or 
absolute] majority of its members.  
Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourgb, Slovenia 
The EWC shall adopt decisions by majority of votes of 
members present  
 
Finland, Norway No mention of rules of procedure or majorities 
a Denmark: rules of procedure to be adopted by select committee, not full EWC. 
b Luxembourg: members present or represented by duly authorised proxies. 
* No information available for Estonia, Iceland or Lithuania. 
 
It might be argued that since the EWC is meant for the purposes of information and 
consultation, there is no need to define decision-making procedures. With respect to its 
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right to be informed about transnational issues, this may be true; furthermore, Article 
2(f) of the EWCD defines ‘consultation’ only as “the exchange of views and 
establishment of a dialogue between employees’ representatives and central 
management”. At the extreme, this consultation might only refer to an exchange of 
views between individual EWC members and central management.  
However, Article 3 of the Annex to the EWCD prescribes that a meeting called in 
extraordinary circumstances be based on a report, on which “an opinion may be 
delivered at the end of the meeting or within a reasonable time”. Interestingly, as many 
as nine countries have not specifically stated in their implementing legislation that the 
employee representatives have the right to submit an opinion or position in person or 
in writing to central management either at the end of the extraordinary meeting or 
within a reasonable or specified period following the extraordinary meeting25. The 
remaining Member States’ EWC legislation26 does specify that the EWC has the right to 
submit an opinion. Seen in the overall context of the EWC Directive, the provision for 
an opinion to be delivered by the EWC arguably implies group decision-making 
towards a single joint position. Alternatively, such a joint position may be implicitly 
based on a consensus, or if there is no consensus, then conceivably a majority and 
minority opinion could be submitted, for example.  
Whether or not the ‘opinion’ of the employee representatives is a joint opinion or a set 
of separate opinions, the fact that all national EWC legislation specifically provides for 
the election of an (employee-side27) chairperson and elections to the select committee 
obviously implies that the EWC is meant to take at least some decisions as a group. 
That such decisions should be made unanimously seems unreasonable. Indeed, in the 
light of the explicit majorities specified for the SNB, and given that those Member 
States which obviously saw the need to regulate decision-making within EWCs all 
specified majority voting, it is more likely that decisions are not intended to be taken 
unanimously. Because this question of decision-making in an EWC is a fundamental 
aspect of its constitutional and political identity and the perceived legitimacy of its 
decisions, it is worthwhile to explore this question in more detail.  
                                           
25 The nine countries which have not made specific reference to the employee representatives’ right to 
respond are: Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia.  
26 The EWC legislation for Estonia, Lithuania, and Iceland is not included in this analysis.  
27 In all national legislation which provides for a default EWC which is made of both management and 
employee representatives (the so-called French or ‘mixed’ model), the employee representatives elect a 
Secretary who act as the employee-side chairperson. 
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As described above, according the German BetrVG, local works councils delegate two 
members each to the Central Works Council, regardless of the size of the local 
workforce. Decisions within the CWC are reached by means of a system of weighted 
majority voting, whereby each CWC member casts as many votes as he or she 
represents at the local site.  
In the case of EWCs, the EWCD and all the national implementing legislation specify 
an allocation of seats based on the principle of universal representation (one country, at 
least one seat), augmented by additional representatives in line with the relative size of 
the national workforces. In other words, the number of representatives from each 
country is broadly based on the relative size of its national workforce. Assuming a 
system of ‘one member, one vote’, does this allocation of seats amount to a comparable 
system of weighted majority voting within the EWC?  
What little evidence there is on this issue resoundingly refutes this idea. As Carley and 
Marginson (2000) have demonstrated, the allocation of seats according to relative 
workforce size does not translate into representative seat allocations in the EWC: on 
the contrary, the seat allocation keys are so blunt that the wider the range of countries 
involved in the EWC, the greater the chance that a significant distortion in favour of 
smaller workforces is the result. Of the 15 agreements in their sample which included 
relevant information about workforce sizes and the allocation of seats on the EWC, 
Carley and Marginson found that in 13 cases, representatives of a minority of the 
workforce could make up a majority on the EWC. Furthermore, Carley and Marginson 
found that of nine cases in which a single national workforce (as a rule, the home 
country workforce) clearly represented over half of the company’s total workforce 
across Europe, this was reflected in a majority of home-country seats on the EWC in 
only two cases. In the remaining seven cases, the majority national workforce holds 
only a minority of seats on the EWC; and in two extreme cases, they only hold a 
quarter of the seats on the EWC. Indeed, Carley and Marginson point out that their 
findings raise “questions about the nature of democracy in EWCs, and the balance 
between giving all countries a say and a concern that the majority of a multinational’s 
workforce can be overwhelmingly outvoted in some cases” (2000: 24-25). 
However, these analyses implicitly assume a system of one member, one vote, without, 
however confirming whether the EWC agreements actually provide for such a 
decision-making mechanism. In fact, a surprisingly high number of EWC agreements 
seem to remain silent on the question of how precisely an EWC takes decisions. 
Perhaps the issue has indeed been widely settled in EWC rules of procedure; these, 
however have never been systematically analysed. The problem remains that the 
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EWCD and agreements refer to elections and delivering opinions, without necessarily 
defining how such decisions are to be jointly reached.  
More importantly, this analysis of majorities implicitly assumes that all representatives 
of the same country will vote the same way, which is not necessarily a sound 
assumption. As Stirling and Tully have found, “the groupings that eventually emerge 
on EWCs may not be those predicted by the common argument of host-country 
domination” (2004: 77). According to Stirling and Tully, this is not only due to the 
potentially divisive effects of cultural or ideological differences within countries and 
national trade union movements; they go on to identify at least three further lines of 
differentiation besides nationality and language which shape EWC members’ 
perception of their particular ‘constituency’. The first of these is union identity: an 
EWC member may represent a single union, a multi-union national constituency, or 
may be a non-union representative. The second line of differentiation may have more 
to do with company structure: an EWC member may represent a particular 
occupational group, a particular site or division, or the whole of the national 
workforce. The third source of representative identity may lie in his or her role in the 
EWC: he or she may be chairperson, a member of the select committee, or may have no 
special function (Stirling and Tully 2004: 77). Personal loyalties and affinities, as well as 
the dynamics of leadership and power can also be expected to play a role. Overall, 
depending on the decision at stake and/or the composition and culture of the group, 
there may very well be other and potentially overlapping definitions of ‘constituency’ 
than mere country of origin.  
Returning to the question of seat allocation and the principle of ‘one member, one 
vote’, further issues tend to exacerbate the dilemma of over- and under-representation. 
Where thresholds have been defined which not only exclude some countries, but 
which also serve to allocate further seats according to a company-specific distribution 
of employment and thus a potentially arbitrary logic, this serves to further distort the 
tenability of simple majorities. In addition, as Carley and Marginson (2000) have 
found, other considerations, such as ensuring that all production sites, divisions, or 
occupational groups in each country are represented in the EWC, have guided the 
allocation of seats.  Gohde (2004) has pointed out that the need to ensure that all trade 
unions from some countries are represented has meant that more seats were allocated 
to those countries. Moreover, the definition of numerical thresholds is also quite likely 
in reality to be a means of defining the type of operation in a country. Larger national 
workforces are usually working in production sites; the most common thresholds of 50 
employees or more (2/3 of Carley’s and Marginson’s sample of Article 6 agreements) 
are thus designed to ensure that production sites are represented – potentially at the 
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expense of smaller sales and service sites , if these are the only company establishments 
within a country.  
Recent evidence from EWC negotiations and re-negotiations suggests that EWCs may 
be moving away from a straightforward application of EWC seat allocation according 
to workforce size in favour of other factors. In several recent negotiations in the metal 
sector, for example, ‘home country’ representatives have agreed to a reduction in their 
EWC representation in return for concessions from the employer in the form of 
extending the coverage of the EWC agreement to include non-EEA countries or 
additional seats for specific countries or divisions. To name a more extreme example, 
in the course of re-negotiating its EWC agreement in 2004, the EWC at Actaris decided 
to allocate its seats on the EWC by division rather than by employment figures. Each of 
the company’s national workforces in 13 countries elects at least one member to the 
EWC, with an additional member delegated for each division which is active in that 
country. The end result is that the French and German works councils each delegate 
three members to the EWC, even though the 1600-strong French workforce is over 
twice as large as the German.  
In summary, the more arbitrary and company-specific the seat allocation, the more 
problematic the notion of ‘one member, one vote’ becomes, since its fundamental 
democratic legitimation, i.e., the proportional representation of national workforces 
within the EWC, has become replaced by other seat allocation factors.  
Is there a solution to this dilemma? There may well be, but the sheer variety of possible 
constructions means that this is an issue which each EWC can best decide for itself 
according to its own collective perception of what is ‘fair’. Some EWCs may prefer to 
continue to operate in a spirit of consensus, without formal decision-making rules. This 
has the advantage that it pragmatically veils potential conflicts without hindering 
discussion. If the ‘spirit of consensus’ is understood to mean an absolute requirement 
of unanimity, however, a single member of the EWC could block all decisions. The 
General Motors EWC, for example operates by consensus, rather than with formal 
voting procedures. Members point out, however, that power relationships within the 
EWC nonetheless clearly shape the outcomes of decisions in favour of the most 
influential sites.  
Other EWCs may prefer to define a system of majority voting. There are two basic 
models: the first is a system of ‘one member, one vote’. As discussed above, however, it 
must be clear that this may result in significant over- or under-representation of certain 
countries or divisions, for example. The second basic model is a system of qualified 
majority voting. The most common method is to weight votes according to 
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‘population’ or workforce figures. If a country has more than one delegate, however, it 
may be difficult to calculate the number of votes to be cast by each. A weighted voting 
system may be considered more representative if the allocation of seats is at great 
variance with the numbers of employees represented by each EWC member. If, as is 
frequently the case, the variation in workforce figures is so great that a small minority 
of members can decide a vote weighted by workforce figures, then higher or more 
complex majorities can be defined, such as a 2/3 majority of all EWC members, or a 
majority of votes representing at least 2/3 of the total workforce and/or 2/3 of all 
countries represented in the EWC. The precise majorities to be defined in such a case 
can best be tailored to the company itself; there is no single formula. What is important 
is that if the EWC decides to establish voting procedures, they must themselves 
perceive the decision-making system to be fair, transparent, and representative.  
A third option is to work with a hybrid of the two. This allows EWCs to sidestep, at 
least initially, the potentially conflictual issue of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. For example, 
the Ford EWC explicitly states in its rules of procedure that it intends to avoid taking a 
vote at all, and to operate by consensus. Should a consensus prove impossible to reach, 
however, a vote can be requested in which each representative casts as many votes as 
there are currently employees in his or her constituency. The presence of EWC 
representatives representing at least half of the company’s total European workforce is 
defined as the quorum. To name another example, at the GEA EWC, issues are 
generally put to a vote according to the principle of ‘one member, one vote’. At the 
request of any EWC member, however, the vote can be held according to a system of 
votes weighted according to workforce figures.  
It should be emphasised in conclusion, however, that the absence of voting does not 
mean that the EWC will be paralysed or ineffective. On the contrary, the example of 
the EWC at General Motors, which has been a pioneer in negotiating on behalf of the 
whole European workforce, demonstrates that operation by consensus and without 
formal rules can be just as effective. At the same time, and as the case study of 
DaimlerChrysler revealed with respect to national-level employee representation, the 
existence of clear decision-making rules underscores a perception of fair and 
representative decision-making processes and outcomes, even if the system of 
weighted majority voting is never actually applied in practice. In the light of the wide 
variety of company structures and power relationships which come together in EWCs, 
the decision whether and how to formalise decision-making procedures is best left to 
EWCs themselves to decide. What’s more: even discussing the issue may itself 
contribute to increased transparency, a responsible approach to power asymmetries, 
and a common understanding of the role of the EWC.  
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6.3. Negotiations in EWCs: Motivation and prerequisites 
It has been long been speculated that EWCs might take on a negotiating role. As a 
nascent platform for cross-border collective bargaining at the company level, EWCs 
were seen as potentially paving the way toward a truly European system of industrial 
relations. While Euro-optimists largely welcomed this prospect, since in an emergent 
multi-level system of European IR this would serve to further ‘europeanise’ national-
level actors and might furthermore provide an impetus for European sector-level 
collective bargaining in the context of the Social Dialogue, Euro-pessimists warned 
against the divisive effects that company-level ‘micro-corporatism’ would have on 
national systems of IR in general and collective bargaining and the position of trade 
unions in particular.  
Until recently, however, little was known about the extent to which EWCs had in fact 
become forums for negotiations between employee representatives and central 
management. Carley’s (2001; 2002) explorative analysis of 26 joint texts or agreements 
which had been negotiated in 12 different companies revealed that the majority of such 
joint texts or agreements amounted to framework agreements, which specified a set of 
principles, rules or policies to be implemented at the national and/or local level. One of 
the most common motivations for negotiating such framework agreements was 
company restructuring; as a rule, it was the employee side which pushed for a 
European-level framework to deal with these issues. In this sense, as Carley points out, 
most of the themes of the joint texts and agreements, in particular insofar as they are 
responses to cross-border restructuring, can be seen as a continuation of the 
information and consultation procedures provided for in the EWCD.  
The EWCD does not explicitly provide for a negotiating role for EWCs – nor does it 
forbid negotiations, however. Schiek (2001) argues that seen in the overall context of 
EU legislation in this area, in particular the Commission’s sustained emphasis on 
negotiated, voluntary regulation, the EWCD can actually be interpreted as encouraging 
as much joint activity between the social partners as possible—up to and including 
negotiating company-level agreements.  
However, Schiek’s overview of the legal issues surrounding EWCs and negotiation 
highlights a number of open questions: On what legal basis can EWCs and central 
management negotiate agreements? What requirements must a negotiating mandate 
fulfil? In the absence of a pan-European labour law system, what is the legal nature or 
quality of such agreements? Do they only bind the EWC and central management, or 
do they also have a binding effect on local and/or national employee representations? 
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How can potential collisions between overlapping rights and competences be 
resolved? (2001: 233).  
Schiek argues that, at least in the context of the German legal system, these critical legal 
obstacles can be overcome, however. Two of these strategies which can be 
accommodated within the existing legal patchwork are of particular relevance here. 
The first is that in the absence of a labour law framework at the European level, an 
EWC agreement can only pertain to the law of obligations. In other words, an 
agreement signed between the EWC and central management does not have the status 
of a collective agreement, but it is enforceable across borders to the extent that central 
management can be obliged to take active steps to encourage management in other 
countries to respect the terms of the agreement. The second strategy, linked to the first, 
addresses the problem of possible collisions with national labour law: since the EWC 
may in no way impinge upon the rights and obligations of employee representatives 
under existing information, consultation and negotiation processes at the national 
and/or local level, and since the forms and subjects of regulation are so different across 
Europe, the only legally viable form for an agreement to take at the European level is a 
framework agreement which is implemented in each country according to that 
country’s legal system, be it by means of a company-level agreement signed by 
workplace employee representatives or a collective agreement signed by trade unions.  
Linked to this is the question of a negotiating mandate. Schiek argues that an EWC can 
only negotiate a binding agreement on behalf of the national/local employee systems of 
workplace or trade union representations if they specifically and formally mandate it 
to do so. This is more likely to be possible regarding strictly circumscribed issues and 
measures and if the national and/or local levels retain the right of final approval of the 
negotiation results. Failing such an explicit mandate, all an EWC can negotiate is an 
agreement which is explicitly subsidiary in its effects, leaving the final decision about 
implementation to the national and/or local levels (Schiek 2001: 234-5).  
The EWC framework agreements on restructuring are illuminating examples of the 
multi-level system of company-based IR in action. In order to investigate how legal 
and political obstacles are managed in practice, it is instructive to take a closer look at a 
few such pioneering agreements. Particular attention will paid to the ways in which 
the process of negotiation and implementation of the framework agreements was 
managed within the multi-level, cross-border EWC structure.  
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Ford  
At Ford, three framework agreements have been signed by central management and 
the EWC. The first framework agreement, signed in January 2000, regulated the 
consequences of Ford’s spin-off of Visteon for employees’ status and representation. 
The second framework agreement was signed in 2001 to deal with the consequences of 
the newly formed joint venture between Ford and Getrag; it guaranteed the Ford 
employee status of all transferred employees, and committed the company to new 
investments to secure several factories. The third framework agreement was signed in 
November 2004 in response to the company’s plans to introduce a project for product 
development and insourcing called “IOS: International Operations Synergies”. In this 
framework agreement, it was agreed that IOS would not lead to job losses, that cost 
savings would be re-invested, that capacity would be fairly balanced across sites, and 
that transferred employees would have the right to re-training.  
Prior to the 2000 Visteon agreement, the members of the Ford EWC agreed to transfer a 
negotiating mandate to the EWC in a resolution passed in May 1999. Following the 
2001 Ford-Getrag agreement, a memorandum of understanding was reached between 
the EWC and central management, in which both parties agreed to negotiate cross-
border solutions where appropriate, provided that the EWC members obtained a 
mandate from the national-level employee representatives, and agreed to implement 
agreements made at the European level. This negotiating mandate was formalised in 
the revised rules of procedure adopted in 2002. In detail, the negotiating mandate of 
the EWC at Ford must meet the following requirements: it can only be given regarding 
a specific issue which affects at least two countries; the national-level employee 
representations must mandate the EWC in writing to negotiate on their behalf; while 
the select committee is empowered to conduct negotiations on behalf of the EWC, the 
full EWC must formally accept or reject the results of these negotiations; an agreement 
reached between the EWC and central management does not take effect until the 
national/local employee representatives and/or trade unions have ratified it; and 
finally, (aside from the relevant management-side) the members of the EWC have the 
responsibility to ensure that the agreement is taken over and duly implemented at the 
local/national level.  
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GE Advanced Materials 
In 2002, the EWC at GE Advanced Materials28 signed an agreement with central 
management about internet/email use (EWCB 2002). In 2004, the EWC signed a further 
agreement with central management about the data protection and employee privacy 
implications of pre-employment background screenings.  
These framework agreements were based on a formal annex to the EWC agreement 
which regulated the way in which the EWC and management would approach 
company policies, procedures, or issues which could be facilitated by cross-border 
implementation rather than country-by-country implementation. In contrast to the 
rules of procedure at Ford, the GE Advanced Materials document specifically allows 
for an opt-out/opt-in process. The procedure agreed between central management and 
the EWC is as follows: The EWC and central management initially discuss whether an 
issue is most appropriately handled at the European level. If they decide this is not the 
case, then the existing legal national/local procedures will be applied. If the EWC and 
central management jointly decide that an issue is most appropriately dealt with at the 
European level, then the EWC members shall ask their constituencies (defined as “the 
national/local works councils and/or trade unions or other forms of worker 
representation”) for a mandate to negotiate on their behalf. The national/local workers’ 
representatives have the right to refuse that mandate. In this case, the existing legal 
procedures at national and local level will apply. Central management enters into 
negotiations with only those EWC members who have been mandated by their 
constituencies. Furthermore, the rules specify that “the EWC will obtain the strongest 
possible legal rights that exist in any one of the participating countries for the 
procedure at hand.” An agreement reached between central management and the EWC 
is presented to the national constituencies. At this stage, the national-level workers’ 
representatives have the right to opt out of the agreement. The agreement will be 
implemented in those countries which have accepted it. If necessary, additional 
arrangements can be made to suit legal requirements or existing practice. Finally, 
should problems occur in the implementation of the agreement, a mediation committee 
will be established. If this mediation is unsuccessful, then the existing national/local 
legal procedures will apply to implement the measure.   
                                           
28 At the time, the company was operating under the name of GE Plastics.  
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General Motors Europe (GME) 
The first framework agreement between GME management and the EWC was signed 
in 2000 to address the effects of the joint venture with Fiat on GME employees, in 
particular, and the maintenance of existing union recognition and forms of worker 
representation, protection of status and benefits, and the right of return. The second 
framework agreement was signed in 2001 to address the effects of restructuring by 
implementing job security measures, and offering new placements, retraining, and 
early retirement packages. The key stake in this restructuring was the shutdown of part 
of the production facilities at GME’s plant in Luton and attempts to secure the future of 
the plant in Ellesmere Port. In the autumn of 2001, a further framework agreement was 
signed which defined the common principles according to which a company-wide 
restructuring plan known as ‘Olympia’ was to be implemented at the national level. In 
2005, the most recent framework agreement was signed: it addresses the effects of a 
radical company restructuring plan which will lead to the loss of over 12,000 jobs, or 
roughly 20% of its total European workforce, of which 10,000 may be lost in Germany 
alone.  
The process of negotiating these framework agreements at GME has been quite 
different from those at Ford and GE Advanced Materials. In contrast to Ford and GE 
Advanced Materials, these framework agreements signed at GME are not based on any 
formal agreement with management about European-level negotiations.  
Rather than adhering to formally agreed procedures and mandates, the framework 
agreements at GME were negotiated ad hoc and were closely coordinated with the trade 
unions under the aegis of the EMF. Working groups were set up consisting of both 
EWC members and full-time union officers to develop joint positions and strategies. 
The EWC and the unions also demonstrated their ability to mobilise the European 
workforce: in pan-European ‘Action Days’ held in 2001 and 2004, tens of thousands of 
GME employees across Europe participated in protests and demonstrations. In the 
course of negotiations in 2004, as management pitted site against site, EWC members 
and trade unions publicly undertook not to undercut any collective agreements, in 
particular concerning pay and working time. Unlike the framework agreements signed 
at Ford or GE Advanced Materials, the framework agreements at GME are also signed 
by a representative of the EMF. The only formal requirement contained in the 
framework agreements is that management and employee representatives must ensure 
that the agreements are made legally binding at the national level according to national 
law and practice. Since these agreements contain concrete commitments, not only with 
respect to employees’ working conditions but also issues of union recognition and 
representation structures, the close involvement of the trade unions in negotiating the 
 225
agreement is a crucial element in ensuring the faithful implementation of the 
agreement.  
As predicted by Marginson and Sisson (1996), such framework agreements have 
proven to be the most realistic form of company-level collective bargaining. Yet the 
parties are clearly closer than ‘arm’s length’ (Marginson and Sisson 1996; 1998). Rather 
than engaging in “arm’s length bargaining, in which the parties do not formally 
negotiate at European level, but influence and anticipate the reactions of one another as 
if they did” (1996: 190), the national-level actors were directly involved in negotiations 
and were charged with ensuring the implementation of the agreements at 
local/national level. Indeed, compared with framework agreements or joint texts on 
other issues, Carley (2002) found that framework agreements on restructuring left the 
least leeway for local or national differentiation in their implementation.  
How can this be explained? Carley points out that framework agreements on 
restructuring were most common in companies whose operations are closely 
integrated across borders, and that the main drivers behind such negotiations were 
employees concerned about the cross-border implications of restructuring. In other 
words, where employee representatives saw a potential for coercive comparisons and 
indeed direct competition among sites, they pushed for a joint regulation at the 
European level. The prevalence of framework agreements on restructuring within 
internationally integrated companies confirms early predictions that company-level 
negotiations in EWCs could be triggered by a “critical incident” (Marginson and Sisson 
1996).  
Because they were operating in a legal vacuum, these EWCs and trade unions were 
obliged to develop creative, responsible, and above all transparent means of 
formulating and asserting common positions and strategies, while at the same time 
preserving their rights and responsibilities at the local and/or national level. Whether it 
is the closely coordinated and public cooperation among trade unions at GME, or the 
pursuit of carefully defined multi-step mandating procedures at Ford or GE Advanced 
Materials, all three examples above illustrate that it is necessary to pursue what was 
cast as a discursive/participative approach in Chapter Three. As was already seen in 
the case study at DaimlerChrysler, the examples of Ford and GME illustrate that 
competition can induce rather than inhibit cooperation if iterative, transparent, and 
legitimated arrangements and institutions are in place which respect local autonomy 
and yet still provide the means to pursue shared objectives.  
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6.4. What does this tell us about solidarity in EWCs?  
The answer is quite simple. If EWC members decide to act jointly, they can. Just as the 
key role of the Central Works Council lies more in obtaining and analysing information 
and in coordinating local strategies than in dictating a central strategy, the basic 
framework provided by EWC legislation and agreements enables the same processes. 
To be sure, there are significant obstacles to their ability to communicate, to develop 
mutual trust, and to build upon stable and responsible IR structures at the national and 
local levels, but the actual determination and development of role of the EWC is 
largely at the discretion of the members of the EWC itself.  
Much has been made of the fact that EWCs’ rights are relatively weak, particularly 
compared to the rights of national-level employee representatives. But it is important 
to remember that the role of an EWC is not invariably restricted to that foreseen in the 
agreement, let alone the law, nor can the employer determine or restrict it unilaterally.  
There is much that an EWC can do on its own. Between obtaining information from 
central management or from fellow employee representatives for use exclusively at the 
national or local level and the conclusion of framework agreements with the employer 
for implementation at the national level, there are a range of other possible degrees of 
coordination. Most importantly, the cooperation of central management is only 
necessary for the negotiation of framework agreements. Every other degree of 
cooperation essentially lies in the hands of the EWC members themselves. This 
conception of a sliding scale of EWC roles and activities is issue-based: close 
coordination may not be appropriate or necessary for some issues, yet indispensable 
for others. For any given issue, EWC members are free to decide amongst themselves 
whether they merely want to exchange information, or whether they want to try to 
coordinate local bargaining strategies. Figure 31 illustrates this wide range of roles and 
activities.  
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Figure 31: A sliding scale of EWC roles and activities 
 
National representatives obtain 
information gained from central 
management and apply this 
exclusively at national level 
Framework agreement 
between employer and EWC, 
implementation made binding at 
national level. 
A sliding scale of EWC 
roles and activities 
Independent and mutual 
exchange of information 
among EWC members 
Close coordination of a 
collective cross-country, cross 
site employee-side strategy 
e.g., minimum standards agreed for 
local negotiations 
Loose coordination of national 
and local-level employee-side 
strategies 
 
Through EWCs, employee representatives at the national and local level gain access to 
quantitatively and qualitatively new information. A glance at the catalogue laid out in 
the Directive indicates what a wide range of information this entails: central 
management is required to inform the EWC on the structure, economic and financial 
situation, the probable development of the business and of production and sales, the 
situation and probable trend of employment, investments and substantial changes 
concerning the organisation, the introduction of new working methods or production 
processes, transfers of production, mergers, cut-backs or closures, and collective 
redundancies  
Faced with restructuring and transfers of production across borders, however, the 
information provided by the employer is only part of the equation. Exchanging and 
pooling information independently of the employer may be even more important: to 
clear up misinformation, to prevent being played against one another, and to come up 
with the whole picture, not just the national parts. Indeed, for many EWC members 
this is one of the most important benefits of the EWC. 
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Taken together, the information received from management and from fellow members 
on the EWC is a crucial feature of EWC work. The key to using these information and 
consultation processes most effectively lies in strategically linking them to parallel 
processes at the local level where appropriate.  
The evidence suggests, furthermore, that rights such as the right to an extraordinary 
meeting are used in conjunction with rights at the national level. The case study of the 
CWC at DaimlerChrysler demonstrated that the capacity of the central works council 
to foster the development of a common approach lies precisely in the iterative 
treatment of issues at both local and central levels. Similarly, the three examples of 
EWC negotiations described above make clear that it is not a question of ‘who is 
informed and consulted first’; it is a question of whether the different levels adequately 
combine the information and consultation procedures at both levels.  
The results of the survey conducted by IG Metall provides further evidence that both 
national and European levels already deal iteratively or at least in parallel with the 
issue of restructuring (Politycki and Schneider 2005). Of the 70 EWCs which were 
confronted by cross-border restructuring, only six EWCs addressed the issue solely at 
the national level, while the issue was addressed at both the German and European 
levels in 62 companies29. The question of when the extraordinary meeting was held was 
only included in course of the survey; therefore there are only 19 answers to this 
question. However, these 19 responses prove instructive. According to respondents, in 
seven companies, an extraordinary meeting was held before the final decision about 
the measure was taken; in eight EWCs the meeting was held after the decision at 
European level, but before the measures were implemented at national level; in two 
EWCs the meeting was held in the course of implementation of the measure; and in 
only two cases, the extraordinary meeting was not held until after the measure had 
been implemented. In 57 cases, the EWC was initially informed directly by central 
management about the impending restructuring measures. Taken together, the 
responses about the parallel treatment of the issue at both national and European level 
and the timing of the information at European level suggest strongly that at least the 
flow of information and consultation procedures between the European and national 
level functions more or less smoothly.  
Applying the prerequisites for solidarity that were identified in Chapter Three,  an 
EWC must be able to ensure a range of discursive/participative structures and 
processes if it is to generate and support solidarity. It was argued in this chapter that 
                                           
29 In two companies, the issue was addressed at the EWC, but not at the national or local level in 
Germany, since it did not have any implications for the German workforce.  
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compared with Central Works Councils, there are important gaps in the constitutional 
character of the EWC. Ill-defined decision-making procedures and the absence of a 
(legal and political) legitimate EWC mandate vis-à-vis the local or national level as well 
as within a European IR arena raise important questions about the EWC’s ability to 
function as peak representation structure within a federalist conception of multi-level 
employee interest representation at the European company level.  The prerequisites 
identified in Chapter Three still hold true, but they must be qualified in order to better 
take into account the less robust political, legal, and operative framework conditions of 
EWCs.  
Clearly, the wide-ranging opportunities for participation which were seen to play such 
an important role in the CWC can less easily be relied upon at the European level: 
EWC members have few opportunities to interact in person, and their interaction 
between face-to-face meetings is limited by language barriers and often restricted or 
even non-existent access to communications technology.  Since such participation 
serves to continually stabilise or regenerate the normative foundation for collective 
activities by increasing the identification of individuals with the whole group, it is 
arguably more difficult to strengthen the internal social cohesion (i.e., community 
solidarity) as an essential condition for effective action outwards vis-à-vis the employer 
(i.e. combative solidarity). 
It was argued in Chapter Three that participative elements must be able to strengthen 
the capacity of a compromise, once reached, to command commitment.  Only those 
who are able to actively and openly participate in a discursive process can be expected 
to adhere to commitments made as a result of a negotiated solution or compromise.   
In the light of the weak linkages between the national level and the EWC, the 
transparency of decision-making and a responsible approach to power asymmetries 
are key elements of this process.  It is with respect to transparency and an EWC 
mandate that the gaps in the constitutional structure of EWCs are most glaringly 
exposed. It might be argued that this focus on formal aspects of decision-making fails 
to capture the social dynamics of collective decision-making.  But it was seen in the 
case of the CWC at DaimlerChrysler that the existence of clear decision-making rules 
(even if they were seldom applied in practice) provided the backbone for the CWC’s 
political processes. On the surface, the decision-making rules were never applied; 
beneath the surface, however, they clearly played a role in shaping the outcome. The 
ambiguity which arises out of the fact that decisions are taken by consensus in full 
knowledge that they could be forced through on the basis of formal qualified majority 
vote is in effect an important political resource in the work of the CWC as a whole 
because it serves to underscore the group’s identity and fosters a responsible approach 
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to undeniable power asymmetries. The close attention paid to ensuring ‘representative’ 
staffing of the CWC’s subcommittees was also seen to play a crucial role in ensuring 
the perceived fairness and transparency of the CWC’s necessarily complex decision-
making processes.  
It was argued in Chapter Three that representatives of stronger and more influential 
sites must demonstrate a willingness to take a step back in the interests of the whole or 
to use their influence for the benefit of weaker sites; they must allow themselves to be 
bound into egalitarian structures if the inherent reciprocity of solidarity is to prove a 
solid foundation for collective identity and action. It has been argued in the literature 
that the ‘home country’ workforce is likely to dominate the EWC. As long as decision-
making is informal and ill-defined, this is certainly likely to be the case. This research 
suggests, however, that if attention is paid to developing decision-making rules which 
are seen by EWC members to be fair and representative, this danger is minimised.   
This argument is closely linked to the definition of an EWC mandate. There are two 
key dimensions: the first is the ways in which the EWC takes decisions as a group, the 
second is the ways in which the EWC members can be empowered by their national 
and/or local constituencies. It was argued above that collective action must be 
developed jointly and discursively: just as there is no possibility to command 
compliance within the CWC, there is no possibility to do so within the EWC either. As 
pointed out above, any framework agreement struck at the European level can only be 
bindingly implemented at the national or local levels. Thus, in the light of these gaps 
between the national and European level, and given the lack of a comparable density 
of interaction which functions as an opportunity to control for ‘defection’, a joint 
strategy developed at the European level relies all the more on the commitment of the 
individuals to act in concert at the national or local level.  In other words, a strong-
armed or bully mandate is, in effect, no mandate at all. Only a mandate which has been 
developed and agreed by all concerned has any chance at all of commanding 
compliance. Arguably, then, the reliance on consensus by most EWCs must be viewed 
with some scepticism. As even members of the GME EWC admit, their consensus does 
not necessarily amount to unanimity; where the stakes are high, this will most likely 
prove an insufficient basis for collective action.  
As pointed out in Chapter Three,  a ‘participative works council’ must be able to offer a 
preventive solution to the fundamental dilemma of solidarity:  the greater the divisive 
pressure from outside to increase competition among those who strive to generate 
solidarity with one another, the more difficult it is to achieve solidarity.  Despite their 
limited rights, EWCs can make use of the opportunities which occur in times of low 
external pressure to reach agreement on less conflictual issues. By building upon the 
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common legal basis provided by other EU Directives on issues such as health and 
safety, data protection, or anti-discrimination, EWCs can develop joint activities and 
local strategies. Such experience can provide a foundation of shared values and 
appreciation of interdependence which can better enable EWCs to cope with 
conflictual situations if and when they arise.  By jointly tackling problems of common 
concern, the EWC can seek ways to actively support the generation of shared values 
and morals. In this way, the moral dimension of ‘traditional’ solidarity, the vision and 
idealism behind it, can be given room to unfold and be tested.  
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Chapter Seven: Summary and implications for further 
research, policy and practice 
7.1. Summary 
This thesis took as its starting point the question whether EWCs could overcome the 
divisive pressures of cross-border competition for jobs and investment between sites 
and act in solidarity. In Chapter Two, this research was situated within the large and 
highly varied body of literature on European Works Councils. It emerged that with 
respect to the potentially divisive effects of cross-site competition, opinion was divided 
between two camps: while the Euro-pessimists suggested that cross-site competition 
poses insurmountable barriers to a true europeanisation of employee interest 
representation, Euro-optimists by contrast saw a potential that the development of 
European identity and internal social cohesion could provide the foundation for 
solidarity in EWCs. In the light of the relatively recent phenomenon of EWCs, these 
arguments are necessarily speculative; both camps were able to present examples to 
support their respective assessments. While the Euro-pessimists explicitly mentioned 
cross-site competition, but largely disregarded internal and socially constructed 
dynamics, however, the Euro-pessimists focussed on the possibilities and conditions 
for the emergence of social cohesion, while leaving open the question whether such 
cohesion was sufficient to overcome the divisive effects of cross-border competition 
between sites.   
This research has sought to close this gap. The central works council (CWC) 
established according to the German law on workplace co-determination was 
identified as a close analogue to an EWC.  In the absence of a body of literature on the 
internal functioning of CWCs, this research undertook to examine in depth the 
experience of a single CWC as a lead case.  In Chapter Three, the contributions of 
theories of federalism as a means of reconciling unity and diversity were applied to the 
multi-level system of employee interest representation. A conceptualisation of 
solidarity as it might be generated among the members of a central and/or European 
works council was developed. It was concluded that a discursive/participative 
structure was most likely to enable the generation of solidarity across and within a 
multi-level, essentially federalist system. Key analytical factors were identified which 
could be applied to the experience of the Central Works Council at DaimlerChrysler, 
and to EWCs more generally. Chapter Five explored in detail the operation of the 
central works council at DaimlerChrysler, covering both its day-to-day functioning as 
well as its core values and perceptions of its appropriate role. In Chapter Six, the 
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conceptual framework developed in Chapter Three and the implications of the case 
study findings were applied to EWCs more generally. It was concluded that the EWC 
can be considered a nascent federalist system at most;  important gaps, however lead to 
problems in practice. Despite important limitations, Chapter Six concludes that 
solidarity within EWCs is possible, if it can be built upon a participative and 
transparent set of institutions and processes which are seen by EWC members and 
national and local employee representatives and trade unions to be fair and legitimate.  
7.2. Implications for policy, practice and future research  
Based on the findings of this research, a number of suggestions for further research can 
be made. These include the need for a further development of the concept of solidarity, 
and a continuation of the existing tradition of quantitative and qualitative EWC 
research. How EWCs deal with restructuring, and what internal and external processes 
shape their approach should also be more closely examined. With respect to research 
about multi-level systems of company-based IR, as they exist in many European 
countries, research should examine the spread and variety of such structures with an 
aim to identifying the ways in which they cope with the challenges of cross-site 
competition. In order to do so, there is a need in this area, particularly with respect to 
the German literature, to move beyond legalistic analyses towards applying the 
approaches of sociology and political science.  
In the light of the significant and problematic gaps in the legal basis for EWCs, as well 
as the disparate range of existing EWC practice, several weaknesses might also be 
addressed in the context of the long-standing demands of the trade unions to revise the 
EWC Directive. Based on this research, a number of issues can be highlighted which 
would remove the uncertainties associated with the EWCD and provide a benchmark 
for the improvement of the actual functioning of EWCs.  
Finally, this research has important implications for practice. Trade unions and their 
European industry federations have an important role to play in intensifying their 
supporting role and in clarifying their own strategies with respect to the place of EWCs 
within the larger context of a europeanisation of industrial relations. For EWC 
members, this research suggests that they will most likely have to continue to find the 
creativity and courage to develop their EWCs into an institution which is 
complementary to existing IR structures and processes at the local and national level. 
The most important finding of this research – that solidarity within EWCs is possible—
should be encouraging to EWC members, their trade unions, and their national and 
local union activists and employee representatives.  
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Implications for Research  
As has been pointed out by various authors, the concept of solidarity must be revisited 
and developed further.  The findings of this research suggest that competition breeds 
solidarity, based on the insight that mutual dependency requires mutual support, as 
Durkheim posited long ago. Potentially conflicting interests can serve as the 
foundation for solidarity, or, as Hyman puts it, “solidarity implies the perception of 
commonalities of interest and purpose which extend, but do not abolish consciousness 
of distinct and particularistic circumstances” (2001a: 170). But how can this perception 
be achieved? What fosters it, what hinders it? With particular reference to EWCs or 
even company-based global networks of trade unions and employee representatives, 
how can this insight be gained despite significant differences in language, culture, and 
ideology and a limited ability to meet in person to develop an underlying supporting 
culture of solidarity?  
Since the questions raised in this research have not yet been systematically investigated 
on a wide scale, a continuation of the existing tradition of quantitative and qualitative 
EWC research is necessary to develop these findings further. Quantitative research on 
EWCs’ activities, such as the results of re-negotiation of their agreements or the 
number of meetings and extraordinary meetings held, would be the most appropriate 
means of maintaining a bird’s eye view of EWCs. This would provide a valuable 
context for case-study based EWC research, which, in the light of the relative novelty of 
EWCs as institutions as well as the shifting framework conditions which shape both 
their internal and external activities, will most likely remain necessary for some time to 
come. Such qualitative examinations could focus on the current state of play within 
EWCs, what factors shape their development towards that point, and what factors 
might prompt a shift (either towards more integration or less). Particular attention 
should be paid to the ways in which EWCs cope with restructuring, since these 
challenges at the very least oblige the EWC to demonstrate its real role, and may 
provide a more complete picture of the limits to and opportunities for the generation of 
solidarity within EWCs.   
EWC practice can be expected to continue to yield new insights into the overarching 
debate on the europeanisation of industrial relations. In particular, the ways in which 
EWCs have begun to negotiate company-based framework agreements within the legal 
vacuum at the European level, and the ways in which trade unions and their European 
federations have addressed this development, may help to refine the terms of the 
debate and thereby reconcile the Euro-optimists with the Euro-pessimists.  
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One important adjustment to the approach frequently adopted in EWC research is 
suggested by these findings.  Much existing research on EWCs has implicitly tended to 
assume that there is one ‘ideal’ EWC against which all EWCs can be measured.  
Although the German system of multi-level company-based IR is quite extensive in 
quantitative terms and can look back upon a longer history than can EWCs, the wide 
variety in the ways in which its universal framework has been filled out with very 
different degrees of depth and scope of cross-site cooperation suggests that variety, not 
sameness will be the future of EWCs as well.   
This research suggests, therefore, that it may be necessary to take a more dynamic and 
differentiated approach to assessing the development and in particular the 
‘effectiveness’ of EWCs. There is no point in exhorting common action on issues which 
are not of common concern. In many cases, the sole role of the EWC may be to serve as 
a source of information for use at the local level and the opportunity to have direct 
contact with management. This does not amount to a renunciation of the potential of 
EWCs; it is a recognition of the fact that there is no ‘one size fits all’ EWC: the primacy 
of IR in many companies may well continue to lie at the local level or national level. 
For other topics, as this research has shown, where issues are perceived to be of 
common concern, there is a perceived need to develop a coordinated response. A fluid 
and issue-specific approach is necessary, in which EWCs decide whether joint action is 
necessary or desirable on a case-by-case basis.   
Changing company strategies and increasingly integrated company structures present 
new challenges at the national level as well, because international competition in global 
markets has been matched by an increase in competition within companies.  With 
respect to research about central and group works councils, as they exist in many 
European countries, research should examine the spread and variety of such structures 
with an aim to identifying the ways in which they cope with the challenges of 
increasing centralisation of company policies in general, and cross-site competition in 
particular. Because of the differences between the composition, role, and competence of 
such instances of centralised interest representation, different questions may need to be 
asked within different national IR systems.   
With respect to Germany, a wide range of quantitative and qualitative research needs 
to be conducted. Essentially, the whole range of research questions which have been 
investigated with regard to European Works Councils need to be investigated with 
respect to central and group works councils. How many central and group works 
councils are there? How has their number increased over time, and why? How wide is 
the coverage of central and group works councils? How much use has been made of 
the possibility of negotiating alternative arrangements by collective agreement, and 
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what alternatives have been developed? Has the reduction in the quorum for the 
establishment of a group works council in 2001 led to an increase in their number? 
What issues do they deal with, and how? The range of questions may be 
overwhelming, but the regular large-scale works council surveys conducted by the 
WSI  provide an opportunity to close at least some of these gaps.  30
As pointed out in Chapter Two, more qualititative research in Germany has focused on 
legal analyses of central and group works councils. This research has made it clear that 
since the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz provides only a framework, there is a need to apply 
the approaches of sociology and political science, for example, in order to gain a better 
understanding of how central and group works councils actually function in practice. 
Some guiding questions might be: How do CWCs and GWCs operate: how often do 
they meet, which activities are delegated to subcommittees, to what extent are local-
level employee representatives included in the work of the CWC or GWC? What role 
do CWCs and GWCs play in addressing the cross-site implications of company policy: 
do they function as a hinge between local works councils, or as a hierarchically 
superior body? Which factors influence decisions and perceptions regarding joint 
versus independent action? How do they deal with the challenge of potentially divisive 
competition between local sites? How are questions of potentially overlapping 
competence dealt with in practice?  Does an active and integrative CWC or GWC lead 
to an erosion of the autonomy of local works councils and thus a weakening of the 
entire system of workplace codetermination? Where works councils are charged with 
implementing collective agreements negotiated by regional trade unions, how are 
potential conflicts dealt with in central and group works councils, and what are the 
implications of this for the system of regional industrial collective agreements in 
Germany? These questions too may seem rather overwhelming,  but considering that 
Central and Group Works Councils have existed for many decades,  answers to these 
questions are long overdue.  
Implications for policy  
The most pressing action on the part of policy-makers at the European level is to finally 
launch a binding revision process of the EWC Directive.  In April 2004, five and a half 
years later than foreseen in Article 15 of the EWC Directive, the Commission launched 
the first phase of consultations with the social partners at the European level. In 
response, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) demanded a rapid 
revision of the EWC Directive, and declared its willingness to engage in negotiations 
                                           
30 See, for example Schäfer (2003).  
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with the European employers’ federations (chiefly UNICE) on this matter. The 
revisions demanded by the ETUC can be grouped into four categories: first, the EWC 
Directive needs to be adjusted to the newer legal standard set by the SE Directive31 and 
the Framework Directive on Information and Consultation; second, a wide range of 
legal problems and uncertainties which have been brought to light by actual EWC 
practice need to be eliminated; third, the basic rules governing EWC practice and 
resources need to be improved, and finally, the scope of application of the EWC 
Directive must be widened to include smaller companies. For its part, UNICE rejected 
any need for the revision of the EWC Directive but offered to discuss best practice with 
the trade unions in the framework of the Social Dialogue.  
On 31 March 2005, the Commission launched the second phase of social partner 
consultations in its Communication Restructuring and Employment, anticipating and 
accompanying restructuring: the role of the European Union. There is some dispute about 
whether or not the Commission’s Communication amounts to a formal second 
consultation. Rather than putting forward a proposal for discussion by the European 
social partners, the Commission merely encourages them to “intensify ongoing work 
and to start negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement among themselves on 
the requisite ways and means for: […] promoting best practice in the way that 
European Works Councils operate, with a view to making them more effective, more 
especially as regards their role as agents for change …”.  
With this call for further activity despite clear signals from the employers’ side that 
they see no need for a revision of the EWCD, the Commission apparently seeks to 
sidestep the whole point of the social dialogue.  With respect to improving the 
operation of EWCs, it is simply not a question of spreading best practice; it is a matter 
of eliminating worst practice. More importantly, by reducing the role of EWCs to being 
‘agents of change’ particularly in restructuring processes, the Commission effectively 
negates the original premise of the EWCD, namely that it is about extending rights to 
information and consultation – i.e., industrial democracy – to the European level in the 
course of deepening economic and social integration within the Union. As this research 
has shown, EWCs have an important role to play in restructuring processes, but their 
role does not begin or end there; rather, EWCs provide the means to extend and 
coordinate activity and strategy on the employee side from the local level through to 
the European level within a fluid and transparent multi-level system.  
This research has highlighted a number of gaps which often hinder EWCs from 
ensuring an effective coordination and representation of employee interests at the peak 
                                           
31 Directive 2001/86/EG: Societas Europea 
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European company level. As pointed out above, most of these weaknesses can be 
remedied in the context of the current legal EWC framework: it has been seen that 
EWCs are able to develop their own tailor-made approach to decision-making , which 
this research suggests to be necessary to ensure the transparency on which solidarity 
rests, and that a more comprehensive articulation between the local/ national and 
European levels would go a long way towards improving the ability of the EWC to 
provide a useful forum for the coordination of local and national strategies.   
However,  a number of these shortcomings might also be remedied on a broader scale 
through the revision of the EWC Directive. Obviously, a revised EWC Directive would 
thus provide a more solid basis for negotiations in those companies which have not yet 
established an EWC. And, while a revised EWC Directive will have no direct effect on 
EWC agreements previously negotiated on the basis of the existing legislation, it might 
still serve as a useful benchmark for EWCs in the process of re-negotiating their EWC 
agreements.  
When the EWC Directive was passed in 1994, it represented a ground-breaking 
innovation in the European regulation of workers’ participation at the European level. 
The same matters have since been developed further and more precisely, in part in the 
light of the experiences gained through the implementation of the trailblazing EWC 
Directive. Notably, the definitions of ‘involvement of employees’, ‘information’ and 
‘consultation’ are more precisely defined in Article 2 of the SE Directive passed in 2001. 
Furthermore, in order to ensure that employee representatives are able to exert some 
influence, in particular in cases of extraordinary circumstances, the SE Directive also 
provides the employee representatives with the right to meet further with central 
management if central management decides not to act in accordance with a position 
put forward by the employee representatives. If these more precise definitions, which 
have clearly been developed in consideration of the shortcomings of practice, 
particularly with respect to the content, timing, and impact of information and 
consultation, were to be included in a revised EWC Directive, then the role and 
competence of EWCs might be strengthened and the recurring controversies 
surrounding its role and competence might be lessened in practice.  
Another weak point in practice concerns the operationalisation of the EWCs’ 
competence regarding cross-border issues.  It is in practice often difficult for individual 
EWC members to determine – let alone prove—that a measure proposed or 
implemented by management has cross-national implications. In order to secure the 
right to information and consultation on cross-border issues without undue delay, the 
burden of proof that an issue or measure has no cross-national implications even if the 
employee representatives suspect that it does must lie with the employer.  
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This research highlights that while the same discursive/participative processes which 
were seen to be the key requirements for solidarity within CWCs can in principle also 
be fulfilled within EWCs, it is clearly more difficult to do so in the light of systemic, 
cultural, and language barriers.  The EWCD’s formal provisions on employee 
representatives’ opportunities to cooperate and to prepare themselves for the new 
demands of their activities at the European level fall short of what is needed. In 
particular, the EWCD only provides for the possibility for EWC members to meet 
independent of  management prior to the meeting with central management.  If the 
notion of ‘consultation’ is to have any meaning at all, a regular internal meeting of the 
employee representatives following their meeting with central management is 
necessary so that the employee representatives can discuss the information they have 
obtained and, if appropriate, prepare an own position for submission to central 
management. Equally, and as the SE Directive already recognises, information and 
consultation at the European level poses qualitatively new challenges; accordingly, the 
SE Directive provides for a right to training for employee representatives.  If this same 
right to training were anchored in a revised EWC Directive, it could prove to be an 
important resource for EWCs as they develop their own conception of their role and 
duties.  
Transparency of decision-making has been seen to be a key concern underpinning the 
legitimacy of decisions made within the EWC if these are to command compliance. The 
issue of decision-making and majorities in the EWC is left entirely unclear in the 
subsidiary requirements. A revised Directive should clearly state the method by which 
an EWC established according to the subsidiary requirements should take its decisions, 
as is already the case for the SNB. Even if some EWCs seem to operate smoothly 
according to consensus, there is the danger that a decision ostensibly reached by 
consensus amounts to a strong-armed mandate.  Sidestepping this issue might seem 
politically less controversial, but this research argues that ensuring transparency of 
essentially pluralist decision-making processes is a cornerstone of the EWC’s identity 
and its ability to generate and maintain solidarity. It might therefore also be considered 
to require that agreements establishing EWC by negotiations also provide for decision-
making methods. This would oblige SNBs to openly confront and clarify the issues of 
transparency and legitimacy of collective decision-making in the EWC.  
This research has shown that it is important that the work of the EWC be 
complementary to the local and national levels. Two areas of uncertainty could be 
remedied in a revised EWC Directive. First,  the lack of a right of access to individual 
sites and the lack of provisions for a systematic inclusion of individual sites into the 
work of the EWC makes a democratically legitimate interest representation difficult; 
this has proved especially problematic in those countries in which there is no system of 
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information and consultation at the national level.  Second, the unclear definition of 
confidentiality has led to situations in which all information given in EWC meetings 
has been declared confidential across the board. Because of the resulting uncertainty, 
EWC members have been unable to report adequately at the national and local levels. 
It must be clarified that the burden of proof of confidentiality lies with central 
management and that such restrictions may only be applied to information which is 
objectively confidential on personal or business grounds. 
Chapter Three notes the importance of an umpire in ensuring the smooth and 
transparent iterative delegation of power and authority within federalist systems.  
The issue of sequencing information and consultation across levels and the ability to 
legally challenge breaches of rights arising out of the Directive, the national 
implementing legislation, and the EWC agreements has been subject to problematic 
gaps in the legal systems of several countries.  The EWC Directive must ensure that 
EWC members, both individually and collectively, have recourse to the courts and 
public administration processes in order to defend their rights deriving from EWC 
legislation and EWC agreements. Furthermore, it should more explicitly define the 
notion of subsidiarity, i.e., that autonomy of the national and/or local level do not 
preclude iterative processes of information and consultation at the local, national and 
European levels.  
Finally, this research suggests that the EWC legislation provides a flexible framework 
within which EWCs can develop the scope of integration and coordination they 
require.   The europeanisation of companies, and in particular restructuring on a 
European scale,  is demonstrably not restricted to large companies. The same 
justifications for the original EWC Directive as outlined in its Preamble (the need to 
close the gap between national-level systems of employee representation and 
increasingly transnational management decision-making structures) are just as relevant 
for companies which employ less than 1000 workers.32 This europeanisation process 
will continue to intensify in the course of closer economic integration,  and the 
arbitrary restriction of information and consultation rights to the workforces of larger 
companies is not acceptable. For this reason the threshold figures for application for 
the EWC Directive should be reduced, for example to a total employment of 500, of 
which at least 50 are employed in at least two countries. This is not to imply that all 
                                           
32 Employee representatives at several companies are known to have tried to set up an EWC because their 
companies have been transferring more and more executive decision-making beyond their reach, but they 
have been unable to initiate EWC negotiations because their companies do not meet the requirements of 
the EWC Directive.  
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companies fulfilling these necessarily broad requirements must set up EWCs, but only 
that those workforces in companies whose decision-making effectively takes place 
beyond their reach be given the means to close the gap between the national and 
European levels.  
Furthermore, the definition of the controlling undertaking in the EWC Directive not 
only leaves important gaps, but it is also not dynamic enough to keep pace with the 
ongoing changes in company structures. In effect, this lack of dynamism and precision  
deprives workforces of the right to cross-border employee representation simply 
because their particular company structure or changes therein are not foreseen by the 
EWC Directive. Most problematically perhaps, there is no explicit regulation with 
regard to joint ventures. Even if a joint venture is indisputably a “European-scale” 
company according to the EWC Directive, the fact that ownership may be split 50:50 
between two undertakings means that neither company can be obliged to set up an 
EWC. The result is that the workforce falls between the two companies and has no 
right to set up an EWC simply because the EWCD’s rigid definition of “controlling 
undertaking” based on ownership rather than control excludes their (not uncommon) 
company structure. To name a further example, there is no procedure outlined to be 
followed in cases of mergers or outsourced operations: at the extreme, the ‘new’ 
company – which arguably needs an EWC more than ever as the merged or outsourced 
company settles into its new structure– may be required to go through the  lengthy 
three-year SNB negotiation procedure, even if one or both companies involved in the 
merger or outsourcing may have already had an EWC prior to the merger or the 
outsourcing. Lest these examples be seen as captious: these are real cases drawn from 
practice in which despite the EWCD’s intentions, its imprecise and short-sighted legal 
rules have precluded employee representatives from engaging with one another and 
with management at the European level.  
Implications for Practice 
Although employers also have a role to play in improving the operation of EWCs, this 
section is aimed primarily towards identifying the key implications of this research for 
EWC members, trade unions and the European-level trade union federations.  
With respect to the urgent necessity of the revision of the EWC Directive, the ETUC has 
a pivotal role to play, both in putting pressure on the EU institutions to take up the 
revision, and—perhaps more importantly—in taking the lead in developing a joint 
position which actively includes both the national union federations and the European 
Industry Federations (i.e., the sector-level trade union federations at European level). 
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In 1999, in preparation of the revision process foreseen in the EWC Directive, the ETUC 
member organisations participated in a broad-based discussion in order to develop the 
joint demands of the European trade unions. Since 1999, however, the trade unions, 
who are, after all, closest to EWC practice,  have gained many new insights and 
experience with the EWC Directive and EWC practice. Some new problem areas have 
become apparent, while other issues have turned out to be far less problematic than 
was originally thought. Although some of these new insights and experiences are 
reflected in a Resolution passed by the ETUC Executive in 2004, which includes many 
of the points outlined above, it is urgently necessary that the these new insights gained 
in the intervening five years be systematically analysed so that they may be reflected in 
the impending discussions about the revision of the EWC Directive.  It should be quite 
clear that ‘negotiations’ with the European employers’ federations will not be likely to 
yield real results, but will instead only result in further delay. The ETUC should 
therefore continue to push for a legislative solution, despite its own institutional 
interest in expanding its role in the so-called Social Dialogue.  
The issue of reducing the threshold figures has been controversially discussed in the 
past within the ETUC and several European sector-level federations.  One of the 
arguments against demanding a reduction of the threshold figures was the claim that 
until all EWCs had been set up in all the companies which currently fall into the scope 
of the Directive, it would be inadvisable to demand a reduction of thresholds. It was, in 
essence, a question of resources.  
There are two main arguments against this position. First and foremost: just because an 
EWC can be set up does not mean that it has to be. Although this might strike some as 
an heretical argument, this research suggests that even if it should remain the goal to 
set up EWCs wherever possible, and certainly wherever they are needed, this does not 
mean that there is an obligation to do so. This research underscores the fact that this is 
the point behind an "optional" (rather than automatic) regulation which relies on the 
workforce to trigger negotiations such as the EWC.  
It is the responsibility of the trade unions to prepare for the future.  If and when the 
EWC Directive is revised, then it will most likely have been the last chance to put 
forward this demand for a long time. It is clear that the progress of European 
integration will continue to accelerate and will affect more and more areas – and 
companies. Everything possible must be done today to ensure that in 10-15 years' time 
at the latest, employees and their unions are not left with their hands tied, while any 
chances that employee representatives have to influence management within smaller 
yet highly "europeanised" companies stop at national borders. 
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Secondly, trade unions need to move beyond the discussion about EWC coverage rates, 
whereby it is loudly proclaimed that only half of all EWCs which could be set up have 
been set up.  What was once a strategic discussion aimed at underlining the need and 
impact of the EWC Directive has turned into a boomerang; neither the figures about 
the number of companies which can set up an EWC nor the figures about the number 
of EWCs which have been set up are reliable. Any coverage rates calculated on the 
basis of these incorrect figures ends up making EWC coverage seem much more patchy 
than it actually is. This has been used as an argument against revision of the Directive 
in the Economic and Social Committee of the EU, for example. In sum, the whole 
discussion about coverage rates is untenable and not useful. It is far more important 
that the trade unions and their federations focus on being able to insist on the right to 
set up EWCs wherever they are needed.  
The European Industry Federations 
As the number of negotiation processes involving EWCs increases, trade unions and in 
particular the European Industry Federations (EIFs) will have to develop a strategy to 
deal with this contentious issue.  As described in Chapter Six, several  EWCs have gone 
beyond consultation and adopted an active negotiating role on restructuring plans.  
EWCs have also been increasingly confronted with the issue of working time at the 
European level, as companies try to extract working time extensions by means of 
coercive comparisons.  
The European Metalworkers Federation (EMF) has recently re-opened the discussion 
of this subject. In the past, the EMF has in principle approved of negotiations at 
European level, provided that any agreement is signed by the union(s).  However, 
since the role of trade unions at European company level is not legally secured at the 
European level, company management usually resisted the inclusion of a trade union 
signature, even if the trade unions were involved in negotiations. The position of the 
EMF on this issue therefore amounted to a virtual – and in the end untenable – 
prohibition.  
Collective bargaining is, of course, a core competence of national trade unions and 
their local representatives, based on national legislation and varying practices in 
different countries.  The area of collective bargaining is, however, not clear-cut.  Some 
issues which clearly lie in the competence of (external) trade unions in one country are 
the responsibility of works councils in another.   
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EWCs and trade unions are thus confronted with four main points of difficulty with 
regard to European-level company agreements. First, there is no legal framework for 
European company agreements, which means that any agreement must also be 
negotiated and implemented at national level in accordance with national systems and 
traditions; second, there is no guaranteed trade union role at European company level; 
third, there are to date no internal procedures for mandates and evaluation of such 
agreements in the European industry federations; and fourth, the potential collision 
within the EWC between different approaches – both legal and political – to the same 
issue means that a difficult balance may have to be struck in the EWC.  
The ambiguity and potential for conflict means that EWC negotiations are a 
fundamentally political problem;  the European Industry Federations must therefore 
provide their own internal guidelines and procedures on the way to best organise and 
coordinate such European company negotiations. Nonetheless, because of the different 
national practices, the fact that no two companies are identical, and the problem of 
implementation, the approach will necessarily have to be determined case-by-case. But 
based on this research, a number of general elements should be defined, such as 
ensuring transparent and ongoing cooperation between the EWC, its union 
coordinator, the trade unions involved in the company, and the EIF. Transparent 
procedures for the provision of a mandate for that specific issue must be developed, 
and the involvement of local and national trade unions must also be ensured.  
Interestingly, the Social Agenda for 2005-2010 published recently by the Commission 
mentions its objective to develop a “framework” for cross-border collective bargaining 
at company level. It is unclear whether the Commission means negotiation by EWCs or 
by trade unions or both, but in the light of the resulting collision between collective 
labour law and/or practice in the Member States, it will be very interesting to see what 
the Commission actually proposes in this area.   
In the meantime, and as argued in Chapter Six, the lack of a valid legal framework at 
the European level, and the need to accommodate a wide variety of different industrial 
relations systems means that the trade unions and their European federations must 
make a virtue of necessity. Experience suggests that EWC members are ahead of their 
unions in these matters.  If company negotiations at the European level are inevitable – 
and indeed often necessary – then such negotiations are an important opportunity for 
trade unions to intensify their cooperation and to ensure an equitable outcome for all 
concerned. But ways must be found to develop a system which is flexible enough to 
accommodate the variety of IR systems, yet resilient enough to maintain a high 
standard and protect the autonomy of local and national trade unions.  
 245
Furthermore, the EIFs should intensify their work with EWCs as an integral part of 
their industrial policy activities. The coverage of EWCs in the automobile industry, for 
example, is nearly complete: all the automotive manufacturers and their 20-25 key 
suppliers have established EWCs. This presents the EMF with the opportunity to work 
directly with the top European-level employee representatives and FTOs in the 
development of its industrial policies for the automobile sector. The EWCs themselves 
have a keen interest in exchanging views and experience with EWCs from competing 
companies. All the companies in white goods industry, to name another example, are 
restructuring intensively, often with benchmarking reference to one another. The 
European white goods industry is concentrated in 4-5 companies in 5-6 countries; by 
convening this relatively small circle of key actors from the companies and trade 
unions, the EMF would be able to facilitate the coordination of employee-side 
strategies in order to better deal with the intense competition in that industry.  
Finally, the EIFs need to continue to intensify their efforts to establish and support a 
well-functioning network of EWC coordinators. As a rule, an FTO from the company’s 
home country is assigned the responsibility to advise the EWC on behalf of the 
European Industry Federation. Nearly all the EIFs have developed elaborate 
descriptions of what such coordination is to mean, but in practice, it is often difficult 
for the coordinators to play this role. The most important task is to instil a sense of 
“European responsibility” into the task of the coordinators, to make it clear that the 
coordinators act on behalf of all unions. The EIFs must also provide ongoing support 
for the coordinators. It is also the responsibility of the national unions to train and 
support the EWC coordinators.   
Trade unions, EWCs, and their members 
German trade unions have only very recently begun to pay attention to the specific 
needs of central works councils, limiting their more intensive activities to the larger, 
trend-setting companies and muddling through the remainder on an ad-hoc and 
largely invisible basis. The challenge is quite real: there are today over 500 group and 
central works councils within the remit of the IG Metall, for example.  While until now, 
central works councils have been – at least nominally—advised at the national level, 
there is as yet no real appreciation of the need to support CWCs in the face of the 
particular political dilemma faced by central and group works councils:  their limited 
competence at the central level means that they are confronted with primarily political 
task of coordinating potentially divergent interests and strategies at the local level.  
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The simultaneous centralisation and decentralisation of management processes poses 
new challenges for the representation of employees via trade unions and works 
councils. Next to the challenges for works councils sketched in Chapters Three and 
Five, this process also entails the potential to undermine the regional base of German 
collective agreements, since within a single company with operations nation-wide, the 
set of applicable regional collective agreements may differ considerably from one 
another. The stakes are high: where collective agreements increasingly provide for 
partial or differentiated implementation at company level, attempts to resolve these 
discrepancies between regional agreements quickly land in the central works council. 
The solution often favoured by companies is to apply a single regional agreement 
nation-wide; if a local workforce is thus exempted from the local agreement, however, 
the ability of the trade union to mobilise is curtailed in those regions whose collective 
agreement is not applied at the local company level.  
Taking the German multi-level system of cross-site interest representation as its 
analytical starting point, this research has explored the ways in which federalist, 
pluralist multi-level structures can reconcile unity with diversity.  This research has 
analysed in detail the workings of a particularly integrative CWC. It has identified the 
pervasive sources of cross-site competition, particularly within highly integrated 
production processes. It has highlighted the ways in which mutual dependence can 
provide the basis for closer cooperation and has pointed out the profoundly political 
nature of deciding collectively how much diversity is possible and how much 
uniformity is necessary. Rather than continuing to treat central and group works 
councils as a mere extension of local works councils which requires ad hoc and 
situational support at most, German trade unions need to recognise that central works 
councils are an arena in which new demands are placed on employee representatives 
and trade unions – an arena, furthermore, which increasingly requires closer 
cooperation between local branches of the trade unions.  Trade unions need to grasp 
the importance of their role in mediating between potentially conflicting local interests.  
Arguably, this challenge of centralisation is not limited to Germany; indeed, in IR 
systems such as that in the UK where the experiment of cross-site cooperation via joint 
shop stewards committees seems to have been largely forgotten, it might be 
worthwhile to reassess the need and means to organise employee-side cooperation 
across sites. The process of implementing the Framework Directive on Information and 
Consultation might provide the catalyst for such a re-evaluation. Most fundamentally, 
the UK implementation of the Framework Directive on Information and Consultation 
entails a choice of setting up information and consultation structures either at the 
national level or at the local level. This research clearly demonstrates that both are 
necessary; it is the interaction between various levels, and the corresponding ability to 
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appropriately respond to management strategies which is the crux of company-level 
employee interest representation. Based on this research, trade unions and employee 
representatives involved in negotiating such information and consultation structures 
would be well advised to aim at setting up a multi-level system. Rather than restricting 
employee representatives’ access to management and to one another to either the local 
or national level, the flexibility and rigour of federalist structures based on the 
principle of subsidiarity should be considered;  as maligned as the word “federalism” 
is in the UK context, it should be recalled that in this context it is the opposite of the 
centralisation it has often been misunderstood to mean. Federalism as it has been 
presented here offers the means to reconcile the need to coordinate strategy 
intelligently while still strictly protecting local autonomy.  
Trade unions have increasingly been confronted by the challenge of restructuring, in 
particular those involving cross-border transfers of production. Whether real or only 
threatened, the threat of transfers of production abroad, and the coercive comparisons 
which underscore them, are credible. Employees and their representatives therefore 
operate under a high degree of uncertainty. By providing a forum to exchange 
information, to increase cooperation, and to develop joint strategies, EWCs can help to 
reduce that uncertainty.   
The findings of this study make clear that EWC members and their trade unions must 
continue to intensify their efforts. The EWC as an additional and complementary forum to 
address the nebulous threat of globalisation must be grasped as an integral part of the 
work of trade unions and workplace employee representatives. By comparing 
information and coordinating their strategies, EWC members and their trade unions 
can unmask attempts to play them off against one another.  
The findings of this research also highlight the need that EWCs use opportunities 
where there is no restructuring crisis to develop their cooperation. EWCs can address 
issues that are of relevance to all sites. It has often been argued that EWCs cannot 
address substantive issues because the laws and procedures governing them are too 
country-specific. There are, however, a wide range of issues for which EU Directives 
have established standard rules or minimum standards across Europe.  Drawing on EU 
Directives on health and safety, data protection, anti-discrimination, or equal 
opportunities for men and women, for example, EWCs can build upon the fact that all 
of these issues explicitly provide for some form of participation by employee 
representatives and/or trade unions at the local level.   
By ‘making hay while the sun shines’,  EWCs can not only play a valuable role in 
coordinating national or local-level activities regarding company-wide policies or 
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measures, but they can also develop a culture of cooperation and trust as a 
preventative solution to the potentially divisive effects of competition between sites.  
As for EWC members themselves, the results of this research make clear that in the 
absence of clear rules and established rights, EWCs and their coordinators will 
continue to have to find the creativity and courage to solve the dilemmas which they 
face. One way forward is to use all the instruments they have at their disposal to 
develop an EWC which is as participative as possible.  This does not mean that 
everything needs to be regulated in precisely the same way in all sites. But the EWC 
must develop ways to identify how much differentiation is possible, and how much 
coordination is necessary, to maintain an even playing field. They need to ensure that 
the work of the EWC is intimately linked to their activities as employee representatives 
and trade union activists at the local and national level. EWCs and their coordinators 
need to be aware of what make solidarity possible. A responsible approach to the 
existing power asymmetries is important, as is an acute sensitivity to the difficulties 
posed by language and cultural barriers. In playing with open cards, EWC members 
may have to take a leap of faith.  The key is not to suppress differences, but to make 
them the very foundation of their cooperation by embedding them into a shared 
perception of the whole.  
Above all, this research has made one thing clear: where there’s a will, there’s a way.  
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Appendix: List of Interviews 
Interviewed on  Site Name   
Factories 
 Hass, Ute 19.IV.01   Berlin 
 Krause, Kurt 6.IV.01    
 Richter, Udo 26.III.01   Bremen 
 Werner, Uwe 26.III.01    
 Mühlenhart, Heinz 23.X.00   Düsseldorf 
 Weilbier, Thomas 23.X.00    
 Brecht, Michael 20.IX.00   Gaggenau 
 Schwab, Stefan 21.X.00    
 Dammann, Günther 26.X.00   Hamburg 
 Dehmel, Norbert 26.X.00    
 Gerhold, Werner 22.VI.01   Kassel 
 Heimrich, Robert 22.VI.01    
 Bürkmann, Emil 14.VIII.01   Mannheim 
 Horner, Joachim 13.X.00    
 Fischer, Karlheinz 21.X.00   Rastatt 
 Haas, Rüdiger 29.III.01    
 Bleibtreu, Emil 14.X.02   Sindelfingen 
 Klemm, Erich 19.IX.00    
 Lense, Helmut 23.IX.00   Untertürkheim 
 Nieke, Wolfgang 27.III.01    
 Keller, Michael 22.IX.00   Wörth 
 Rheude, Gerd 22.IX.00    
 Dörle, Bruno 28.III.01   Zentrale 
  Roos, Richard 28.III.01   
Sales and Service Commission (S&S) 
 Langer, Jürgen 16.II.01   S&S-Mitte 
 Reinhard, Wolfgang 20.VIII.02   S&S-Süd 
 Willmann, Franz 12.VII.01   S&S-Südwest 
 Görgemanns, Alfons 24.X.00   S&S-West 
Research and Development sites 
 Lederer, Elisabeth 30.III.01    
Guests in the Central Works Council 
 Krüger, Gudrun 13.VII.01   Ludwigsfelde 
 Hommel, Martin 12.IX.99   Secretariat 
 Wurl, Bernhard 28.V.00   IGM 
 Lehmann, Kurt 30.III.01   EvoBus 
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